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The Public Oversight Board and Other Interested Parties

From: Shaun F. O'Malley
Chair, Panel on Audit Effectiveness
Subject: Report and Recommendations – Exposure Draft

Over a year and a half ago, at the request of the chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the Public Oversight Board (POB) appointed a Panel of eight members,
charging it to thoroughly examine the current audit model. The Panel and its staff completed a
comprehensive review and evaluation of the way independent audits are performed and assessed
the effects of recent trends in auditing on the public interest.
I would like to emphasize that, while many specific recommendations are made for
improvements in the conduct of audits and the governance of the profession, our report
demonstrates that both the profession and the quality of its audits are fundamentally sound.
The Panel believes the recommendations in this report will result in more effective audits that
improve the reliability of financial statements, enhance their credibility, contribute to investors’
confidence in the profession, and improve the efficiency of the capital markets. Implementation
will require the efforts, support and cooperation of the profession, various standard-setting and
oversight bodies, and the SEC. The very existence of the Panel has helped to stimulate desirable
changes, and the Panel is gratified to note that various bodies and firms have already adopted, or
are currently in the process of adopting, some of its recommendations.
The Panel’s recommendations are addressed to many constituencies: standards-setters, firms, the
SEC Practice Section (SECPS), audit committees, the SEC and others.
Among the Panel’s major recommendations are:
•

Auditors should perform some “forensic-type” procedures on every audit to enhance the
prospects of detecting material financial statement fraud.

•

The Auditing Standards Board should make auditing and quality control standards more
specific and definitive; in certain specified areas, audit firms should review, and where
appropriate, enhance their audit methodologies, guidance, and training materials; and peer
reviewers should “close the loop” by reviewing those materials and their implementation on
audit engagements and then report their findings.
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•

Audit firms should put more emphasis on the performance of high quality audits in
communications from top management, performance evaluations, training, and compensation
and promotion decisions.

•

The POB, the AICPA, the SECPS, and the SEC should agree on a unified system of
governance under a strengthened, independent POB that oversees standards setting (for
auditing, independence, and quality control), monitoring, discipline, and special reviews.

•

A majority of the members of the Independence Standards Board (ISB) should be from
outside the profession, and the SEC should encourage and support the ISB to carry out its
mission.

•

The SECPS should strengthen the peer review process, including requiring annual reviews of
the largest firms, and the POB should increase its oversight of those reviews.

•

The SECPS should strengthen its disciplinary process.

•

Audit committees should pre-approve non-audit services that exceed a threshold amount, and
should consider certain specified factors when doing so. The ISB should identify the factors.

•

The International Federation of Accountants should establish an international self-regulatory
system for the auditing profession.

The Panel believes that its recommendations are supported by its findings and are necessary to
enhance audit effectiveness. The results of the Panel’s review of specific audits were generally
good, and the Panel is satisfied that the audit risk model is appropriate, although it needs to be
updated and implemented more consistently.
The Panel members were unable to agree whether to support or reject an exclusionary rule that
would prohibit an audit firm from providing non-audit and non-tax services, except in very
limited circumstances, to its public audit clients. Chapter 5 contains statements of the opposing
views. The SEC’s announced rule-making initiatives should provide an opportunity for public
discussion and resolution of this issue.
All who have had the privilege to be involved in this important effort are grateful to the POB for
the opportunity to serve and for its support and encouragement throughout the process. The
Panel thanks everyone who provided information and support in its endeavor. We look forward
with confidence to an increasingly important future role for the profession both in the United
States and throughout the world.
Finally, the Panel calls attention to the accompanying Notice of Public Hearings and Request for
Written Comments and encourages participation and written submissions.
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Notice of Public Hearings and Request for Written Comments

Hearings: July 10 and 11, 2000
9:30 AM – 5:00 PM
TIAA-CREF Building
18th Floor, Room 4
730 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017
Deadline for Notice of Intent to Speak: June 28, 2000
Basis for hearings: The Panel on Audit Effectiveness will hold public hearings to obtain the
views of interested individuals and organizations about the recommendations of the Panel in this
Exposure Draft. Panel members will conduct the hearings. An individual or organization desiring
to speak must notify the Panel in writing or by telephone by June 28, 2000. Speakers will be
notified of the designated time for their presentations by June 30, 2000.
Oral presentation materials: Although not a requirement, the Panel requests that speakers
submit a position paper, presentation outline, or comment letter addressing the recommendations
in the Exposure Draft by July 7, 2000. All submissions should be addressed to David B. Pearson,
director of the Panel staff, at the address listed below.
Format of the hearings: Speakers will be allotted up to 15 minutes for their presentations to be
followed by a period for answering questions from members of the Panel. Speakers should use
their allotted time to provide information in addition to that in any written comments they have
submitted.
Observers: Observers are welcome at the public hearings, but may not participate in the
discussions. Observers are encouraged to submit written comments.

Deadline for Receipt of Written Comments: July 21, 2000
Written comments: Participation at the public hearings is not a prerequisite to submitting
comments on this project. Written comments are given the same consideration as public hearing
testimony. Comments or suggestions on any aspect of this Exposure Draft will be appreciated.
To facilitate the Panel’s consideration of responses, comments should refer to specific
paragraphs and include supporting reasons for the comments or suggestions.
Any individual or organization may send written comments to David B. Pearson, director of the
Panel staff, at the address listed below by July 21, 2000.
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Public files: A transcript of the public hearings and copies of written submissions on this
Exposure Draft will be available for inspection at the offices of the Public Oversight Board on or
about July 28, 2000.
Availability of Exposure Draft: This Exposure Draft is available on the web site of the Panel at
www.pobauditpanel.org. Individuals or organizations may request one printed copy until July
21, 2000 by writing to the Panel at the address listed below.
Additional information: For further details about the public hearings or about submitting
written comments, please contact the staff of the Panel.

Panel on Audit Effectiveness
c/o The Public Oversight Board
One Station Place
Stamford, CT 06902
(203) 353-5370
Fax (203) 353-5311
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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness was charged with the responsibility to review and evaluate
how independent audits of the financial statements of public companies are performed and assess
whether recent trends in audit practices are in the public interest. This report is the culmination
of a lengthy and complex investigation in furtherance of that responsibility. The scope of the
project was wide ranging and the activities undertaken to carry it out were substantial. This
Executive Overview summarizes the genesis of the project and its scope, the way it was
approached to develop findings, and the Panel’s recommendations based on those findings. It
also sets forth a final observation of the Panel on the importance of the individual professional
auditor who is the ultimate backstop in furthering audit quality.

GENESIS AND SCOPE OF THE PROJECT
The Public Oversight Board (POB) is an independent, private sector body that monitors and
reports on the self-regulatory programs and activities of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The
POB appointed the Panel in October 1998 at the request of Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Over the last few years the SEC has become increasingly concerned about the efficacy of the
audit process and a wide range of issues involving the public accounting profession – the
profession of independent auditors that audit the financial statements of public companies. It has
expressed those concerns in public and private forums, and, in turn, those concerns have been
widely publicized in the press. Also, several major instances of misstated earnings have resulted
in massive declines in the market capitalization of the affected companies; some SEC registrants
have appeared to be overreaching in terms of permissible accounting treatments; and the
environment in which the auditing profession functions has been changing dramatically.
The high market valuations of equity securities have created pressures on corporate management
to achieve earnings or other performance targets, especially in response to the expectations of
securities analysts. Missing those targets can result in significant declines in market
capitalization, and consequently, reduced compensation for those managers whose incomes are
dependent in large part on achieving earnings or stock-price targets. The unforgiving nature of
the equity markets when companies fail to achieve projected earnings or other targets has created
unprecedented pressures on corporate management to “make the numbers.” In succumbing to
those pressures, management’s behavior can become suspect, leading to accusations falling
under the broad rubric of “earnings management.” And, as this report discusses in some detail,
earnings management can sometimes lead to or constitute fraud.
When auditors express their opinion on the fair presentation in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles of a public company’s financial statements, they do not guarantee
that the financial statements are not misstated. Rather, auditors provide only reasonable
assurance that they are free of material misstatement. Nevertheless, when previously issued
xi

audited financial statements turn out to be unreliable and must be restated in corrected form, the
logical question is “where were the auditors?” Implicitly, the question not only asks about the
efficacy of the audit process, it also raises doubts about the value of audits in assuring the
reliability of financial statements that are a key element in the efficient functioning of the capital
markets. A fundamental assumption underlying the Panel’s project is its belief in the value of an
audit and the public’s need for effective audits.
The constantly changing environment in which audits are conducted presents challenges to audit
firms and consequently to the quality of audits. Rapid technological advances in both the
operating and financial systems of companies, for example, have forced audit firms to recruit,
train and deploy large numbers of information technology specialists to support their audit
efforts. They also have caused firms to reconsider their audit methods and techniques in an effort
to harness technology to improve audit efficiency and effectiveness. The SEC and others have
questioned, however, whether the increased efficiency may have been accompanied by reduced,
not enhanced, effectiveness. In addition, the large audit firms’ consulting practices have grown
significantly in recent years, at least in part as a result of the technology explosion. This growth
has led to concerns about the relative importance of the audit practice to the firms, and about
auditor independence when non-audit services are performed for audit clients.
The Panel was created in response to all of these concerns. The SEC requested the POB to
sponsor a thorough and objective examination of auditing to explore the efficacy of the audit
process. Examining the efficacy of the audit process is insufficient in assessing audit
effectiveness. Understanding the environment in which the audit firms operate and the factors
that drive their business is equally important. For those reasons, the Panel investigated not only
how audits are conducted, but also it studied several aspects of audit firms’ operational
management and the questions of whether non-audit services provided to audit clients pose a
threat to auditor independence and whether the system of governance of the auditing profession
is adequate or in need of change.

APPROACH TO THE PROJECT
The Panel’s investigation encompassed a wide range of activities. Its principal effort was its
Quasi Peer Review – in-depth reviews of the quality of a significant number of audits of
financial statements of public company clients of the eight largest audit firms, as well as focus
groups and other activities related to those reviews. Panel members attended most of those
reviews, and the Panel staff planned and directed all of them. The Quasi Peer Review is a major
source of the Panel’s findings and recommendations for improving the conduct of audits.
The Panel also undertook many other activities. It held meetings with representatives of the SEC
and various private-sector bodies involved in the governance of the profession, such as the
AICPA; the SECPS Executive, Peer Review and Quality Control Inquiry committees; the
Auditing Standards Board; the Independence Standards Board; and the POB. It also conducted
focus groups with financial executives and internal auditors from public companies, and partners
from smaller accounting firms. In addition, the Panel conducted research, with the assistance of
the SEC staff, into the circumstances that led to recent SEC Accounting and Auditing
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Enforcement Releases involving the five largest firms or their clients; studied the profession’s
current governance structure and analyzed alternatives to that structure; analyzed the academic,
professional and regulatory literature on the effects of non-audit services on auditor
independence; and studied recent international initiatives to strengthen audit effectiveness on a
global basis.
The findings resulting from all of these activities are included throughout this report.
Finally, the Panel considered the benefits and costs of its recommendations. The Panel believes
that the benefits to the public and the participants in the financial reporting process from
implementing its recommendations and thereby enhancing audit effectiveness and reducing the
cost of capital will exceed the additional costs. The net benefit may be substantial if the
recommendations reduce the incidence of undetected material fraudulent financial reporting,
indirectly serve as a deterrent to such frauds, and improve the overall quality of financial
reporting.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Because they are premised upon the many findings discussed and analyzed throughout this
report, the Panel’s recommendations are numerous. However, the Panel’s principal
recommendations in the following areas are summarized in this Executive Overview:

• Conduct of audits, including the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud
(including earnings management when it constitutes fraud)

• Leadership and practices of the audit firms
• Effects on auditor independence of non-audit services provided to audit clients
• Governance of the auditing profession
• Strengthening the auditing profession internationally
Conduct of Audits
Overall, findings from the in-depth reviews of audits were favorable, and did not support the
view that audits are being conducted in an ineffective manner. The Panel is satisfied that the
model underpinning financial-statement audits generally is appropriate, although in need of
updating and enhancing. Furthermore, the Panel accepts the premise that reasonable, not
absolute, assurance that financial statements are not materially misstated is a sufficiently high
standard of responsibility for auditors to protect the public interest. The Panel’s perspective,
however, is that, even in the face of strengthened auditing standards in recent years, the audit
firms may have reduced the scope of their audits and level of testing, at least in part, as a result
of redesigning their audit methodologies. The Panel is concerned that the auditing profession has
not kept pace with a rapidly changing environment, and that the profession needs to address
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vigorously the issue of fraudulent financial reporting, including fraud in the form of illegitimate
earnings management.
The Panel’s principal recommendation in this area is that auditing standards should create a
“forensic-type” fieldwork phase on all audits. This work would be based on the possibility of
dishonesty and collusion, overriding of controls, and falsification of documents. Auditors would
be required to perform substantive tests directed at the possibility of fraud during this phase, in
some cases on a surprise basis. The recommendation also calls for auditors to analyze certain
opening financial statement balances to assess, with the benefit of hindsight, how certain
accounting estimates and judgments or other matters were resolved. The intent of this
recommendation is twofold: to enhance the likelihood that auditors will be able to detect material
fraud and to establish implicitly a deterrent to fraud by posing a greater threat to its successful
concealment.
The Panel’s recommendations for improving the conduct of audits reflect three major themes:

• Definitive auditing standards form the starting point for promoting quality audits
• Audit firms need comprehensive and vigorous audit methodologies, based on the
standards, to drive the behavior of their auditors to a higher plane

• The peer review process is a critical element in “closing the loop” to provide
assurance to the public that audit performance measures up to high standards and
continues to improve
Consequently, virtually all of the recommendations are addressed to the three major
constituencies that are capable of significantly improving the conduct of audits. They are the
Auditing Standards Board, the firms that audit the financial statements of public entities, and the
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA. The Panel also has made certain recommendations to other
constituencies.
The individual recommendations fall in a number of areas, including assessing inherent and
control risks, analytical procedures, auditing revenue, auditing estimates and judgments,
considering materiality and waived adjustments, and communicating with audit committees. In a
number of instances they call for a deeper understanding by auditors of business processes and
risks, including the client’s use of information technology. The recommendations also call for
increased information technology skills and for more effective participation in audits by
information technology specialists.
The Panel believes that each of its recommendations is individually important, but also that they
need to be viewed in their totality. Recommendations addressed to only one constituency are less
likely to lead to major changes in how audits are conducted; action by all constituencies is
necessary to assure the public that the recommendations achieve their objectives.

xiv

Leadership and Practices of the Audit Firms
The Panel’s recommendations to the audit firms fall into four areas: professional leadership,
professional development, personnel management, and time pressures on auditors. Certain
recommendations also are made to assist smaller firms.
Its first set of recommendations concerns professional leadership and “the tone at the top.” The
Panel calls on the audit firms to reaffirm, within their organizations and to the outside world, the
importance of their audit practices and to stimulate their auditors to proudly hold high the banner
of objectivity, independence, professional skepticism, and accountability to the public by
performing quality audit work. These messages should be conveyed by all of the firms’ top
leaders, consistently and continuously.
Similarly, the Panel calls on the AICPA to promote actively the importance of audits in its public
persona.
The Panel recommends that audit firms assure that performing high quality audits is
appropriately recognized as the highest priority in their professional development activities,
performance evaluations, and promotion, retention, and compensation decisions. The Panel also
calls on the firms to place more emphasis on managing time pressures that might compromise
audit quality.
Lastly, the Panel recommends that the AICPA provide greater audit-related technical and
industry support to smaller firms, and assist them in their practices by providing practical tools
for their client acceptance and retention decisions.
Auditor Independence – Non-audit Services
This report highlights the importance and wide-ranging perspectives about the issue of non-audit
services provided to public audit clients in two statements of views discussing the subject.
Members of the Panel were of two minds on this issue: one view supports (with limited
exceptions) an exclusionary ban on those services; the other opposes such a ban. The Panel did
not fully support either view. However, it foresees considerable public debate as the SEC pursues
its planned rule-making initiatives to address the subject.
Beyond this debate, the Panel recommends that, whatever the outcome of the SEC’s planned
rule-making initiatives, the ISB develop guidance to help auditors, audit committees and
management comply (a) with recent ISB requirements for auditors to disclose independence
matters to audit committees and (b) with new disclosure rules for audit committees of public
companies set by the SEC. That guidance should include factors to consider in determining
whether specific non-audit services are appropriate, and the Panel has identified and suggested
several such factors. One guiding principle for determining the appropriateness of particular
services is whether the services facilitate the performance of the audit, improve the client’s
financial reporting process, or are otherwise in the public interest.
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The Panel also recommends that audit committees immediately begin considering the factors
suggested by the Panel when evaluating non-audit services, and that they pre-approve significant
non-audit services exceeding threshold levels that they establish.
In addition, the Panel recommends that the SEC and the ISB evaluate, on a continuing basis, the
effectiveness of the disclosures made by public companies under the SEC’s new rules, and the
disclosures made by auditors to audit committees under the ISB’s requirements. This
recommendation also applies to any new requirements or rules issued by the ISB or by the SEC
pursuant to its rule-making initiatives.
Governance of the Auditing Profession
The Panel proposes significant changes to the profession’s self-governance system. The Panel
believes the profession’s system of governance should be unified under a strengthened,
independent POB that oversees the profession’s activities with respect to standards-setting (other
than accounting standards), monitoring, discipline, and special reviews.
The Panel recommends the POB work with the AICPA, the SECPS, and the SEC in creating a
formal charter that will strengthen the POB’s oversight of the auditing profession and ensure the
POB’s independence and viability. It should obtain agreement for this charter from the preceding
groups as well as the major firms. Important new elements of the charter should include: (1)
oversight of the Auditing Standards Board and the Independence Standards Board, (2) a
nominating committee for new POB members, and (3) term limits for POB members.
As a result of this recommendation, the POB would oversee the Auditing Standards Board, the
Independence Standards Board, and the SECPS Executive Committee (including its main
committees, the SECPS Peer Review Committee and the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry
Committee). This expansion of authority should enable the POB to serve as the body to whom
the SEC, the auditing profession, and the public can look for leadership.
The Panel recommends the SECPS strengthen the peer review process by providing for more
frequent reviews of the largest firms, increased POB oversight of the reviews, and increased
emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the reviews. Similarly, the Panel makes recommendations
to enhance the profession’s disciplinary process. The Panel envisions a more coordinated and
substantive approach for providing feedback and guidance to the profession as a result of the
enhanced peer review and disciplinary processes, as well as from special reviews undertaken by
the POB.
The Panel recommends the Independence Standards Board reconstitute its membership to
include four members representing the public and three representing the auditing profession
(currently the membership is four and four). The Panel believes that adoption of this
recommendation should provide a more appropriate balance between the interests of the public
and the profession.
The Panel recommends the SEC respect the POB’s authority, as specified by its new charter, to
carry out the profession’s self-regulatory activities. In this connection, the Panel also
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recommends that the SEC encourage and support the Independence Standards Board in carrying
out its independence mission.
International
The Panel also focused on the audit firms and the international organizations that play key roles
in the international setting. Accordingly, it reviewed recent international developments in
accounting and auditing standards, regulation, and the governance of the profession. It makes no
claim of having made a comprehensive analysis of audit effectiveness on a global basis. The
Panel is aware, however, of current efforts to strengthen self-regulation of the auditing
profession globally. Because it devoted considerable attention to the governance of the auditing
profession in the United States, the Panel concluded that it was advisable to make similar
recommendations to the International Federation of Accountants relating to the global selfregulatory structure of the auditing profession and to audit firms that operate internationally.
The Panel’s principal recommendation to the International Federation of Accountants is that the
self-regulatory structure of the international auditing profession meet certain important criteria.
The main elements of such a structure would include public interest oversight, including
oversight over standards-setting in auditing, quality control, and ethics and independence;
monitoring; investigations; discipline; and public reporting.
The Panel also recommends that audit firms implement uniform audit methodologies worldwide
following international auditing standards as the base minimum and subject all audit practice
units to periodic inspection procedures. It believes that the leadership and support of the large
international audit firms is critical to the success of a number of international initiatives now
underway and to the effectiveness of a global self-regulatory structure.

THE PROFESSIONAL AUDITOR
This report contains many recommendations to enhance audit effectiveness that are addressed to
a variety of constituencies. The Panel recognizes that, in the final analysis, the most important
determinants of audit effectiveness are the personal attributes and skills of the individual auditor.
The personal attributes of individuals provide structure and definition for their role in society and
establish the foundation for what constitutes a true professional. For the individual auditor, these
attributes are independence in fact and in appearance, adherence to an ethical foundation, a high
sense of personal integrity and the will to act objectively even in the face of intense pressures.
Most importantly, individual auditors, as members of a respected profession, should assign their
highest priority to protecting the public interest.
A priority for the public interest and personal professional attributes are not concepts that are in
conflict with a sense of service to clients – public companies, their shareholders and the investing
public. The clients of audit firms require the skills and competencies offered by the auditing
professionals in those firms – indeed, clients value those skills and competencies. Auditors need
not apologize for feeling pride and satisfaction in providing audit services to clients. At the same
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time, auditors must possess the discipline, fortitude and ability to stand up to management or to
an audit committee or board of directors. They need to be able to say, “No, that’s not right!”
Critical to such discipline is firm management giving clear and consistent messages that they not
only expect auditors to do the right thing, but also that they will support them, fully and
unequivocally, when “no” is the right answer – even when that risks losing a client.
Each and every auditing professional contributes to the task of performing an audit. No amount
of guidance, admonitions to do good work, the right “tone at the top,” or the threat of sanctions
will produce a high quality audit, unless every individual auditor embraces a high sense of
personal responsibility and diligence. The Panel calls on all individual professional auditors to
heed this message: only quality audits serve the public interest, and the public is your most
important client.

______________
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1
At the request of Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Public Oversight Board (POB) appointed the Panel on Audit Effectiveness in October
1998 to assess whether independent audits of the financial statements of public companies
adequately serve and protect the interests of investors. The Panel reviewed and evaluated the
way that audits are performed and assessed recent trends in audit practices to determine whether
they are in the public interest. It studied the audit policies, methodologies and other forms of
guidance used primarily by the large audit firms, certain aspects of auditor independence, and the
auditing profession’s self-regulatory structure. The Panel also focused on international
developments affecting the auditing profession.
1.2
This chapter provides an introduction to independent audits of financial statements, the
environment in which the auditing profession functions, and the Panel's approach to the project.
It also describes how this report is organized according to the chapters that contain the Panel’s
findings and recommendations. Finally, it discusses the Panel’s consideration of the benefits and
costs of its recommendations.

INDEPENDENT AUDITS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The Value of Audits
1.3
Public companies are required to file financial statements with the SEC that have been
audited in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) promulgated by the
Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA). Those standards require the auditor to obtain sufficient evidence to express an opinion
on whether the entity’s financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The financial statements are
the responsibility of the company’s management; the auditor is responsible for expressing an
opinion on those statements.
1.4
Financial statement audits are performed by certified public accountants in the private
sector who must be independent of the entities whose financial statements they audit. Whether
audits should be performed in the private sector or by government auditors was debated during
the Senate hearings that preceded the Securities Act of 1933, and the resulting decision has not
been challenged seriously in the intervening seven decades.
1.5
Audits improve the reliability of financial statements, make them more credible, and
increase shareholders’ confidence in them. Auditors constitute the principal external check on
the integrity of the financial statements. As former SEC Commissioner Steven M. H. Wallman
has noted, “Without accountants to ensure the quality and integrity of financial information, the
markets for capital would be far less efficient, the cost of capital would be far higher, and our
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standard of living would be lower.”1 Accordingly, a fundamental assumption underlying the
Panel’s study and recommendations is its belief that, for many reasons, the value of audits and
the public’s need for effective audits remain undiminished, and in fact may be greater than ever.
Efficacy of the Audit Process
1.6
Over the last few years several major instances of misstated earnings resulted in
headlines reporting massive declines in market capitalization. If share prices decline when
companies’ results fail to meet expectations, they decline even more precipitously when the
market learns that previously issued audited financial statements are unreliable. This frequently
leads to restatements of those financial statements, suggesting that the financial reporting system
may not, in fact, promote the most efficient allocation of capital. Restatements also raise the
question “Where were the auditors?,” indicating that perhaps there is something wrong with the
very concept of audits performed by private-sector auditors who are largely self-regulated.
1.7
At the same time, the SEC and others have expressed concerns about registrants’
overreaching in terms of permissible accounting treatments as well as alleged accounting abuses
involving such matters as accounting for business combinations, revenue recognition, and
restructurings, along with alleged misuse of the materiality concept. This overreaching often is
characterized as “earnings management.”
1.8
As a consequence, the SEC requested the POB to sponsor a thorough and objective
examination of auditing, from top to bottom, in order to explore the efficacy of the audit process.
In large part, the Panel was created in response to those concerns.

THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE AUDITING PROFESSION
1.9
The past decade has been one of unprecedented change in the global economy and capital
markets. Key aspects of the current business environment include a globalized, highly
competitive, expanding economy; explosive growth in the development and use of technology;
unparalleled expansion in the number of public entities; large increases in the number of
individuals who directly or indirectly own equity securities; and unprecedented growth in the
market value of those securities.
1.10 The growth in equity values over the past decade has introduced extreme pressures on
management to achieve earnings, revenue or other targets. These pressures are exacerbated by
the unforgiving nature of the equity markets as securities valuations are drastically adjusted
downward whenever companies fail to meet “street” expectations. Pressures are further
magnified because management’s compensation often is based in large part on achieving
earnings or other financial goals or stock price increases. These pressures on management, in
turn, translate into pressures on how auditors conduct audits and in their relationship with audit
clients.
1

S. M. H. Wallman, “The Future of Accounting and Disclosure in an Evolving World: The Need for Dramatic
Change,” Accounting Horizons (September 1995).
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1.11 The expanded use of technology in both the operating and financial systems of
corporations also has significantly affected the audit environment, forcing the audit firms to
recruit, train and deploy a large number of information technology specialists to support their
audit efforts. It also has caused the firms to reconsider their audit methods and techniques in an
effort to harness technology to improve audit efficiency and effectiveness. Some have
questioned, however, whether the increased efficiency may have come at the cost of reduced, not
enhanced, effectiveness.
1.12 The technology explosion also has contributed significantly to the enormous growth in
the large audit firms’ consulting practices, to the point where revenue from their audit practices
has declined from some 70% or more of total firm revenue 25 years ago to about half that today.
This shift has led to concerns about the relative importance of the audit practice to the firms and
about auditor independence when significant non-audit services are performed for audit clients.
These concerns come at a time when the importance of public confidence in auditing has never
been greater.
1.13 Thus, examining the efficacy of the audit process alone is not the answer to assessing
audit effectiveness. Understanding the environment in which the audit firms operate and the
factors that drive their business is an important feature of the Panel’s efforts. Accordingly, the
Panel studied not only how audits are conducted but also the questions of whether non-audit
services provided to audit clients pose a threat to auditor independence and whether the system
of governance of the auditing profession is adequate or in need of change.

THE PANEL’S APPROACH TO THE PROJECT
1.14 The Panel’s investigation encompassed a wide range of activities. Its principal effort was
its Quasi Peer Reviews (QPRs) – in-depth reviews of the quality of 126 audits of SEC registrants
in 28 offices of the eight largest audit firms.2 In addition to the engagement reviews, meetings
with two focus groups were held in most of the 28 offices – one with seniors and the other with
audit managers, most of whom work on audits of public companies. The QPR process also
included in-depth interviews with the partner in charge of the office’s audit practice. Panel
members attended most of the QPRs, and the Panel staff planned and directed all of them. The
QPRs are a major source of the Panel’s findings and recommendations for improving the conduct
of audits.
1.15

The Panel’s other activities included:

• Meetings early in the project with the accounting and auditing leaders of each of the
eight largest firms to gain an understanding of their audit methodologies, their views
on the environment in which audits are performed, and their views of the key issues
requiring attention
2

The eight largest firms are: Arthur Andersen LLP; BDO Seidman, LLP; Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young
LLP; Grant Thornton LLP; KPMG LLP; McGladrey & Pullen, LLP; and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (see
Appendix B).
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• Eleven focus group meetings – one with chief financial officers and controllers, one
with internal auditors, one with individuals who perform peer reviews of smaller
firms, and eight with representatives of the eight largest firms (each firm was
represented in each focus group)

• A survey, distributed to over 500 selected individuals and organizations representing
a wide range of constituencies, titled, “Request for Opinions on Issues of Audit
Effectiveness Addressed to Thought Leaders and Key Stakeholders”

• Two days of public hearings before the Panel’s findings and recommendations were
formulated at which individuals from 21 organizations testified, including the SEC,
auditors, financial statement preparers, analysts, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys,
standards-setters and educators

• Reviews of the eight largest firms’ audit methodologies, policies and procedures
manuals and other guidance materials, information about their risk management and
professional development activities, audit-related marketing publications, and policies
and procedures for recruiting, evaluating, compensating, and promoting audit
personnel

• Meetings with representatives of the SEC and various private-sector bodies involved
in the governance of the profession, such as the AICPA, the ASB, the SEC Practice
Section (SECPS) Executive Committee, the SECPS Peer Review Committee, the
SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee, the POB, and the Independence
Standards Board (ISB)

• Research, with the assistance of the SEC staff, into the causes and circumstances that
led to recent SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases involving the five
largest firms or their clients

• Analysis of the academic, professional, and regulatory literature on the effects of nonaudit services on auditor independence

• Studies of the profession’s current governance structure and analysis of alternatives
• Collection of information on recent international initiatives to strengthen audit
effectiveness on a global basis
These activities are discussed in greater detail in the other chapters of this report.
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CHAPTERS CONTAINING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1.16 This section describes how this report is organized according to the chapters that contain
the Panel’s findings and recommendations.
Improving the Conduct of Audits
1.17 Chapter 2, “Improving the Conduct of Audits,” discusses the profession’s standards that
provide guidance on how audits of financial statements should be conducted, the Panel’s findings
on how those audits actually are conducted, and the Panel’s recommendations for improving the
conduct of audits. Because of the importance of earnings management and fraud, a separate
chapter is devoted to those subjects.
1.18 The chapter includes an overview of the conceptual foundation for audits of financial
statements, referred to as the “audit risk model,” and the profession’s standards underpinning
audits of financial statements, referred to as “generally accepted auditing standards” (GAAS).
These are important concepts for readers of this report for they provide the context for the
qualitative assessments made in the QPR undertaking. The QPR itself tracked the audit risk
model created by the ASB to drive the auditor’s decision-making process, and it focused on
certain important audit areas, including assessing inherent and control risks (including the
clients’ use of technology), analytical procedures, auditing revenue, auditing estimates and
judgments, considering materiality and waived adjustments, and detecting fraud.
1.19 Each of the audit areas is addressed individually. The findings from the QPR and the
Panel’s analysis of them, together with information gathered from its other activities, form the
basis for its recommendations. In large part, those recommendations are derived from three
major themes:

• Definitive auditing standards form the starting point for promoting quality audits
• Audit firms need comprehensive and vigorous audit methodologies, based on the
standards, to drive the behavior of their auditors to a higher plane

• The peer review process is a critical element in “closing the loop” to provide
assurance to the public that audit performance measures up to high standards and
continues to improve
1.20 There are three major constituencies to whom the recommendations for improving the
conduct of audits are made, namely the ASB, the firms that audit the financial statements of
public entities, and the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA. (In certain areas, recommendations
also have been made to the SEC, the AICPA, the POB, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, and audit committees.)
1.21 The Panel also discusses its conclusions about the appropriateness of the audit risk model
and provides recommendations to the ASB on establishing auditing standards.
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Earnings Management and Fraud
1.22 Chapter 3, “Earnings Management and Fraud,” focuses on
with respect to earnings management and fraud. It discusses the
define fraud and that provide guidance to the auditor on detecting
concepts of earnings management and the quality of earnings, and
may lead to or constitute fraud.

the auditor’s responsibility
profession’s standards that
fraud. It also explores the
how earnings management

1.23 The QPR findings in the areas of fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of
assets are provided, and the Panel’s broader consideration of fraud is described. Importantly, the
Panel discusses certain perspectives about auditors’ responsibilities that it took into consideration
in framing its recommendations. The recommendations are addressed to the ASB, the audit
firms, the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA (more specifically to the SECPS Peer Review and
Quality Control Inquiry committees), and audit committees.
Audit Firms
1.24 Chapter 4, “Audit Firms,” addresses the Panel’s study of the overall professional
leadership in the audit firms (the “tone at the top”), their hiring and employee retention policies,
the professional development of auditors, the assignment of personnel to audits, the performance
measures the firms use to evaluate audit personnel, time pressures on auditors, and other issues.
The Panel focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the eight largest firms.
1.25 The Panel’s findings and recommendations to the audit firms fall into four areas:
professional leadership – tone at the top; professional development; personnel management; and
time pressures on auditors. The Panel also makes certain recommendations to the AICPA
designed specifically to benefit smaller firms.
Auditor Independence
1.26 Chapter 5, “Auditor Independence,” discusses the historical background and evolution of
non-audit services by audit firms, and the potential for conflict when an auditor provides such
services to a public audit client. It addresses the process for assessing the effects of non-audit
services on audits, including the findings from the QPR. The Panel’s wide-ranging perspectives
about the issue of non-audit services also are discussed, and statements of views supporting and
opposing an exclusionary ban on non-audit services to public audit clients are provided. Finally,
the subject of former firm personnel in client management is discussed and the Panel’s findings
disclosed.
1.27 The Panel makes recommendations to the SEC, the ISB and audit committees with
respect to providing non-audit services to public audit clients.
Governance of the Auditing Profession
1.28 Chapter 6, “Governance of the Auditing Profession,” describes the auditing profession’s
current governance system, the limitations of that system, and the Panel’s recommendations for
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strengthening it. It also briefly discusses the current relationship between the profession and the
SEC.
1.29 The Panel concludes its study of the governance system by proposing changes. The
recommendations are addressed to a number of constituencies, including most importantly, the
POB that appointed the Panel. Other constituencies to whom recommendations are addressed are
the AICPA, the ISB, the SEC Practice Section, and the SEC.
International
1.30 Chapter 7, “International,” describes how the Panel’s project sought information on
issues of audit significance from a global perspective. However, the Panel did not make a
comprehensive review of audit effectiveness on a global basis.
1.31 The chapter focuses on the audit firms and the international organizations that play key
roles in the international setting. The goal of transparency is discussed. Recent developments in
international accounting standards, auditing, regulation, and the governance of the profession are
described. The Panel makes recommendations to the International Federation of Accountants
relating to the global self-regulatory structure of the international auditing profession and to audit
firms.
Looking Ahead
1.32 Chapter 8, “Looking Ahead,” contains the Panel’s vision about some issues that pose a
challenge to the auditing profession’s development in the years ahead and some final thoughts.

BENEFITS AND COSTS
1.33 The benefits of more effective audits include enhancing the credibility of and investors’
confidence in financial statements, thereby lowering entities’ cost of capital, reducing the costs
of investigating frauds and prosecuting their perpetrators, reducing the costs of both public and
private regulatory systems aimed at preventing frauds, and reducing the billions of dollars of
losses incurred by those who have invested in entities that have committed fraud. The Panel has
not tried to quantify the benefits of implementing its recommendations to increase audit
effectiveness, nor does it believe that such an analysis is feasible, given that many of those
benefits are in the nature of foregone costs that cannot be measured.
1.34 The Panel believes that its recommendations are necessary to improve audit
effectiveness; it recognizes that implementing those recommendations will increase audit costs
for most entities. The Panel expects that those to whom the recommendations are addressed will
attempt to analyze the added costs, when practicable. The Panel believes that the benefits to the
public and to other participants in the financial reporting process from implementing its
recommendations and thereby enhancing audit effectiveness will exceed the additional costs. The
net benefit may be substantial if the recommendations improve the quality of financial reporting,
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reduce the incidence of undetected material fraudulent financial reporting, and indirectly serve as
a deterrent to such frauds.
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CHAPTER 2 – IMPROVING THE CONDUCT OF AUDITS
2.1
This chapter discusses the profession’s standards that provide guidance on how audits of
financial statements should be conducted, the Panel’s findings on how those audits actually are
conducted, and the Panel’s recommendations for improving the conduct of audits. Because of
their importance, Chapter 3 is devoted in its entirety to the Panel’s analysis, findings, and
recommendations regarding earnings management and fraud.

OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY
2.2
This section provides an overview of the audit risk model, explains the Panel’s Quasi
Peer Review (QPR) approach to assessing the effectiveness of audits, summarizes the Panel’s
broad conclusions, and presents its framework for developing recommendations to improve the
quality of audits.
The Audit Risk Model
2.3
Starting in 1948, the membership of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) adopted ten statements referred to as “generally accepted auditing
standards” (GAAS). The Auditing Standards Board (ASB), a senior technical committee of the
AICPA, has been assigned the responsibility for amplifying and interpreting the ten GAAS
statements through pronouncements called Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The SASs
and the ten GAAS statements are frequently referred to collectively as generally accepted
auditing standards.
2.4
GAAS fall into three broad areas: general standards (dealing with the professional
qualities of auditors, including technical training and proficiency, independence and the exercise
of due professional care), standards of fieldwork (dealing with planning and supervision, internal
control and sufficiency and competency of audit evidence), and standards of reporting (dealing
with how GAAS are linked to “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP) and the
consistent application of GAAP, the adequacy of disclosures in financial statements and the
expression of opinions in audit reports).
2.5
The ASB has established a formal process for developing standards, including subjecting
them to public scrutiny prior to issuance. Rule 202 of the AICPA’s Code of Professional
Conduct requires AICPA members to adhere to GAAS. Adherence to GAAS also is required of
auditors by state accountancy laws and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Consequently, GAAS apply to all audits, not just to audits of financial statements of public
entities.
2.6
United States auditing standards, which reputedly are the most comprehensive and
demanding auditing standards in the world, generally call for auditors to achieve certain goals or
objectives in carrying out an audit. In some cases, the standards require auditors to perform
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specified tasks (e.g., assess risk). In other cases, they require auditors only to consider attendant
circumstances in deciding what to do. They typically allow wide latitude for auditors to exercise
judgment. This flexibility is understandable. The standards are designed for audits of financial
statements of large and small entities in all industries, and they are premised on auditors being
professionals who possess the necessary skills and knowledge to make the required judgments.
2.7
GAAS include an “audit risk model” for carrying out audits that requires auditors to use
their judgment in assessing risks, selecting an audit approach, and deciding what tests to
perform.1 The model allows auditors to take a variety of circumstances into account in selecting
the audit approach for a particular engagement. The model calls for auditors to have an
understanding of the entity’s business and industry, the systems employed to process
transactions, the quality of personnel involved in accounting functions, and the entity’s policies
and procedures related to the preparation of financial statements. The model requires auditors to
gain an understanding of an entity’s internal controls to assess the risk that those controls will
fail to prevent or detect material financial statement error and fraud, and to test the effectiveness
of those controls that the auditor intends to rely on in designing and performing substantive tests
of the entity’s accounts. For example, if internal control over sales and accounts receivable is
strong, the auditor might confirm a limited number of accounts receivable at an interim date and
rely on the controls and certain other tests for updating the accounts to year end. Conversely, if
controls are not strong, the auditor might confirm a larger number of accounts receivable, and do
so at year end.
2.8
Based on the auditor’s assessment of various risks, supported by appropriate tests of
controls, the auditor makes judgments about the kinds of evidence (from sources that are both
internal and external to the entity’s organization) needed to support the audit opinion. On the one
hand, GAAS set forth numerous requirements or matters that auditors should consider, such as
an explicit requirement to assess the risk of fraud; on the other hand, the need to exercise audit
judgment is embedded throughout GAAS.
The QPR Approach to Assessing Audit Effectiveness
2.9
The Quasi Peer Review undertaking was an important, but not the only, part of the
Panel’s assessment of audit effectiveness.2 The QPR reviewed the audits of 126 SEC registrants
in 28 offices of the eight largest audit firms. The engagements were selected on the basis of risk
profiles established by the Panel for the purposes of:

• Assessing the quality of the audit work performed in specific key areas
• Assessing whether the individuals who performed and reviewed the work had the
necessary knowledge, skills and experience

1

A complete discussion of the audit risk model is included in Appendix A. That discussion provides an overview of
the model, a technical briefing about it, and a historical perspective of how the model evolved in GAAS. Also in
Appendix A is a discussion about the audit methodologies used by accounting firms to guide their work and how
those methodologies have evolved over time.
2
The QPR approach is discussed more fully in Appendix E.
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• Assessing whether the work was performed appropriately and reviewed on a timely
basis

• Developing ideas for enhancing audit effectiveness
2.10 The objectives and scope of the QPRs differed from those of the peer reviews that a
member of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA must undergo triennially. The
objectives of an SECPS peer review are to evaluate whether the reviewed firm’s quality control
system for its accounting and auditing practice met the objectives of the AICPA’s quality control
standards, and whether the firm complied with the system and with the SECPS membership
requirements.3 The QPR’s objective, on the other hand, was to make qualitative assessments of
audit effectiveness on a sample of recent audit engagements. The QPR generally tracked key
elements of the audit risk model.
2.11 The scope of the QPRs also differed from that of SECPS peer reviews. For example, the
QPRs included more interviews with the engagement personnel; they were limited to certain
specific key areas of the audit; and no reports or letters of comments were issued. In the specific
areas reviewed, however, the reviews were more in-depth and subjective.
2.12 The QPR results are discussed in this and the following chapter under the following
headings:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Assessing engagement risk
Assessing inherent risk
Multi-location audits
Assessing control risk
Communicating and reporting on internal control
Linking the risk assessments to substantive tests
Analytical procedures
Auditing revenue
Auditing estimates and judgments
Materiality, waived adjustments, and analysts’ expectations
Going concern considerations
Use of internal auditors
Communicating with audit committees
Earnings management and fraud

2.13 For each engagement selected for review, the QPR reviewers probed into the engagement
team’s risk assessment processes. The reviewers also selected three or four key risk areas at the
specific account or class of transaction level for in-depth evaluation. Those evaluations covered
the assessment of inherent, control, and fraud risks and how those assessments were linked to the
3

Peer reviews are described in Appendix C.
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substantive tests performed by the engagement team. The reviewers also assessed the design and
performance of substantive tests. In addition to the key risk areas, they addressed the use of
analytical procedures in five additional audit areas on each engagement. They also probed into
how the audits were completed, including how engagement teams considered their audit findings
and resolved issues. The QPR also evaluated how the auditors interacted and communicated with
the entities’ audit committees.4
Findings and Conclusions
2.14 The Panel is satisfied that the audit risk model is appropriate, but needs updating. It
embraces judgment in an organized and logical way. Input from the Panel’s survey and other
activities disclosed that the model is widely accepted, though some evidence suggested that the
model is somewhat out-of-date and inconsistently implemented. Some participants suggested
that the model is out-of-date for purely technical reasons, such as its failure to include the
concept of engagement risk and not clearly including fraud risk within the concepts of inherent
risk or control risk. Others suggested that the model is not sufficiently specific and vigorous,
does not call for a deep understanding of business processes and related risks, and thus cannot be
consistently applied. Still others suggested that the model should drive more procedures directed
at the detection of fraud. Some also believed that the concept of materiality in the model is too
vague, both in how it is applied in planning audits and how it is used in evaluating audit results.
Lastly, others believed that the model is linked too closely to audits of historical financial
statements to accommodate an expanded notion of assurance services that contemplates
providing assurance about many other kinds of information, in some cases on a continuous basis.
2.15 The Panel’s recommendations to improve audit effectiveness are designed to update the
model and enhance its consistent application in financial statement audits. In the final analysis,
however, the Panel recognizes that it is the conscientious performance of individual auditors that
most contributes to audit effectiveness.
2.16 Overall, the findings from the QPRs were favorable, and did not support the view that
audits are being conducted in an ineffective manner. Notwithstanding the generally positive QPR
results and its conclusions about the appropriateness of the audit risk model, the Panel believes
that audits should be strengthened in a number of important ways. In its analysis of the quality of
audits and how audits should be improved, three major themes emerged:

• First, definitive auditing standards form the starting point for promoting quality audits
• Second, the audit firms need comprehensive and vigorous audit methodologies, based
on the standards, in order to drive the behavior of their auditors to a higher plane

• Third, the peer review process is a critical element in “closing the loop” to provide
assurance to the public that audit performance measures up to high standards and
4

The QPR was designed to provide a qualitative assessment of audit effectiveness; it was not designed to identify
instances of non-compliance with specific standards or firm policies. Certain matters, resulting from QPR reviewers’
disagreements with the quality or sufficiency of the work of an engagement team, were referred to the audit firm for
appropriate follow up.
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continues to improve
2.17 From these three themes, the Panel created a framework for developing its
recommendations.
A Framework for Developing Recommendations
2.18 The Panel’s framework for developing recommendations to improve the conduct of
audits consisted of identifying the areas where the Panel believed improvements were desirable
and specifying the key constituencies that are best able to carry out its recommendations.5 Those
constituencies are:

• the Auditing Standards Board
• the firms that audit the financial statements of public entities
• the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
2.19 The ASB promulgates auditing standards and quality control standards that auditors and
their firms are required to follow in their accounting and auditing practices. Those standards
measure the quality of performance that auditors should adhere to in conducting their audits and
for firms to follow in conducting their practices. The audit firms obtain the clients; the firms hire,
train, develop, and provide career opportunities for their personnel; and they develop audit
methodologies and quality control systems to help ensure that audits are performed in
accordance with professional standards. The SECPS establishes requirements for its members.
The SECPS Peer Review Committee determines whether the firms follow the quality control
standards in their accounting and auditing practices and the auditing standards in the conduct of
their audits, and thus serves to “close the loop” between the standards and the way audits are
actually performed. The activities of the SECPS are overseen by the Public Oversight Board
(POB) to further ensure that the system functions as intended.
2.20 The recommendations to the various constituencies in the ensuing sections of this chapter
and in Chapters 3 and 4 are based principally on the Panel’s QPR findings, together with
knowledge gained from its survey (Appendix H), public hearings (Appendix I), focus groups and
interviews (Appendix G), reviews of firms’ methodologies (Appendix J), research and analysis
of cases of alleged audit failures (Appendix F), and other investigative and deliberative activities.
The Panel believes that each of its recommendations is individually important, but also that they
need to be viewed in their totality. Recommendations addressed to only one constituency are less
likely to lead to major changes in how audits are conducted; action by all three constituencies is
necessary to assure the public that the recommendations achieve their objectives.

5

The Panel’s recommendations to improve the conduct of audits also include some that are addressed to
constituencies that did not fall precisely in its framework. In certain areas, recommendations have been made to the
SEC, the AICPA, the Public Oversight Board, the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board and audit committees.
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Auditing Standards Board
2.21 Many of the Panel’s recommendations to the ASB in specific areas suggest the need to
examine existing auditing standards critically, with the objective of revising or replacing some or
all of them with more specific and definitive guidance containing imperatives for auditors to
follow. (Some of the recommendations to the ASB seek to make its quality control standards
similarly more specific and definitive.) In so doing, the ASB should not pay blind homage to the
current audit risk model when there are more useful or practical alternative approaches.
2.22 A major objective of auditing standards should be to help audits serve not only to detect
material fraud but also, by being perceived as rigorous, to deter fraud from occurring in the first
place. Toward that end, the Panel recommends that auditing standards should require auditors to
possess a far deeper understanding of the entity’s business processes and risks and that
substantive tests that have detecting material fraud as their principal objective be designed and
performed on all audits.
2.23 The Panel believes that the ASB, with its access to staff and volunteer resources with
information technology expertise and its contacts with the academic community, could act as a
catalyst for identifying how technology might facilitate and improve the audit process. Research
efforts in partnership with audit firms and academe might lead to breakthrough ideas that could
benefit the auditing profession. The Panel encourages the ASB to pursue this suggestion.
Audit Firms
2.24 Many of the Panel’s recommendations in specific areas suggest that audit firms need to
undertake substantive efforts to reestablish the importance of the role of independent auditors
within their organizations and thereby reinvigorate their audit practices. They should provide
guidance to their audit personnel that is specific and definitive and focus more on training audit
personnel in the methodologies that support their audit practices (including how to both use
technology and audit their clients’ use of it). The audit firms should embed intolerance for audit
failures in their cultures. The concept of professional skepticism should be taught effectively and
the role of auditors in the detection, and implicitly in the deterrence, of fraud reinforced.
2.25 The combination of definitive professional standards and well-conceived firm policies,
procedures, guidance materials, practice aids, and audit training programs are insufficient,
however, to achieve the Panel’s objectives. The strong commitment of the audit firms to make
continuous improvements in their processes and raise the bar by setting a goal of “zero defects”
is essential to achieve true audit effectiveness. The firms’ leaders should convey a tone of high
professionalism as the principal message to their auditors, and develop systems for incentives,
compensatory rewards and penalties, and promotions that not only mirror the tone but also make
it a reality.
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
2.26 Many of the Panel’s recommendations reflect a belief that the SECPS should be the
source of both leadership and specific guidance to audit firms in the effort to strengthen their
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quality controls. Only with specific guidance can peer reviewers effectively assess compliance
with quality control standards. The SECPS Peer Review Committee should make its peer
reviews of firms not only more frequent, but also more rigorous. The role of peer review in a
program of continuous improvement of audit effectiveness should be given high priority. The
SECPS’ role in providing assurance that audits are being conducted effectively, with appropriate
oversight by the POB, is critical to maintaining the profession’s right to participate in its
regulation, rather than ceding it entirely to others.
*****
2.27 The remainder of this chapter and Chapter 3 discuss the Panel’s findings from the QPR
process. Generally, for each specific audit area, there is an overview of the requirements of
GAAS, the significant findings from the QPR and how the Panel considered them, and the
Panel’s recommendations. Not all aspects of the audits that were reviewed in the QPR process or
all the qualitative assessments made by the QPR reviewers are discussed in detail, although all of
the findings were reviewed and considered by the Panel.

ASSESSING ENGAGEMENT RISK
2.28 SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, notes that “in addition to
audit risk, the auditor is also exposed to loss or injury to his or her professional practice from
litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with financial statements
audited and reported on.” This exposure, often referred to as “engagement risk,” is not part of
the audit risk model. It is present even though the auditor has performed the audit in accordance
with GAAS and reported appropriately on the financial statements. Engagement risk usually is
assessed as part of the audit firm’s client acceptance and continuance procedures.
Requirements in Statements on Quality Control Standards (SQCS)
2.29 Client acceptance and continuance is one of the five elements of quality control identified
in SQCS No. 2, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing Practice,
issued by the Auditing Standards Board.6 The client acceptance and continuance process should
be designed to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that the likelihood of association with
a client whose management lacks integrity is minimized.
2.30 The process ordinarily is designed to enable the engagement team to identify and
consider the risks associated with the overall engagement -- such as the risk that the entity will
fail, the risk that the entity’s management lacks integrity, the risks inherent in the entity’s
industry, and the capabilities and track record of senior management -- and then to use the
resulting information to make an engagement risk assessment. The risks, individually and in the
6

The Auditing Standards Board issues both SASs and SQCSs. Auditing standards relate to the conduct of individual
audit engagements, while the quality control standards relate to the conduct of a firm’s audit practice as a whole.
Firms that are members of the SECPS must adhere to the quality control standards as well as SECPS’ membership
requirements.
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aggregate (or the absence of risks), also should affect the inherent, control, and fraud risk
assessments discussed in subsequent sections of this and the following chapter, and in turn the
nature, timing, and extent of the auditor’s tests.
2.31 The QPR examined the engagement risk assessment made during the client acceptance
and continuance process and the specific actions, if any, taken to address the identified risks.
Findings
2.32 The QPR reviewers generally agreed that the engagement risk assessments (e.g., high,
moderate, or low) by the audit engagement teams were appropriate, that the thought processes
applied in determining the engagement risk assessments and the specific actions to be taken were
thorough and gave appropriate consideration to the appropriate factors, and that the right people,
namely, partners, were involved in the process. The reviewers also generally agreed with the
specific actions taken to address the specific risks identified; that the right people developed,
reviewed, and approved those actions; that they were completed effectively and timely by the
right people; and that the working papers adequately documented the actions taken and the
results.
2.33 All eight firms included in the QPR consider client acceptance and continuance,
including the engagement risk assessment, to be a key element of their quality control system
and risk management efforts. They all devote substantial attention to it at high levels within the
firm. The firms have strengthened their policies and procedures in this area in recent years, and
some have improved their processes by computerizing them. Computerization generally has
enabled a firm to improve its abilities to identify the risks associated with potential and current
clients and to monitor compliance with the firm’s policies more effectively. In addition, it has
enabled high-level risk management personnel to be involved in client acceptance and
continuance decisions on a more timely basis.
2.34 The Panel observed that some of these computerized systems are highly developed and
involve quantitative measures, a search for potentially derogatory or other information about the
entity and its principal owners and officers, and qualitative judgments. These systems require
various levels of consultation and approvals depending upon the particular circumstances, for
example, the calculated “risk score,” and they are monitored electronically to ensure they are
completed in a timely manner. These systems also are integrated into the audit itself. Information
regarding any significant risk factors that are identified and the action plans for dealing with
them are included in the audit working papers and are considered by the engagement team when
planning and performing the audit.
Recommendations
To audit firms:
2.35 The Panel recommends that audit firms consider adopting sophisticated, computerized
systems for identifying engagement risk that involve quantitative measures, a search for
potentially derogatory or other information about the entity and its principal owners and officers,
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and qualitative judgments, and integrating those systems into their audits.7 A cooperative effort
by the firms should facilitate implementing this recommendation.

ASSESSING INHERENT RISK
Overview of GAAS
2.36 SAS No. 47 defines inherent risk as “the susceptibility of an assertion to a material
misstatement, assuming that there are no related controls.”8 The risk of misstatement is greater
for some assertions and related account balances and classes of transactions than for others. For
example, complex calculations are more likely to be misstated than simple ones. Cash is more
susceptible to theft than an inventory of coal. Accounts consisting of amounts derived from
accounting estimates pose greater risk of error than do accounts consisting of relatively routine,
factual data.
2.37 External factors also influence inherent risk. For example, technological developments
might make a particular product obsolete, thereby causing inventory to be reported at more than
its net realizable value. In addition to factors that are unique to a specific assertion for an account
balance or class of transactions, some factors may relate to various assertions for several or all of
the entity’s account balances or classes of transactions. These latter factors are referred to in this
report as overall inherent risk factors, and include, for example, a lack of sufficient working
capital to continue operations, a declining industry characterized by a large number of business
failures, aggressive analysts’ forecasts, and management compensation that is largely
performance based.
2.38 SAS No. 47 notes that the auditor needs to have an appropriate basis for assessing
inherent risk below the maximum. The SAS does not require the auditor to perform any tests to
assess inherent risk below the maximum, however, as it does in the case of control risk. Also,
SAS No. 47 indicates that the auditor should assess inherent risk at the maximum when
designing audit tests if he or she concludes that the effort required to assess inherent risk at
below the maximum for an assertion would exceed the potential reduction in audit procedures
derived from such an assessment.
Findings
2.39 The QPR reviewers determined who performed and reviewed the inherent risk
assessments both at the overall financial statement level and for each of the key areas selected.
They also considered the appropriateness of the risk assessments and how they were made.

7

In Chapter 4, the Panel recommends that the AICPA develop, or promote the development of, a technology-driven
tool that small firms can use to enhance the effectiveness of their client acceptance and continuance processes.
8
The auditing literature defines an assertion as a representation by management that is embodied in a financial
statement component. The five assertions are existence or occurrence, completeness, rights and obligations,
valuation or allocation, and presentation and disclosure.
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2.40 The reviewers generally agreed with both the overall inherent risk assessment and with
the inherent risk assessments at the specific account or class of transactions level. They also
agreed that, in general, the people involved in those assessments had the appropriate knowledge
and skills, that they gave appropriate consideration to the various factors, and that the right
people reviewed the assessments at the right time. The assessments generally were made at an
appropriate level (e.g., the assertion level for account balances and classes of transactions).
While generally expressing their agreement, some reviewers nonetheless indicated a need for
improvements in this area.
2.41 In recent years, the eight firms that participated in the Panel’s QPR have made efforts to
provide their audit personnel with significant industry and entity-specific information (often in
the form of electronic databases). They also have been increasing their emphasis on how the
auditor’s understanding of the entity’s business and industry can be enhanced, for example, by
interviewing entity personnel outside of the accounting and finance functions. Many of the
participants in the focus groups spoke enthusiastically about these developments. The Panel
applauds these efforts and believes they should assist auditors in making better inherent risk
assessments. The Panel also believes all auditors would benefit from similar efforts.
2.42 Moreover, the Panel believes that the professional standards, guidance, and practices with
respect to assessing inherent risk need strengthening, given the increasing emphasis on inherent
risk assessments in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests.9 For example, SAS
No. 47 currently permits the auditor to assess inherent risk with respect to a particular account or
class of transactions as a whole, rather than requiring the auditor to make the risk assessment at
the assertion (or lower) level by considering what could go wrong. The Panel believes that it is
not sufficient merely to indicate that inherent risk with respect to revenue recognition, for
example, is high or at the maximum. Rather, the auditor should be required to determine
precisely why it is “high” (e.g., as a result of the complexity of sales terms, potential cutoff
problems, “channel stuffing,” understated deferred revenue, or side agreements permitting rights
of return if the goods are not sold). The Panel believes that such a requirement would better
prepare the auditor to select and perform the appropriate tests of controls and substantive tests.
2.43 Also, by assessing inherent risk at the maximum because it is more efficient to do so, the
auditor may design substantive tests without fully understanding what could go wrong. In so
doing, the auditor unintentionally may omit certain important audit tests and assume a higher
level of detection risk than is appropriate. Requiring tests to support assessing inherent risk
below the maximum also could help prevent similar results.

9

For example, the Panel noted during its study of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs)
(see Appendix F) several instances in which the entity’s inherent risk apparently increased as a result of significant
changes in the entity’s business (e.g., the loss of a major customer or the existence of a new competitor with a better,
cheaper product) and the auditors apparently did not assess accurately how those changes increased inherent risk.
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Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.44

The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Require the auditor to make inherent risk assessments for account balances and
classes of transactions by considering what could go wrong at the individual assertion
level

• No longer permit the auditor to default to assessing inherent risk at the maximum for
efficiency or other reasons without considering what could go wrong in specific
financial statement assertions

• Provide additional guidance regarding the factors that affect inherent risk, including
the entity’s business processes and risks, and the depth of the auditor’s understanding
of those factors10

• Indicate the types of tests the auditor should perform to support assessing inherent
risk below the maximum
To audit firms:
2.45

The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Review and ascertain whether they need to augment their policies and guidance on
assessing inherent risk.

• Require that a partner be actively involved in making inherent risk assessments at
both the overall financial statement level and the assertion level for account balances
and classes of transactions.

• Require that for high risk clients inherent risk assessments be reviewed by the
concurring partner or an industry expert before the related tests of controls and
substantive tests are designed and performed.

• Review their training materials on assessing inherent risk and ascertain whether they
need to be augmented, either in terms of the time devoted to the subject or the
10

The Panel is aware that a Joint Working Group (JWG) made up of representatives from large accounting firms,
auditing standards-setters, and academics submitted a paper in May 2000 with recommendations arising from a
study of recent developments in the audit methodologies of the largest accounting firms to the International Auditing
Practices Committee (see Chapter 7), the Assurance Standards Board of the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants, the Auditing Practices Board of the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the ASB. The JWG suggests that
a greater business risk orientation by auditors might benefit audit quality, and the ASB may wish to consider its
suggestions.
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materials used, such as by “real life” case studies on assessing inherent risk. The
training should reinforce the need for every engagement team to take the necessary
time to gain a thorough understanding of the entity’s business and industry and do a
thorough job of assessing inherent risk, at both the overall financial statement level
and the assertion level for account balances and classes of transactions.
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.46

The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee:

• Request that peer reviewers evaluate the adequacy and extent of implementation of
the firm’s methodologies, guidance and training materials relating to assessing
inherent risk

• Include items in the peer review questionnaires that address the appropriateness of the
inherent risk assessments made, whether they were made at the appropriate financial
statement levels, who made and reviewed them, and whether they were made and
reviewed on a timely basis

• Request that peer reviewers include their findings in this area in their reports to the
SECPS Peer Review Committee

MULTI-LOCATION AUDITS
Overview of GAAS
2.47 SAS No. 47, as amended by SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit, requires that the auditor consider the extent to which audit procedures should be
performed at selected locations or components of an entity with operations in multiple locations
or components. The auditor’s identification of the specific locations or components is an
important result of the risk assessment process. Auditing standards provide examples of the
inherent and control risk factors an auditor should consider when selecting the particular
locations or components to visit, such as the materiality of the location, the effectiveness of the
entity’s control environment, and the frequency, timing, and scope of monitoring activities by the
entity or others at the location. The decisions regarding which locations or components to visit
and how much audit work to perform at each of them can be complex, especially in audits of
large multi-national entities with numerous businesses in many countries. These decisions on the
scope of work in an audit are integral elements in the application of the audit risk model.
2.48 The first standard of fieldwork requires that audit personnel be properly supervised.
SQCS No. 2 requires firms to establish policies and procedures to provide reasonable assurance
that the work performed by engagement personnel meets applicable professional standards,
regulatory requirements, and the firm’s standards of quality. This includes firm personnel who
perform the work at all the locations, including those at foreign locations. Developing an
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appropriate structure for supervising personnel on large, multi-location engagements requires
careful consideration by experienced personnel.
2.49 The SECPS Peer Review Standards11 require that peer reviews cover the supervision and
control, in accordance with U.S. professional standards, of any work on segments performed by
U.S. and foreign offices or by domestic or foreign affiliates or correspondents. The Peer Review
Standards also specify certain matters regarding the work performed at other locations that
should be documented in the working papers of the auditors in-charge of the overall engagement.
Such matters include the independence of the auditors at the other locations; how the auditors incharge of the overall engagement obtained reasonable assurance that the auditors at the non-U.S.
locations are familiar with GAAS, GAAP and SEC regulations; and the procedures performed
and conclusions reached when the auditors in-charge of the overall engagement visited other
locations.
Findings
2.50 The QPR reviewers were directed to address certain matters when the engagement
involved an entity with significant facilities or operations that either were not audited or were
audited by individuals who were not under the direct supervision of the engagement team whose
work was being reviewed. The reviewers probed into the audit procedures, if any, performed at
each location and the supervision and control that the auditors in-charge of the overall
engagement exercised over the work performed at other locations.
2.51 With one exception, which was appropriately addressed by the firm involved, the QPR
reviewers agreed with the engagement teams’ determination of the audit procedures to be
performed for each location and the scope of those procedures. The reviewers also agreed that:
the people involved in determining the audit procedures, if any, for each location had the
appropriate knowledge and skills; the engagement partners were involved in a substantive,
timely manner in the decision-making processes; and the engagement teams’ supervision and
control of the work performed at the various locations were adequate to provide reasonable
assurance that the audits complied with GAAS (including complying with GAAS in audits
conducted outside of the United States).
2.52 The Panel noted there is little specific guidance in the professional literature on the
appropriate audit coverage in a multi-location audit. The Panel believes there should be
additional guidance in view of the increasing growth and globalization of many entities.12 The
Panel also notes that some firms have extensive guidance in this area that the ASB might find
helpful in developing similar assistance.

11

The Peer Review Standards are issued by the SECPS Peer Review Committee and provide guidance on
performing and reporting on peer reviews that are intended to meet the SECPS membership requirements.
12
The Panel noted during its study of AAERs (see Appendix F) several instances of material fraud, sometimes
fraudulent financial reporting and other times misappropriation of assets, at relatively small divisions or subsidiaries.
In some of these instances, the auditors apparently had not visited the locations in several years even though the
entities did not have any internal auditors, controls at the locations were weak, or competition for the locations’
products had increased substantially.
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Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.53

The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Create more specific, demanding, and definitive standards for multi-location audits to
cover such matters as:
•

the extent of knowledge and involvement needed by the auditor with final
responsibility for decisions about the locations and the key personnel assigned to
perform the work at them

•

criteria (including materiality
coverage of smaller locations

•

reliance on internal auditors for coverage of various locations

•

methods of establishing materiality at different locations

•

the scope of work to be performed at different sizes and types of locations

considerations)

for

periodically

rotating

the

• Emphasize in its guidance that accounting systems, controls, personnel, and other
circumstances can vary widely from location-to-location within an entity, and that
these variations should be considered explicitly in decisions about how many and
which locations to visit and the nature, timing, and extent of the work to be performed
at each of them. The guidance also should recognize that analytical procedures may
be useful in helping to select the locations to be visited, especially when there are
many rather homogeneous locations.

ASSESSING CONTROL RISK
Overview of GAAS
2.54 SAS No. 55, Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement
Audit, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement
Audit: An Amendment to SAS No. 55, describes the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to an
entity’s internal control, including the responsibility to assess control risk.
2.55 SAS No. 78 defines internal control as “a process – effected by an entity's board of
directors, management, and other personnel – designed to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: (a) reliability of financial
reporting, (b) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and (c) compliance with applicable laws
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and regulations.”13 Controls that are relevant to an audit are those that pertain to the entity’s
preparation of financial statements for external purposes.
2.56

Internal control consists of five interrelated components:14

• The Control Environment sets the tone of an organization, influencing the control
consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other components of internal
control, providing discipline and structure.

• Risk Assessment is the entity's identification and analysis of relevant risks to the
achievement of its objectives, forming a basis for determining how the risks should be
managed.

• Control Activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure management
directives are carried out.

• Information and Communication are the identification, capture and exchange of
information in a form and timeframe that enables people to carry out their
responsibilities.

• Monitoring is the process that assesses the quality of internal control performance
over time.
2.57 GAAS require, in all audits, that the auditor “obtain an understanding of internal control
sufficient to plan the audit by performing procedures to understand the design of controls
relevant to an audit of financial statements and whether they have been placed in operation.”
This knowledge is used to:

• identify types of potential financial statement misstatements
• consider factors that affect the risk of material misstatement
• design substantive tests
2.58 The risk that a material misstatement will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis
by the entity’s internal control is referred to as control risk. Some control risk always exists
because of the inherent limitations of internal control and the possibility of control override by
supervisory level personnel.
2.59 Obtaining an understanding of internal control does not require the auditor to reach any
conclusions about the effectiveness of internal control. GAAS allow the auditor to assess control
risk as very high or at the maximum level in specific areas of the financial statements if he or she
believes that controls are unlikely to be effective, or that evaluating and testing their
13

The definition is the same as that adopted by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission in, Internal Control - Integrated Framework (September 1992).
14
Safeguarding of assets is an integral part of each of the components.
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effectiveness would be inefficient. This is commonly expressed as “defaulting” to an audit
approach that relies entirely on detailed substantive audit tests with little or no testing of controls.
2.60 GAAS further provide that the auditor may assess control risk at a lower level, below the
maximum, by:

• identifying specific controls that are likely to prevent or detect material misstatements
relative to specific aspects of the financial statements, and

• performing tests of those controls to evaluate their effectiveness
2.61 Assessing control risk at below the maximum enables the auditor to adjust the nature,
timing, and extent of the substantive audit tests, for example by performing fewer tests, obtaining
less persuasive (and presumably less costly) evidence, performing tests before year end, or
reducing sample sizes. When auditors “rely” on controls in an area, it means they have assessed
control risk below the maximum level and have tested the effectiveness of those controls.
Findings
2.62 The QPR reviewers looked at auditors’ work in assessing control risk at the control
environment level and in the key areas reviewed on each engagement, and at how the risk
assessment was documented.
Control Environment
2.63 In all engagements, the auditors assessed the entity’s control environment. The work in
this area generally was performed by an in-charge auditor with three to five years’ experience,
working under timely and effective supervision and review by more experienced professionals.
In substantially all situations, the QPR reviewer agreed with the engagement team’s assessment
of the control environment.
2.64 The results indicated, however, that on nearly 17% of the reviewed engagements the
audit would have been improved by more thoughtful analysis and in-depth auditor knowledge of
the entity’s control environment. In addition, the QPR reviewers believed that, on about 21% of
the engagements, more effective use of the audit firm’s information technology specialists would
have been desirable and improved the team’s assessment of the control environment.
Assessing Control Risk and Testing Controls
2.65 The QPR reviewers found that the depth of understanding about information systems and
controls, the substance of the risk assessments performed, and the degree of reliance on controls
varied considerably among engagements, even within the same firm. The process of obtaining an
understanding of internal control typically consisted of some combination of completing
checklists, interviewing entity personnel, and examining individual transactions. On almost 24%
of the reviewed engagements, the reviewers raised questions about the engagement team’s
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thought process or depth of knowledge and understanding of the information system and related
controls, including consideration of the entity’s computer environment and processing.
2.66 The reviewers noted that firms’ information technology specialists frequently were used
by engagement teams to assist in understanding general computer controls or specific application
controls in more complex computer-based systems. In some cases, these specialists also were
used in the design and execution of related audit testing. The reviewers also observed, however,
that the level and effectiveness of the coordination between the technology specialists and audit
personnel varied, and in almost 20% of the engagements could have been improved. In addition,
the reviewers frequently noted that an increased understanding of computer-based systems by
engagement teams and the involvement of information technology specialists would have
improved the control risk assessment process.
2.67 Assessing control risk below the maximum level and relying on controls to reduce
detailed substantive audit tests were found to be somewhat uncommon, particularly for small and
medium-sized entities. Testing and relying on specific application controls were more common
on larger engagements. In high-risk key areas, controls usually were not relied on in lieu of
detailed tests. The reviewers noted no situations in which they considered the planned reliance
on internal control to be inappropriate.
2.68 When the auditor planned to rely on controls, however, the nature, timing and extent of
the tests of controls varied considerably. In some cases, there appeared to be some confusion
about what constitutes an internal control over an identified risk versus simply a procedure for
processing a transaction. Identification of controls that are relevant to the auditor’s selection of
substantive tests, and the corollary nature, timing and extent of control testing that was
appropriate in the circumstances, also seemed to be somewhat unclear to some engagement
teams. In addition, the QPR reviewers concluded that the tests of controls were not completely
effective in about 12% of the key areas reviewed where controls were tested.
2.69 The QPR reviewers often commented about the circumstances permitting rotation of tests
of controls over two or more years, the circumstances in which tests of controls also may serve
as substantive tests (referred to as “dual purpose tests”), and the necessary level of testing of
management reports and other internal data sources used by the auditor in performing analytical
procedures or other audit tests. The reviewers generally concurred with the concept of rotation,
but sometimes questioned the appropriateness of the time lag between testing of specific areas or
whether changes in the entity or the engagement team called for updated testing. The reviewers
generally expressed reservations about whether the dual purpose tests were adequate as
substantive tests to enable the auditors to achieve the desired audit objectives. Their comments
on the level of testing of the management reports and other internal data sources that were used
in performing analytical procedures or other audit tests indicated inconsistencies in practice.
Documentation
2.70 Engagement teams’ documentation of their understanding and assessment of internal
control takes different forms, including firm-specific checklists and preparation of detailed
descriptions of the entities’ policies and procedures. The QPR disclosed that documentation of
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the control environment was viewed as needing improvement on 15% of the engagements
reviewed. The documentation of the control work in the key areas was similarly lacking in
substance or completeness on nearly 14% of the engagements and 23% of the key areas
reviewed.
*****
2.71 The findings are consistent with a widely held perception that auditors typically focus on
substantive tests rather than on tests of controls. The findings also are consistent with views
expressed by both QPR engagement team members and focus group participants, which can be
summarized as follows:

• Professional standards in this area are perceived by many as complex and difficult to
apply, particularly with respect to the guidance on how much knowledge auditors
need about internal control, the need to test controls, and the nature and extent of
controls testing.

• Professionals have a wide range of beliefs about the relevance of internal control and
how internal control is, or should be, considered in audits. In addition, the level of
knowledge about internal control, including understanding the types of errors that can
result from internal control weaknesses, and how internal control fits or should fit into
the audit process varies widely among auditors.15

• Testing controls is considered time consuming and seems to be viewed by some
auditors, including partners, as less effective than detailed substantive audit tests.
There is confusion about when, if ever, an auditor can rely entirely on substantive
tests for assurance about a particular assertion.

• Some auditors and firms believe there is little choice but to rely on controls, given the
pervasiveness of complex computer systems and the volume of transactions. To do
otherwise, they argue, would result in highly inefficient, costly and often ineffective
audits. Firm methodologies seem to be placing more emphasis on relying on controls.

• There is a diversity of views about the most effective way of coordinating the work of
information technology specialists with auditors and the role of those specialists in
understanding, assessing and testing controls. The ability of engagement personnel to
supervise the work of these specialists is often questioned.

15

During its study of the AAERs (see Appendix F), the Panel noted numerous instances of management overriding
controls unbeknownst to the auditors. These included controls over the aging of accounts receivable, recording
shipments, changing computer programs, and classifying payments. As a consequence, the auditors assessed control
risk and fraud risk as being lower than they actually were. The Panel also noted that entities often used information
technology to facilitate material fraud, such as by making inappropriate modifications to computer programs,
making large numbers of small non-standard journal entries rather than a few large ones, and “freezing the date” in
the computer system.

26

Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.72

The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Provide more specific guidance on:
•

The required level of auditor knowledge and understanding about internal control

•

The nature and extent of documentation needed, particularly to support the
auditor’s consideration of internal control in planning the audit and in assessing
control risk

•

The circumstances, if any, in which auditors may rely entirely on detailed audit
tests with either no reliance on controls or reliance only at the control
environment level

•

Identifying and focusing on key controls for the purpose of determining what
could go wrong

•

The distinction between a control and a procedure that is simply a part of a
transaction process

•

Linking the “components of internal control,” particularly environmental and
transaction-level controls, with identified risks and detailed audit tests

•

The nature, timing and extent of control testing

•

The circumstances, if any, permitting rotating tests of controls over two or more
years in areas in which the auditor intends to rely on controls

•

The circumstances, if any, in which tests of controls also may constitute
substantive tests (dual purpose tests)

•

The necessary level of testing of management reports and other internal data
sources used by the auditor in performing analytical procedures or other audit
tests

• Consider issuing a non-authoritative pronouncement to assist auditors in assessing
control risk until revised standards are issued.

• Indicate the importance of involving personnel, with significant audit and industry
experience, in performing internal control work, particularly at the planning stage.
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• Give priority to completing the work of the ASB technology task force that was
formed to consider the manner in which auditing standards taken as a whole
appropriately reflect the use and impact of information technology and whether
changes should be made to auditing standards. As part of its work, the technology
task force should review the AICPA Audit Guide, Consideration of Internal Control
in a Financial Statement Audit.
To audit firms:
2.73 The Panel recommends that audit firms place a high priority on enhancing the overall
effectiveness of auditors’ work on internal control, particularly with respect to the depth and
substance of their knowledge about companies’ information systems. The following areas should
be addressed:

• Audit Practice – Firms of all sizes should examine critically their audit work on
internal control. In most situations, firms should increase the engagement time
allotted to internal control, particularly in the audit planning phase. They also should
raise the level of involvement by more experienced audit personnel. Audit personnel
who supervise engagements should be directed to focus on increasing the engagement
team’s knowledge of important information systems and controls. They should focus
particularly on (1) a more thorough understanding of information systems relevant to
financial reporting and the related risks and controls, (2) identifying key controls, (3)
linking controls with identified risks and substantive audit tests, and (4) how
decisions about the nature, timing and extent of control testing affected audit
effectiveness.

• Professional Development – Training programs should place greater emphasis on
each of the components of internal control as well as on assessing and testing
controls. The objective should be to increase significantly the overall effectiveness of
auditors in identifying and responding to the control environment and information
systems’ risks, key controls, and control deficiencies.

• Information Technology – The Panel sees an increasing need for auditors to have a
higher level of technology skills and for more effective participation in audits by
information technology specialists. Their participation should include assessing the
risk that erroneous information may affect the financial statements, assessing the
adequacy of controls, and designing tests of their operating effectiveness. Firms
should develop specific training materials and programs to make auditors more
knowledgeable about information technology and information technology specialists
more knowledgeable about auditing. Information technology specialists should be
more effectively and consistently integrated into the audit process. There should be
joint training of auditors and specialists, starting at the partner and manager levels.
Firms without such specialized capabilities should develop appropriate cooperative
arrangements to assure information technology risks and controls are fully addressed
in the audit.
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• Inspection Programs – Internal inspection programs should increase their focus on
internal control work, the effective involvement of information technology
specialists, and the effective involvement of experienced audit personnel in this area.
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.74

The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee:

• Develop more detailed inquiries for peer reviewers about firms’ methodologies and
engagement performance relating to audit work on internal control, focusing
particularly on internal control considerations in planning the audit. Peer review
inquiries also should focus on the depth of the engagement team’s understanding of
the entity’s information system and related risks that are relevant to financial
reporting. In addition, they should address the engagement team’s effectiveness in
identifying, testing, and assessing key controls, and the sufficiency of the
involvement of experienced professionals.

• Instruct peer review team captains to emphasize the importance of including
professionals with specialized technology expertise on their peer review teams.

• Request that peer reviewers include their findings in this area in their reports to the
SECPS Peer Review Committee.

COMMUNICATING AND REPORTING ON INTERNAL CONTROL
Overview of GAAS
2.75 The auditor’s standard report on a financial statement audit does not address internal
control or purport to give any assurance about it, and auditors are not required to assess the
overall effectiveness of internal control or search for control deficiencies. During the course of
an audit, however, the auditor may become aware of matters relating to internal control that may
be of interest to management or the audit committee (or equivalent body). SAS No. 60,
Communication of Internal Control Related Matters Noted in an Audit, requires that auditors
communicate such matters if they meet the definition of a reportable condition – a significant
deficiency in the design or operation of internal control that could adversely affect the entity’s
ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial data consistent with management’s
assertions in the financial statements.
2.76 A reportable condition may be of such magnitude to be considered a material weakness.
A material weakness is defined as “a reportable condition in which the design or operation of one
or more of the internal control components does not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that
misstatements caused by error or fraud in amounts that would be material to the financial
statements being audited may occur and not be detected within a timely period by employees in
the normal course of performing their assigned functions.”
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2.77 An auditor also may be engaged to report on the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting under the attestation standards (such standards are similar in concept to
auditing standards and also are issued by the ASB). Statement on Standards for Attestation
Engagements (SSAE) No. 2 (as amended), Reporting on an Entity’s Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting, prescribes performance and reporting standards for engagements to
examine management’s assertion on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.
The Panel understands that SSAE No. 2 engagements and reports are rare. While there are
statutory requirements for auditors to report on internal control in certain banking institutions,
attestation reports on those engagements generally are provided only to the regulators and the
audited entity.
2.78 Mandatory management and auditor reporting on the effectiveness of internal control for
public entities has been considered in the past, and continues to be advocated in some quarters.
The 1987 Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Treadway
Commission) specifically recommended that the SEC require management reporting to
shareholders on the effectiveness of internal control. Similarly, in a 1993 report, In the Public
Interest, the POB recommended that the SEC require management and auditor reporting on the
effectiveness of internal control. The 1996 GAO Report on the Accounting Profession - Major
Issues, Progress and Concerns contains an extensive discussion about the importance of internal
control and states:
While the accounting profession now supports internal control reporting, the SEC
has not been convinced of the merits of reporting on internal controls. SEC
support is critical to further progress in this area. In the long run, GAO expects
that audits will be expanded to include internal control reporting, either because
of market demand or some systemic crisis.
Findings
2.79 The QPR disclosed only a few instances of auditors specifically communicating
"reportable conditions" or “material weaknesses.” This may result from (a) a lack of such
conditions on the engagements reviewed, (b) the limited amount of internal control work
performed by the auditors, (c) the subjectivity of the criteria for identifying reportable conditions
and material weaknesses, or (d) a combination of the above. The QPR results indicate that it is
very common for auditors to report that the audit did not identify any "material weaknesses."
2.80 The Panel believes, based on focus groups and comments from QPR reviewers, that
management and auditor communications with audit committees frequently do not give
sufficient time and attention to internal control. Audit committees likely presume that auditors do
more work in this area than they actually do, and they take more comfort than is warranted or
intended by the auditors. Audit committees seldom ask management and the auditors in-depth
questions about internal control.
2.81 The Panel recognizes that management acknowledges its responsibility for the system of
internal control in many annual reports of public entities. Some reports also express
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management’s views about the effectiveness of the system, and in some cases, the basis for its
views. Management reports generally refer to the auditors of the financial statements in a variety
of ways and some may lead users to an incorrect understanding of the auditors’ work on controls.
These reports typically are found among the larger public companies. Reporting by auditors on
such management reports is rare. (The QPR did not address attestation engagements to report on
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.)
2.82 It is widely recognized that effective internal control is critical to the reliability of the
financial reporting process. The use of information technology, the growing complexity of
systems and processes, the sheer volume of transactions, the global reach of business entities,
and other factors were cited as evidence of this by many of those responding to the Panel’s
requests for input. It also is clear from discussions with focus group participants, firm leadership
and others that there has been and continues to be a significant gap between what management,
audit committees and investors believe auditors’ involvement with internal control is or should
be, and reality. Input to the Panel on the need for management reporting on the effectiveness of
internal control, and auditor involvement and reporting thereon was mixed. A number of survey
respondents addressed this issue, with some constituencies supporting both management
reporting and auditor involvement and reporting thereon, while others opposed auditor
involvement and reporting.
Recommendations
To audit committees:
2.83 The Panel recommends that audit committees increase the time and attention they devote
to discussions of internal control with management and both the internal and external auditors.
Specifically, audit committees should:

• Obtain a written report from management on the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting. Annual management reporting on internal control to the audit
committee is necessary for the effective discharge of the audit committee’s
responsibilities and will serve as a catalyst for its more substantive involvement in the
area of internal control and a more meaningful dialogue with the internal and external
auditors about controls.

• Establish specific expectations with management and the internal and external
auditors about the qualitative information needs of the committee related to internal
control. Particular emphasis should be given to understanding management’s and the
auditors’ views on (1) the control environment and (2) the controls (or lack thereof)
over financial reporting, with particular attention to the controls in higher risk areas of
the company’s information systems. In addition, these discussions should include the
effects of technology on current and future information systems and the related
financial statement risks.
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To the Securities and Exchange Commission:
2.84 The Panel recommends that, if management is required to report to shareholders on the
effectiveness of internal control, the SEC should require either external auditor reporting on
internal control or management to explicitly state that the external auditors do not express an
opinion on internal control. Otherwise, the Panel believes that investors may draw unwarranted
inferences about auditors’ involvement with and responsibility for the appropriateness of
management’s assertions in such reports. Furthermore, investors also are likely to draw
unwarranted inferences about the degree of internal control work that auditors perform in
connection with their audits of financial statements.

LINKING THE RISK ASSESSMENTS TO SUBSTANTIVE TESTS
Overview of GAAS
2.85 The major reason for the auditor’s risk assessment activities is to provide a basis for
determining the nature, timing, and extent of substantive tests to be performed to provide the
reasonable assurance the auditor needs about the reliability of the assertions that are embedded in
the financial statements. This determination is often referred to as “linkage”; it is one of the most
difficult and important set of decisions that the auditor must make, requiring considerable
judgment, and should be made and reviewed by experienced personnel with the appropriate level
of knowledge and skills.
2.86 All other things being equal, the higher the risks, the more extensive the substantive tests
the auditor should perform, the more persuasive the evidence they provide should be, and the
nearer the balance sheet date they should be performed. (SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling, provides
additional guidance on linking risk assessments to sample sizes in situations in which sampling is
appropriate.) While the auditor is permitted to exercise considerable judgment in the linkage
process, SAS No. 47 cautions that it is not appropriate to rely completely on the risk assessments
to the exclusion of performing substantive tests of material account balances and classes of
transactions. The auditor also should consider the various risk assessments in assigning staff and
determining the appropriate level of supervision.
Findings
2.87 The QPR reviewers evaluated the engagement team’s linkage decisions for the key areas
on each engagement reviewed. The reviewers also considered the appropriateness of the
substantive tests performed, the timing of the tests, whether the number of items included in a
particular test or sample was adequate, the adequacy of the documentation, whether the
appropriate personnel performed and reviewed the work performed, whether any “exceptions”
were resolved appropriately, and whether the responses of entity management to the auditors’
inquiries were adequately corroborated. At the conclusion of both the review of each key area
and the overall engagement, the reviewers evaluated whether all major issues that arose on the
engagement were resolved appropriately and whether consultation had occurred when it should
have, and if so, the appropriateness of the consultation process.
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Linkage
2.88 The QPR reviewers generally agreed that the specific tests performed or other actions
taken in response to each of the risk assessments were appropriate and sufficient and that they
clearly addressed the specific potential misstatements that the engagement team identified. The
reviewers also generally agreed that the thinking that led to the specific tests or actions gave
appropriate consideration to the appropriate factors, that those who initially selected the specific
procedures had the appropriate knowledge and skills to perform those tasks, and that those who
reviewed and approved them also had the appropriate knowledge and skills and did so on a
timely basis. Although the reviewers generally agreed that the number of items examined in
particular substantive tests was adequate in light of the risk assessments, they noted significant
differences in sample sizes—sometimes in reasonably similar circumstances, even within the
same firm. Even though the reviewers generally agreed with the linkage decisions, they believed
the linkage needed improvement in 7% of the key areas reviewed.
Substantive Tests
2.89 In approximately 10% of the key areas reviewed, the QPR reviewers did not agree that
the substantive tests (nature, timing, and extent) appropriately addressed the relevant assertions
to achieve the necessary level of audit assurance. In addition, in approximately 15% of the key
areas reviewed, the reviewers did not agree that the documentation of the substantive tests and
their results were appropriate (e.g., that there was sufficient information in the working papers to
enable someone else to replicate the original work and understand the nature of the evidence
examined).
2.90 The QPR reviewers generally agreed that the engagement teams clearly understood the
entity’s policies and processes related to the key areas reviewed and that the people who
performed the tests, including specialists when appropriate, had the necessary knowledge and
skills.
2.91 The reviewers also generally were satisfied that the engagement teams performed
appropriate procedures to understand and evaluate the work performed by specialists, that
sufficient tests were performed for the period between interim and year end when interim testing
was performed, and that sufficient substantive tests were performed. The reviewers generally
agreed that the results of the substantive tests and key entity documents (e.g., contracts) were
reviewed on a timely basis by an engagement team member with appropriate knowledge and
skills, that exceptions found in testing were resolved appropriately, and that decisions about the
need for additional substantive tests were appropriate.
2.92 The QPR reviewers noticed a tendency in some instances for engagement teams not to
confirm material receivables even though SAS No. 67, The Confirmation Process, states that:
Confirmation of accounts receivable is a generally accepted auditing procedure.
…it is generally presumed that evidence obtained from third parties will provide
the auditor with higher-quality audit evidence than is typically available from
within the entity. Thus, there is a presumption that the auditor will request the
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confirmation of accounts receivable during an audit unless one of the following is
true:

• Accounts receivable are immaterial to the financial statements.
• The use of confirmations would be ineffective. For example, if based on prior
years’ audit experience or on experience with similar engagements, the
auditor concludes that response rates to properly designed confirmation
requests will be inadequate, or if responses are known or expected to be
unreliable, the auditor may determine that the use of confirmations would be
ineffective.

• The auditor’s combined assessed level of inherent and control risk is low, and
the assessed level, in conjunction with the evidence expected to be provided
by analytical procedures or other substantive tests of details, is sufficient to
reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level for the applicable financial
statement assertions. In many situations, both confirmation of accounts
receivable and other substantive tests of details are necessary to reduce audit
risk to an acceptably low level for the applicable financial statement
assertions.
2.93 When questioned, the engagement teams generally responded that they had not attempted
to confirm receivables, even though they were material, on the basis that the second or third
condition was met. In some instances, it was clear that one or both of the conditions were met;
however, in other instances, it was not apparent that either condition was met. The Panel is aware
from the focus groups and other input that some auditors believe that confirmation is not a
particularly effective audit procedure in many situations.
2.94 On a few engagements, the QPR reviewers noted that the engagement team had permitted
the entity’s personnel (other than internal auditors) to mail or receive the confirmation requests
or the auditors accepted facsimile responses without taking appropriate precautions, such as
verifying the source and contents of the response by a telephone call to the purported sender.
(SAS No. 67 requires the auditor to maintain control over the confirmation requests and
responses and to consider taking certain precautions to verify the propriety of any facsimile
responses.) These conditions also were present in some of the cases the Panel studied in its
review of litigation or enforcement actions against auditors.16
2.95 In approximately 8% of the key areas where the engagement teams noted exceptions, the
QPR reviewers found that the exceptions were resolved inappropriately and that the decisions
regarding the need for additional substantive tests were inappropriate. This condition also was

16

The Panel noted during its study of AAERs (see Appendix F) numerous other instances in which the auditors’
substantive procedures apparently were inadequate to detect material misstatements. Examples were: (a) not
adequately following up on exceptions found through testing, (b) not adequately testing cutoff, charges to asset
accounts, or the valuation of securities or property, plant and equipment, and (c) not ascertaining whether the
financial statements agreed or reconciled with the accounting records.
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present in some of the cases the Panel studied in its review of litigation and enforcement actions
against auditors.
Resolution of Issues
2.96 The QPR reviewers generally agreed that the engagement issues raised in the key areas
were resolved appropriately, that the engagement teams performed appropriate tests to obtain
reasonable assurance that they had all of the relevant information pertaining to those issues, and
that, if necessary, there was appropriate consultation.
2.97 In 14% of the situations, the QPR reviewers found that the documentation concerning the
issues in the key areas and their resolution was inappropriate. When the reviewers were able to
conclude that the resolution of those issues was appropriate, they ordinarily did so on the basis of
discussions with members of the engagement team and, when applicable, with those consulted
by the engagement team.
2.98 The reviewers also generally agreed, on an overall basis when completing their review of
the audit, that the engagement team carefully reviewed and objectively evaluated, in light of all
of the circumstances, all of the issues identified during the course of the audit. The reviewers
also generally found that the people involved with the issues and their resolution had the
appropriate knowledge and skills, and that the audit partner was involved sufficiently and on a
timely basis in their consideration and resolution.
2.99 The reviewers also generally concluded that there was appropriate and timely
consultation about the key issues with the right persons at the right time, that all the relevant
information was provided to those consulted, and that the nature, timing, and extent of the
concurring partner’s involvement in the resolution of the issues were appropriate. Finally, the
reviewers generally agreed that the conclusions reached with respect to each of the issues were
appropriate, that the issues were identified and resolved on a timely basis (e.g., not late in the
audit), and that there were sufficient discussions with management regarding the identified
issues.
2.100 The QPR reviewers on 13% of the engagements reviewed indicated they became aware
of other issues for which they believed consultation with others in the firm would have been
prudent or was required by firm policy, but did not take place.
Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.101 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Linkage

• Develop more definitive authoritative guidance on linking the nature, timing and
extent of substantive tests to risk assessments, including guidance aimed at reducing
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the incidence of inadequate sample sizes and variations in sample sizes in similar
circumstances. (The Panel suggests that the ASB may wish to consider the nonauthoritative AICPA Auditing Practice Release, Audit Sampling published in 1999
when developing that guidance.)
Substantive Tests

• Articulate more precisely the considerations that should be present to overcome the
presumption that it is necessary to send confirmations

• Undertake research to develop more effective methods of confirmation or other
means of obtaining evidence from third parties, such as through the use of technology
To audit firms:
2.102 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Linkage

• Review their policies and procedures and guidance materials with respect to sampling
to ensure that they result in sample sizes that are large enough to provide sufficient
evidence whenever sampling (as defined in SAS No. 39) is employed

• Review their training materials with respect to linkage and sampling and ascertain
whether they need to be augmented, either with respect to the time devoted to the
subjects or the materials used, such as by developing “real life” case studies
Substantive Tests

• Emphasize to their personnel the importance of obtaining evidence from third parties
whenever possible and that the presumption that receivables are to be confirmed
when they are material is not easily overcome

• Remind their personnel of other types of information, in addition to or in lieu of
receivable balances, that might be confirmed

• Develop case studies or other communications to audit personnel that illustrate the
dangers of losing control over the confirmation process, of accepting facsimile
responses to confirmation requests without taking appropriate precautions, and of not
following up and appropriately resolving all exceptions noted during the audit

• Require that at least an experienced audit manager review the resolution of all
“exceptions” noted in all areas of the audit and be satisfied that they were resolved
appropriately and that appropriate decisions regarding the need for additional
substantive tests were made
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Resolution of Issues
•

Continue to emphasize the importance of consulting on important issues

•

Vigorously enforce their consultation policies by taking strong actions with
respect to those who do not consult when they should, as revealed by the firm’s
inspection program or other events

To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.103 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
Linkage

• Request that peer reviewers evaluate the adequacy of the firm’s policies, procedures,
guidance, and training relating to linkage and extent of testing decisions, including
those involving sampling

• Request that peer reviewers determine whether the firm has conducted the requisite
training in these areas and to evaluate the effectiveness of the engagement teams’
implementation of the firm’s methodology and guidance materials

• Include items in the peer review questionnaires that are similar to those covered in the
QPRs, such as whether the specific tests performed or other actions taken in response
to the risk assessments were appropriate and sufficient, whether the thought processes
that led to the specific tests or actions were thorough and gave appropriate
consideration to the appropriate factors, whether those who initially selected and
subsequently reviewed the specific tests or other actions had the appropriate
knowledge and skills and did so on a timely basis, and whether the extent of testing
(including, when appropriate, sample sizes) for substantive tests was sufficient
Substantive Tests

• Request that peer reviewers evaluate whether engagement teams are (a) confirming
receivables whenever they are material unless the presumption that receivables will
be confirmed clearly has been overcome, (b) maintaining control over the
confirmation process, (c) taking appropriate precautions when facsimile responses to
confirmations are received, and (d) appropriately following up and resolving any
exceptions noted, and when appropriate, performing additional audit tests
Resolution of Issues

• Request that peer reviewers consider whether there were any issues on the audit
engagements reviewed for which they believed consultation would have been prudent
(or was required by firm policy) and for which it did not occur (or at least was not
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documented)

• Request that peer reviewers include their findings in these areas in their reports to the
SECPS Peer Review Committee

ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES
Overview of GAAS
2.104 Analytical procedures are defined by SAS No. 56, Analytical Procedures, as “evaluations
of financial information made by a study of plausible relationships among both financial and
nonfinancial data . . . . A basic premise underlying the application of analytical procedures is that
plausible relationships among data may reasonably be expected to exist and continue in the
absence of conditions to the contrary.” SAS No. 56 requires that analytical procedures be used
in audit planning and in the overall review stage of the audit. Analytical procedures also may be
used as substantive tests to identify potential material misstatements.
2.105 Analytical procedures involve comparisons of recorded amounts, or ratios developed
from recorded amounts, to expectations developed by the auditor. SAS No. 56 notes that “the
expected effectiveness and efficiency of an analytical procedure in identifying potential
misstatements depends on, among other things, (a) the nature of the assertion, (b) the plausibility
and predictability of the relationship, (c) the availability and reliability of the data used to
develop the expectation, and (d) the precision of the expectation.
2.106 Analytical procedures by nature tend to elicit inquiries to management as auditors search
for explanations when investigating significant unexpected differences. SAS No. 56 admonishes,
however, that “management responses… should ordinarily be corroborated with other evidential
matter.”
Findings
2.107 The QPR was designed to address all aspects of the use of analytical procedures in audits.
Analytical procedures used in planning were addressed in the QPR’s probe into the risk
assessments made by engagement teams, and analytical procedures used in the overall review
stage of audits were examined in the QPR’s probe into the resolution of audit issues. In the key
areas for each audit engagement, the QPR reviewers made direct inquiries concerning the
effectiveness of analytical procedures used as substantive tests. Lastly, in five additional audit
areas for each audit engagement, the reviewers addressed the effectiveness of analytical
procedures when used as the primary or sole substantive test for the particular area.
Analytical Procedures in Audit Planning
2.108 For audit planning purposes, analytical procedures are employed by auditors as a tool to
help the auditor understand the entity’s business and to identify areas that may represent specific
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risks relevant to the audit. Since most audits are planned before the end of an entity’s fiscal year,
it is understandable that the expectations developed at the planning stage often are not made with
a high degree of precision and are not intended to provide a high level of assurance. Analytical
procedures in planning are one of a number of important elements, however, in the risk
assessment process and in designing the scope of the audit, including making decisions about the
locations the auditor will visit.
2.109 The QPR results indicated that analytical procedures used in planning were appropriate
and were performed effectively. Furthermore, the results also indicated that the people involved
in the analytical review process had the appropriate knowledge and skills to carry it out
effectively. The QPR disclosed room for improved documentation of planning-stage analytical
procedures in 14% of the engagements.
Analytical Procedures in the Overall Review
2.110 In the overall review stage of the audit, the objective of analytical procedures is to assist
the auditor in assessing the conclusions reached and in evaluating the overall financial statement
presentation. The auditor considers the adequacy of evidence gathered in response to unusual or
unexpected balances identified in the planning and testing stages of the audit and unusual or
unexpected balances or relationships that were not previously identified. This overall review may
indicate the need for additional evidence.
2.111 The QPR results paint a mixed picture of how well auditors perform analytical
procedures in the final stage of the audit. In general, the analytical procedures performed were
appropriate, the people involved had the requisite knowledge and skills, the thought process was
thorough and considered the appropriate factors, and the timing of the analytical review was
appropriate. However, the adequacy of inquiries and corroboration of explanations was
questioned in 14% of the engagements reviewed. That, together with a perceived absence of
sufficient documentation in 25% of the engagements reviewed, raised some doubt about the
efficacy of the analytical review process at the completion of the audit.
Analytical Procedures as Substantive Tests
2.112 Analytical procedures that serve as substantive tests are used in many contexts. Some are
used in combination with tests of details; others are used as the primary or only substantive tests.
The selection of substantive analytical procedures can differ significantly between balance sheet
accounts and income statement accounts. The procedures selected also may vary with the
assessment of, and extent of testing undertaken on, internal control over a particular account or
class of transactions.
2.113 The QPR disclosed that in 73% of the key areas, substantive analytical procedures were
predominantly supplemental procedures used in combination with tests of details. When the
analytical procedures were the primary or only substantive tests, the QPR results indicated that
ordinarily they were appropriately designed and performed.
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2.114 In the five additional audit areas selected for each audit engagement, the QPR addressed
whether substantive analytical procedures were the primary or sole substantive tests. For the
most part, these five additional audit areas were not considered high-risk areas. The QPR results
indicated that in 75% of those areas, analytical procedures were not the primary or sole
substantive procedures.
2.115 In the remaining 25% of the additional audit areas, analytical procedures were used as the
primary or sole substantive test. In 20% of these remaining areas, the QPR reviewers deemed the
substantive analytical procedures insufficient to provide the necessary level of assurance. In
these instances, the insufficient procedures related to the income statement, such as sales or
revenue trends, gross profit ratios, and selling, general and administrative expenses. The QPR
reviewers found that the analytical procedures were sufficient when they were employed as
substantive tests of balance sheet areas. In those cases, the explanations of the results of the
procedures generally were corroborated appropriately, and the procedures themselves were
adequately documented. The QPR results generally reflect a belief by engagement personnel that
when analytical procedures were used as the primary or sole substantive test of balance sheet
accounts, they generated stronger evidence than when they were used as the primary or sole
substantive test of income statement accounts.
2.116 In assessing the mixed results of the QPR findings with respect to the use of analytical
procedures as substantive tests, the Panel observed that analytical procedures were not as
effective as primary procedures when expectations were not properly developed, materiality
thresholds for investigating differences were not clearly established, the analytical procedures
were superficial or explanations were not corroborated,17 and the documentation was inadequate.
The Panel reviewed the firms’ audit methodologies and guidance materials, guidance available
from the AICPA in the form of a 1998 Audit Practice Release, Analytical Procedures, and other
commercially available materials. All in all, the quantity of information on analytical procedures
is impressive, yet the QPR disclosed practice issues of sufficient importance that the Panel
concluded that the area needs attention.
*****
2.117 The Panel noted that the degree of specificity in audit firms’ methodologies and their
guidance on applying those methodologies varies significantly. It also appears to the Panel that a
gap exists between (a) what is available in the firms’ audit methodologies, professional
standards, and other guidance materials and (b) what actually transpires in practice. The gap
closes and the analytical procedures are more effective if a firm’s audit methodology contains
clear and unequivocal guidance requiring the appropriate use of analytical procedures in different
circumstances (including guidance on the characteristics of the data to be used, establishing
expectations, setting precision levels, employing explicit materiality thresholds, deciding on the
17

The Panel noted during its study of AAERs (see Appendix F) that the entities that engaged in the most
sophisticated frauds ordinarily were very concerned that “the numbers and the relationships among them would
‘look right’ to the auditors” when they performed analytical procedures. Thus, these entities would “play around”
with the numbers, often through the use of unsupported non-standard entries. In these circumstances, key ratios such
as the accounts receivable and inventory turnover ratios and the gross margin percentages would meet the auditors’
expectations rather than raising questions that might reveal the fraud.
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desired levels of assurance, and resolving differences). In addition to guidance materials and
methodology, training auditors in the effective use of analytical procedures by using “real-life,
practical, how-to” cases would appear to be invaluable.
Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.118 The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Enhance auditing standards for analytical procedures to provide more specificity
about what auditors need to do to design and perform analytical procedures in
differing circumstances. The auditing standards should:
•

Provide guidance on how to design substantive analytical procedures for different
types of accounts and assertions

•

Clearly articulate how relevant auditing concepts (for example, the concepts of
planning materiality, control risk assessment and testing of controls, and desired
levels of assurance) influence the design and performance of analytical
procedures

•

Provide guidance on linking analytical procedures in the overall review stage to
the auditor’s conclusions reached in the audit and the sufficiency of the audit
evidence that supports those conclusions

•

Specify appropriate documentation requirements

To audit firms:
2.119 The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Ensure that their audit methodologies provide definitive guidance on analytical
procedures. At a minimum, specific guidance should be provided in the following
areas:
•

Developing expectations.

•

Characteristics and reliability of different types of data.

•

Using planning materiality in designing substantive analytical procedures.

•

Establishing desired levels of assurance for substantive analytical procedures.
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•

Establishing precision levels that depend on the level of assurance the auditor
desires from the analytical procedures.

•

Relating control risk assessments to the objectives of analytical procedures.

•

Considering the role of account-level or assertion-level risk assessments (e.g., low
risk versus high risk assessments) in designing analytical procedures.

•

The effect of the nature of particular accounts or assertions (e.g., balance sheet vs.
income statement accounts) on analytical procedures.

•

Identifying, investigating and evaluating the results of analytical procedures
(including corroborating the responses to inquiries).

•

Specifying the appropriate level of personnel assigned to perform analytical
procedures, and the responsibilities of those assigned to review their work.

•

Assessing the results of analytical procedures in the final stage of the audit.

•

Documentation requirements consistent with the objectives of the analytical
procedures.

•

Ensuring that training programs specifically address analytical procedures, are
taken by all levels of audit personnel, and employ “real-life, practical, how-to”
case examples in varying circumstances that illustrate the firm’s methodology and
guidance. Depending on levels of personnel, such training programs should
include basic concepts of financial statement analysis as well as techniques used
by analysts in evaluating the securities of different types of entities.

To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.120 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Evaluate the firm’s methodology, guidance and training materials relating to
analytical procedures

• Determine whether the firm has carried out the requisite training and to evaluate the
effectiveness of the firm’s implementation of its methodology related to analytical
procedures on audit engagements

• Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer Review
Committee
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AUDITING REVENUE
Overview of GAAS
2.121 The 1999 COSO Report18 noted that either premature revenue recognition or recognition
of fictitious revenue occurred in approximately half of the cases of misstated financial statements
reported in the SEC’s AAERs issued in the period 1987-1997.19 Similarly, a substantial portion
of litigation against audit firms reported to the SECPS’s Quality Control Inquiry Committee
involves revenue recognition issues. Finally, a study of recent SEC enforcement actions made on
behalf of the Panel also indicated many problems related to revenue recognition.20
2.122 Auditing standards generally do not prescribe procedures for auditing specific financial
statement elements, and revenue is no exception. Auditing revenue starts with audit planning,
and SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision, requires the auditor to gain an understanding of the
entity’s business, internal control, type of products and services, related parties, locations, and
production, distribution and compensation methods. Other SASs that are relevant to testing
revenue deal with audit sampling, confirmations and other evidential matter, auditing accounting
estimates, analytical procedures, management representations, related parties, and using the work
of a specialist.
2.123 In addition, in November 1998 the AICPA SEC Practice Section issued Practice Alert
No. 98-3, Revenue Recognition Issues, and in January 1999 the AICPA staff issued a Notice to
Readers, Audit Issues in Revenue Recognition (sometimes referred to as the revenue recognition
“tool kit”). Both documents were intended to alert auditors to circumstances that could signal
improper revenue recognition and to describe procedures that auditors can use to limit audit risk
arising from improper revenue recognition.
2.124 The authoritative literature provides guidance on confirming receivables as a means of
obtaining evidence that the receivables exist and are genuine. Since revenue often is recognized
from transactions that concomitantly give rise to accounts receivable from a third party,
confirming those receivables provides evidence that the revenue transactions actually occurred.
SAS No. 67 provides guidance on selecting the items to be confirmed, designing the
confirmation requests, communicating with the right third party, and obtaining and evaluating
the responses. SAS No. 67 also discusses alternative procedures when receivables are not
confirmed. SAS No. 67 establishes a rebuttable presumption that the auditor will confirm
accounts receivable.

18

Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987 – 1997, An Analysis of U. S. Public Companies, research commissioned by
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (1999 COSO Report).
19
Revenue is used in its broadest sense to encompass, among others, sales of products or services, income from
leasing property, and income from investments.
20
The Panel noted during its study of AAERs (see Appendix F) that approximately 70% of the cases in the study
involved the overstatement of revenue, either from premature recognition or from recognizing fictitious revenue.
This finding is consistent with the findings of the 1999 COSO Report and other studies. Appendix F describes the
most frequent techniques noted for overstating revenue.
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Relevant Accounting Standards
2.125 Authoritative accounting guidance for recognizing revenue is mostly industry-specific,
and addresses such industries as franchising, software, construction contracting, real estate and
leasing. The general guidance is sparse,21 and the industry guidance is not wholly consistent.
Some of the restatements of revenue in recent years could be characterized as resulting from a
lack of clear guidance on how to deal with the many elements critical to revenue recognition,
such as the timing of delivery of products or services or the performance of activities over long
periods of time.22
2.126 Revenue has always been an important indicator of a company’s vitality and growth
prospects. Recently, however, revenue has taken on even more significance, as it has become the
primary basis for valuing some companies’ equity securities. For example, for some internetbased companies without any current earnings or prospects for earnings in the short term, the
market looks to surrogates for earnings or operating cash flows for valuation, and in some cases
revenue is the surrogate.
2.127 In December 1999 the staff of the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 101,
Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, which summarizes certain of the staff’s views on
applying GAAP to revenue recognition in financial statements.23 In addition to codifying the
staff’s views in some specific areas, such as “bill and hold” transactions, SAB No. 101 discusses
broad principles of revenue recognition. Some observers have noted that the SAB is in apparent
conflict with certain well-established practices.24
2.128 Further, in December 1999 the SEC asked the Emerging Issues Task Force to add to its
agenda accounting for revenue-generating arrangements that include multiple deliverables of
products or services. Expressing a view that allocations to deliverable elements should be based
upon relative fair values, the SEC also asked the ASB to develop guidance for practitioners on
what constitutes sufficient, verifiable, and objective evidence of fair values. The Panel
understands that the ASB is developing an audit guide on revenue recognition.
Findings
2.129 The 1999 COSO Report, the information the Panel gathered from its analysis of AAERs,
and other litigation naming auditors, all indicate a particular need for auditors to examine
21

Examples of general guidance on revenue recognition include Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 5,
Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises; Accounting Principles Board
Opinion No. 10, Omnibus Opinion – 1966; and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 48, Revenue
Recognition When Right of Return Exists.
22
The 1999 COSO Report noted, however, that half of the frauds that related to improper revenue recognition
involved purely fictitious sales.
23
SABs are not Commission rules or interpretations and are not officially approved by the Commission. They
represent staff interpretations in administering the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. SABs are
usually narrow in focus and issued in question and answer format. Because they are not official SEC rules, SABs are
issued without exposure for comment.
24
For example, some observers would argue that the SAB gives greater weight to contractual customer acceptance
clauses in determining whether revenue recognition is appropriate than is necessary in many cases.

44

revenue transactions near the end of the period under audit. Also, auditors should be alert for
indications of management override of controls with respect to period-end transactions. The
COSO Report notes that, “Findings suggest a continued need for evaluating and testing controls
related to recording end-of-period accounts and transactions….”
2.130 The number of negative comments made by the QPR reviewers related to auditing
revenue was relatively low, but they generally were higher than in other areas. The specific
aspects of auditing revenue for which the rate of negative responses was higher than in the other
key areas included:

• Obtaining a sufficient understanding of information systems and control activities,
including consideration of the computer environment and processing, to identify and
assess control risk

• The resultant assessment of control risk
• The appropriate involvement of information technology specialists in understanding,
assessing and testing the information systems and control activities

• Focusing tests at the right controls
• The appropriateness of the nature, timing and extent of tests of controls
2.131 Despite these results, the QPR reviewers generally agreed that the resulting substantive
tests were adequate because little reliance was placed on internal control, even when controls
were tested. The reviewers noted, however, that a better understanding of the systems and
controls might have led the auditors to design more effective or additional substantive tests.
2.132 There also were many positive findings. For example, the reviewers reported that they
believed that appropriate consultation had occurred in all instances in which it was necessary
(although the documentation could have been better), and that substantive analytical procedures
were well executed.
2.133 Many respondents to the Panel’s survey and commentators at the public hearings
expressed the belief that auditors should pay more attention to, and be better trained in,
accounting for and auditing revenue. One analyst opined that, unlike financial statement
restatements resulting from other issues, revenue recognition issues may signal fundamental
problems with the business.
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Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.134 The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Require that auditors test the cutoff of revenue when inherent or control risks over
such transactions are other than low and specifically when there is a high level of
sales transactions or individually significant sales transactions near the end of the
reporting period. Cutoff tests should be more extensive than tests of only a few
transactions before and after the close of the period. Cutoff testing often should
require the auditor’s physical presence at the entity’s location(s) at period end.

• Reconsider its standard on the confirmation process (SAS No. 67) and clarify the
circumstances in which confirmation of the terms of transactions should be required.
The terms of revenue transactions should be confirmed whenever the transactions are
individually significant and the risks associated with revenue recognition or the
existence of receivables are high. This might be appropriate even if the auditor
believes that confirmation of balances is ineffective.25

• Give the highest priority to completing its proposed audit guide for revenue
recognition.
To audit firms:
2.135 The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Test the cutoff of revenue when inherent or control risks over such transactions are
other than low, and specifically when there is a high level of sales transactions or
individually significant sales transactions near the end of the reporting period. Cutoff
tests should be more extensive than tests of only a few transactions before and after
the close of the period. Cutoff testing often should require the auditor’s physical
presence at the entity’s location(s) at period end.

• Develop training materials, including case studies, focused on auditing revenue
recognition issues in specific industries. Require the training for professionals
working engagements in those industries.

25

Confirmation of terms can be helpful in identifying the existence of any “side agreements,” which the 1999 COSO
Report identified as a significant factor in some misstatements of revenue.
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To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.136 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Consider the adequacy of the firms’ policies, guidance and training (and any changes
in them) in the area of auditing revenue recognition

• Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer Review
Committee
To the Financial Accounting Standards Board:
2.137 The Panel recommends that the FASB:

• Add revenue recognition to its agenda. The Panel realizes that this would be a longterm project, but believes that an authoritative statement on the broad principles of
revenue recognition is sorely needed.

• Identify and resolve or clarify areas of diverse or uncertain practice in the area of
revenue recognition in the existing professional literature.

AUDITING ESTIMATES AND JUDGMENTS
Overview of GAAS
2.138 Financial statements generally are replete with accounting estimates and judgments.
Concerns most frequently cited about auditing those estimates and judgments relate to
restructuring and merger-related reserves26 and the use of those and other reserves to “manage”
earnings.
2.139 SAS No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates, defines an accounting estimate as an
approximation of a financial statement element, item or account.27 It describes aspects of an
entity’s internal control that may reduce the likelihood of material misstatements of accounting
estimates, and contains guidance in evaluating (i) whether management has identified all

26

The term reserves is used in this Report to refer to allowances for estimated losses that are displayed either as
liabilities (e.g., a product warranty reserve) or as reductions of assets. (e.g., a loan loss reserve). Modern usage
generally avoids the term reserves in financial statements, and instead refers to “estimated liabilities” and asset
“allowance” accounts. The term reserves, however, continues to be widely used in other contexts.
27
SAS No. 57 states that “accounting estimates are often included in historical financial statements because (a) the
measurement of some amounts or the valuation of some accounts is uncertain, pending the outcome of future events
or (b) relevant data concerning events that have already occurred cannot be accumulated on a timely, cost-effective
basis.”
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accounting estimates that could be material to the financial statements and (ii) the reasonableness
of an estimate.
2.140 The SAS states that in evaluating reasonableness, the auditor should obtain an
understanding of how management developed the estimate. Based on that understanding, the
auditor should use one or a combination of the following approaches: (a) review and test the
process used by management to develop the estimate, (b) develop an independent expectation28
of the estimate to corroborate the reasonableness of management’s estimate, and (c) review
subsequent events or transactions occurring prior to completion of fieldwork. SAS No. 57 also
provides guidance on how to review and test management’s process (including the possibility of
using the work of a specialist regarding certain assumptions).
Unique Audit Problems
2.141 There are at least three reasons why it is difficult to audit accounts involving estimates
and judgments.
2.142 First, there may be little “hard” evidence supporting the amounts. Unlike a transaction
with a third party, there is seldom any external documentation, such as a contract, invoice or
purchase order. Except in a few instances, the authoritative accounting literature has no required
minimum levels of documentation to support the establishment of or subsequent activity in
reserves.29 Sometimes the only significant documentation may be that prepared by auditors to
support their conclusions.
2.143 Second, the amounts involve subjective estimation and judgment.30 Unlike most third–
party transactions, the amounts involved are not fixed. They may be based upon a range of
potential results, and reasonable people may disagree on the most likely outcome or amount.
2.144 Third, activity in reserves may be driven principally by management’s intentions and
decisions rather than by external events or transactions. (For example, management has the
ability to determine whether it will offer to settle outstanding litigation.) Indeed, determining
just when management’s intentions create a liability has vexed accountants and auditors for
decades, and, for example, has been a significant factor in the uncertainties surrounding the
accounting for restructuring and similar reserves.

28

See the section on analytical procedures in this chapter for a discussion of the concept of developing expectations,
and related recommendations to the ASB.
29
Among the accounting pronouncements on estimates and judgments that do address documentation are: EITF
Issue No. 94-3, Liability Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other Costs to Exit an Activity
(including Certain Costs Incurred in a Restructuring), EITF Issue No. 95-3, Recognition of Liabilities in Connection
with a Purchase Business Combination, and SAB No. 100, Restructuring and Impairment Charges. SFAS No. 133,
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, although unrelated to reserves, addresses the
appropriate documentation when management designates financial instruments as hedges.
30
Because of the pervasiveness of estimates, the AICPA’s Statement of Position 94-6, Disclosure of Certain Risks
and Uncertainties, requires disclosure (i) that the preparation of financial statements in conformity with GAAP
requires the use of management’s estimates and (ii) when it is reasonably possible that a material change in estimate
will occur in the near term.
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Relevant Accounting Standards
2.145 The principal accounting guidance for reserves is Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, issued in 1975.31 That statement calls
for the accrual of a loss contingency when it is probable that an asset has been impaired or a
liability incurred at the date of issuance of the financial statements and the loss can be
reasonably estimated. General or unspecified business risks do not meet these conditions for
accrual. Inappropriate reserves also include (i) amounts accrued in excess of those meeting the
SFAS No. 5 conditions and (ii) amounts maintained in reserves that are not reversed into income
after the event for which they had been established had occurred or failed to occur.
2.146 SFAS No. 5 offers little clarification as to when management’s intent can result in an
asset having become impaired or a liability having been created. Certain accruals that are
triggered in part by management intent are addressed in the literature.32 In other cases, it may be
difficult to distinguish between the appropriate accrual of a loss contingency based on GAAP
and an inappropriate accrual of future expenses.33
2.147 Another apparent area of confusion is the belief by some that reserves are “fungible,” and
are therefore “allocable” to financial statement risks other than those for which the reserves were
initially established. For example, a company with an excess income tax accrual and an
understated allowance for doubtful accounts might “reallocate” the tax reserve, rather, than
reversing the unneeded tax accrual into income and separately accruing a provision for doubtful
accounts. Similarly, an unused or excessive restructuring reserve might be used to offset the cost
of a new restructuring. Such reallocations are not appropriate under SFAS No. 5; rather, GAAP
would require separate accounting and disclosure of both amounts, if material.
2.148 In his testimony at the Panel’s open hearings, the chairman of the FASB noted that there
is a direct relationship between the effectiveness of accounting standards and the financial
reporting system on the one hand, and the ability of auditors to be effective on the other hand.
The Panel agrees. It appears to the Panel that the confusion (warranted or not) over the
appropriate application of SFAS No. 5 and related guidance, such as that for restructuring and
similar reserves, may reduce audit effectiveness. Among the matters that could be clarified are:

• Which future expenses or operating losses qualify for loss accrual when management
intends or commits to incur them? (That is, when does management intent create a
liability?)

31

Additional guidance includes FASB Interpretation No. 14, Reasonable Estimation of a Loss.
See, for example, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 30, Reporting the Results of Operations – Reporting
the Effects of Disposal of a Segment of a Business, and Extraordinary, Unusual and Infrequently Occurring Events
and Transactions, and EITF Issue No. 94-3, (see note 28); SFAS No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of LongLived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of.
33
An example of the latter would be the accrual of incremental or redundant future costs, such as the anticipated
costs of running parallel accounting systems during the introduction of a new system. (To illustrate the point in the
extreme, if expenses that are only “committed” could be accrued, then, arguably, next year’s budget might be
accruable because such expenses are both probable and estimable.)
32
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• What is the “date of issuance” of financial statements for purposes of loss accruals?34
• Are there minimum levels of documentation that registrants should prepare regarding
activity in reserves? Examples of minimum documentation might include a
description and the dates of the specific event or events that caused the reserve
activity, an analysis of compliance with SFAS No. 5 and other relevant standards, and
approvals by appropriate levels of authority.

• Are there minimum levels of homogeneity and other characteristics that must exist for
contingent losses to be collectively evaluated?
reserves “fungible” or “allocable”?)

(To what extent -- if any -- are

2.149 In January 2000 the SEC proposed changes to clarify and expand disclosures related to
changes in certain reserves.35 The proposal also would reposition the disclosures (which
companies currently present in a schedule) to the forepart of the filing document.
Findings
2.150 The QPR reviewers found that the most effective auditing of amounts subject to
estimation and judgment occurred when the senior members of the engagement team (including
the engagement and concurring partners, designated consulting partners, and functional
specialists) were involved significantly and on a timely basis. The reviewers reported positive
findings in the areas of risk assessment and linkage of those assessments to substantive tests. The
matters cited most frequently for potential improvement involved documentation and
corroboration of management inquiries and representations. Because the audit evidence is
usually internally generated, management’s representations often are critical to the audit process,
although the auditor should corroborate those representations. The reviewers did not find
widespread development of independent expectations related to reserves, one of the techniques
suggested by SAS No. 57 for evaluating the reasonableness of estimates. Finally, in some
instances the reviewers were concerned that not all issues related to reserves had been
appropriately resolved. In those few instances, the reviewers were satisfied nonetheless that the
overall audit results were satisfactory.
2.151 The QPR disclosed that auditors generally did not document internal control in the area
of reserves. A registrant’s lack of specific controls related to accounting estimates -- including
documentation and adequate review and approval by appropriate levels of authority – presents an
34

The Panel understands that there have been widely differing views as to the date of issuance, ranging from a
public release of earnings to the filing of a Form 10-K or 10-Q. The Panel is aware that in December 1999 the SEC
staff indicated its general view that financial statements are “issued” as of the date they are distributed for general
use and reliance, and that a press release of earnings does not constitute issuance. However, that may present a
significant public policy question: should the investing community view all earnings releases as tentative? Should
they be considered subject to change for revisions of estimates for events that may occur between the release of
earnings and an uncertain future date? The Panel doubts that this view is understood by investors today, and
believes that investors base decisions on earnings releases, which are assumed to be reliable unless otherwise
indicated.
35
Proposed Rule: Supplementary Financial Information, Release Nos. 33-7793 and 34-42354 (January 21, 2000).
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audit issue as well as a possible matter to be communicated to the entity. 36 In some instances,
the QPR reviewers noted confusion or misunderstanding by both the registrant and the auditor
about the appropriate application of the relevant accounting standards.
2.152 Many respondents to the Panel’s survey and speakers at the public hearings urged more
auditor involvement in the entity’s reporting of reserves in its interim financial statements. Some
noted that financial frauds often originate in interim periods. The SEC recently adopted rules
requiring reviews of interim financial information by the company’s independent auditors before
that information is filed with the SEC. The Panel believes this should improve financial reporting
and audit effectiveness.
2.153 Some participants in the Panel’s study noted that many accounting standards involving
accounting estimates are complex and require a significant amount of judgment.37
In
establishing new standards, the FASB evaluates (among other things) the cost-effectiveness of
the accounting information. Some have expressed concern that FASB standards are increasingly
difficult not only to implement but also to audit. On the one hand, the FASB may receive few if
any comments as to audit practicability during the period of exposure of proposed standards. On
the other hand, auditors may not be able to identify all of the issues until a new standard is
implemented and the results first audited. The Panel understands that there is communication
between the staffs of the ASB and the FASB as audit issues related to new standards are
identified. Those efforts often take place after the standards have been issued, however, and there
is little formal assessment of the auditability of proposed accounting standards.

36

The auditor should consider whether such a situation could represent a reportable condition that should be
communicated to the audit committee (SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Related Matters in an
Audit). A registrant’s lack of controls and related documentation potentially might constitute a violation of Section
13(b)(2)-(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (known as the “books and records and internal control
provisions,” and part of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977), which requires keeping books, records and
accounts in reasonable detail.
37 Recent exa mples include:
• SFAS No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes – Measurement of deferred tax assets is based upon an
assessment of whether realizability is “more likely than not.” In certain circumstances, the assessment
must include tax planning strategies that meet certain criteria, which expands even further the
judgment required.
• SFAS No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be
Disposed Of – Both recognition and measurement of impairment may be based upon forecasts of
future cash flows .
• SFAS No. 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of
Liabilities – Determination of whether an asset has been sold or a liability extinguished may depend on
complicated legal determinations. Auditors must assess whether legal opinions support those
determinations.
• SFAS No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities – All derivatives are
recognized and measured at fair value. Techniques for valuation may be intricate, and may include
expected future cash flows, option-pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and
fundamental analysis.
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Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.154 The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Provide detailed guidance regarding the auditing of reserves.38 The Panel understands
that the ASB intends to prepare a guide for auditing reserves along the lines of the
Notice to Readers, Audit Issues in Revenue Recognition that it issued in 1999. The
Panel urges the ASB to assign a high priority to this effort, and believes that the
guidance should include assessing the sufficiency of evidential matter supporting
reserve activity and corroborating internally-generated documentation.

• Establish a formal protocol to assess the auditability of proposed accounting
standards prior to their issuance. Any field tests of proposed standards should also
include evaluations of auditability. Further, the liaison between the ASB and the
FASB that exists currently should be formalized to help ensure timely identification
of and reaction to audit issues related to accounting standards.39
To audit firms:
2.155 The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Provide training on the application of SAS No. 57 and the provisions of SFAS No. 5
and related guidance

• Encourage engagement teams to apply audit tests to reserve activity on a timely basis
– for example, during the performance of interim reviews

• Adopt policies or internal guidance that promote partner and manager involvement in
the evaluation of reserve activity during interim reviews (if they do not already have
such policies or guidance)

38

The Panel notes that in December 1999 the Chief Accountant of the SEC recommended that the ASB add this
project to its agenda. He indicated that the SEC was aware of audit problems involving reserves and suggested areas
where additional guidance was needed.
39
The AICPA’s Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) issues comment letters on behalf of the
AICPA on standards proposed by the FASB. These letters usually are limited to accounting matters and generally do
not address implementation or auditability issues. This may occur because of an often-held view that, if an
accounting standard can be implemented by financial statement preparers, the results also can be audited. The Panel
recognizes that the current staff levels and structure of the ASB do not lend themselves to easy implementation of
this recommendation. For the most part, the profession has looked to the firms to identify implementation and
audibility issues and to forward them directly to the FASB. Nonetheless, the Panel believes that AcSEC and the
ASB should analyze both the accounting and auditing aspects of proposed accounting standards.
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To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.156 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Evaluate firms’ policies, training and guidance materials on auditing estimates and
judgments

• Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer Review
Committee
To the Financial Accounting Standards Board:

2.157 The Panel recommends that the FASB:

• Reconsider accounting for contingencies. Recognizing that this may be a long-term
project, in the interim the FASB (or another appropriate body such as AcSEC or the
EITF) should identify and clarify matters that appear to be causing confusion and
misunderstandings

• Establish a formal protocol with the ASB to assess the auditability of proposed
accounting standards before they are issued, including evaluations of auditability
when proposed standards are field tested

• Formalize the existing liaison between the ASB and the FASB to help ensure timely
identification of and reaction to audit issues related standards after they are issued
To audit committees:
2.158 The Panel recommends that audit committees:

• Evaluate the nature of entities’ reserves and review activity in them with both
management and the auditor.

MATERIALITY, WAIVED ADJUSTMENTS, AND ANALYSTS’
EXPECTATIONS
Overview of GAAS
2.159 SAS No. 47 recognizes that the auditor may become aware of misstatements during the
audit that, individually and in the aggregate, are not material to whether the financial statements
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are presented fairly in conformity with GAAP.40 The SAS instructs the auditor to aggregate the
misstatements that the entity has not corrected in a way that enables him or her to consider
whether, in relation to individual amounts, subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they
materially misstate the financial statements taken as a whole. SAS No. 47 points out that there
are both qualitative well as quantitative aspects of materiality.
2.160 In recent years there have been numerous instances of the price of a company’s stock
dropping precipitously when the company failed to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts by only a
penny or two a share, or failed to meet their revenue forecasts. The Chairman and the Chief
Accountant of the SEC, among others, have expressed concerns that some registrants may have
been “managing” their earnings inappropriately (often referred to as “earnings management”) in
order to meet analysts’ forecasts and thereby avoid a precipitous drop in the price of their stock.
They also have expressed concern that auditors have not challenged these actions, but instead
have “waived” known potential misstatements of earnings or revenue because the amounts
involved were quantitatively immaterial.
2.161 In August 1999, the staff of the SEC issued SAB No. 99, Materiality, which states that
registrants and auditors should not rely exclusively on quantitative benchmarks, such as five
percent of net income, to determine whether an item, or the aggregation of items, is material to
the financial statements. The SAB describes various qualitative factors (e.g., whether a
misstatement affects the trend of earnings, whether analysts’ forecasts are met, and whether a
loan covenant is violated) that also should be considered when making materiality decisions.
2.162 In December 1999, the ASB issued SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments, which requires the
representation letter that the auditor obtains from management to include an acknowledgment by
management that it has considered the misstatements aggregated by the auditor and concluded
that any uncorrected misstatements (often referred to as waived adjustments) are immaterial. The
SAS also requires that a summary of the waived adjustments be included in or attached to the
representation letter and that those misstatements be reported to the audit committee.
Findings
2.163 The QPR reviewers determined whether the audit engagement teams were aware of and
considered analysts’ forecasts, especially when evaluating waived adjustments. The reviewers
also considered whether they agreed with the engagement team’s conclusions that it was
appropriate to waive the uncorrected misstatements and whether the waived adjustments enabled
the companies to meet analysts’ forecasts.

40

Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information (Glossary and paragraphs 123-132), describes the concept of materiality as follows: “The omission or
misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the magnitude
of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have
been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.” This formulation is in substance equivalent
to the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court that a fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the … fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information
made available.” Each Statement of Financial Accounting Standards adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) states, “The provisions of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items.”
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2.164 The QPR found that analysts’ forecasts were publicly available for 60% of the audits
reviewed. The QPR reviewers reported that the engagement team considered those forecasts
when evaluating waived adjustments on 60% of the engagements for which analysts’ forecasts
were available. (During the QPR, the Panel became aware that one firm provides all its
engagement partners with the latest information regarding analysts’ forecasts, as well as the
entity’s latest earnings announcements, for each of their clients.)
2.165 The Panel believes, based on its own observations and experience, the focus group
discussions, and interviews with audit professionals during the QPRs and in other forums, that
auditors will improve their understanding of the entity’s control environment, business, and
industry if they are aware of analysts’ forecasts and reports on the entity, the information
management provides to the analysts, and management’s policies and processes for
communicating that information.
2.166 The QPR reviewers reported that the waived adjustments did not affect whether the
company met the analysts’ forecasts on 66% of the engagements reviewed where analysts’
forecasts were publicly available, that they could not ascertain whether the waived adjustments
affected whether the company met the forecasts on 33% of the engagements reviewed where
analysts’ forecasts were publicly available, and that the waived adjustments may have affected
whether the company met the analysts’ forecasts on, at most, only one of the engagements
reviewed.
2.167 The QPR reviewers generally agreed with the engagement team’s conclusions that it was
appropriate to waive the proposed adjustments and with the engagement team’s reasons for
waiving them. The reviewers also generally agreed that the upper level engagement team
members (ordinarily the engagement partner, concurring partner, manager, and in-charge
accountant) thoroughly reviewed the summary of waived adjustments, and that the engagement
team thoroughly discussed the waived adjustments with upper-level entity management.
2.168 In those few situations (approximately 4% of the engagements reviewed) in which the
QPR reviewer did not agree with the engagement team’s conclusion that it was appropriate to
waive the proposed adjustments, the reviewer either was satisfied that the waived adjustments
did not have a material effect on the overall financial statements or the matter was referred to the
firm for appropriate resolution.
2.169 The Panel understands that the Auditing Standards Board is currently working on a
project to update the auditing standards as they relate to materiality in view of the issuance of
SAB No. 99 and changing views regarding the criteria for determining whether an item is
material.41
2.170 The QPR reviewers reported that the audit firms treat proposed adjustments differently in
judging whether they are material. Some firms use the so-called “iron curtain” approach, in
which the effects of all (cumulative) uncorrected misstatements are deemed to affect the current
period’s income statement as well as the balance sheet. Other firms use the so-called “rollover”
41

The Panel has not attempted to assess all of the implications of SAB No. 99, which was issued after the audits
covered in the QPR were conducted and the related audit reports issued.
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approach, in which the cumulative uncorrected misstatements, net of the uncorrected
misstatements carried over from the prior year (i.e., “rolled over”), are deemed to affect the
current period’s income statement. The balance sheet effects are the same under both methods.
Both techniques are permitted under SAS No. 47. While good arguments can be made for either
method, the Panel believes that permitting both methods is potentially confusing, especially in
view of the provisions in SAS No. 89 requiring that waived adjustments be addressed in
management’s representation letter and be reported to the audit committee.
Recomme ndations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.171 The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Provide additional authoritative guidance to assist auditors in determining whether
identified misstatements are material. (The Panel understands the ASB is considering
this subject.)

• Specify, in cooperation with the FASB if necessary, that there be only one method of
handling prior periods’ uncorrected misstatements when determining whether
proposed adjustments are material, (The Panel understands that this matter is on the
ASB’s agenda and recognizes that the ASB and the FASB likely would need to
develop an appropriate method of transitioning to the chosen method.)

• Require the auditor to consider published analysts’ reports and forecasts when
gaining an understanding of the entity’s business and industry, assessing risks, and
considering whether the effects of identified misstatements are material.
To audit firms:
2.172 The Panel recommends that audit firms adopt policies (unless they already have done so)
requiring engagement teams to:

• Obtain an understanding of the entity’s policies and processes, if any, for
communicating information to analysts

• Obtain analysts’ reports and forecasts as part of gaining an understanding of the
entity’s business, consider the effects of those forecasts and the information in those
reports when assessing risks and evaluating important issues, and include them
among the factors considered when evaluating the materiality of potential adjustments

• Become aware of the information management is providing to analysts, such as by
reading transcripts of the presentations or by listening to management’s presentations
to analysts when the presentations are available by telephone, videotape, the internet
or other public communications vehicle
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To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.173 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Evaluate the effectiveness with which engagement teams implement SAS No. 89 and
SAB No. 99 and determine whether additional guidance or training is needed

• Review and evaluate the firm’s policies, if any, for understanding the entity’s policies
and processes for communicating information to analysts; obtaining analysts’ reports
and forecasts, and considering them when assessing risks and evaluating important
issues and the materiality of potential adjustments; and becoming aware of the
information management is providing to analysts

• Evaluate the effectiveness with which engagement teams implement their firms’
policies and determine whether additional guidance or training is needed

• Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer Review
Committee

GOING CONCERN CONSIDERATIONS
Overview of GAAS
2.174 Financial statements are prepared on the assumption that the entity will continue as a
going concern. SAS No. 59, The Auditor’s Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a
Going Concern, requires the auditor to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time.42 Conditions and
events identified through the performance of audit tests over the course of the audit are
considered in the aggregate to determine if there could be such doubt.43 In the face of such
doubt, the auditor expands the audit tests to obtain evidence about management’s plans that are
intended to mitigate the effects of the identified conditions and events and assess the likelihood

42

“A reasonable period of time” is defined in SAS No. 59 as a period of time not to exceed one year beyond the date
of the financial statements being audited, and is often referred to as the one year time horizon in SAS No. 59. The
concept also is recognized in Section 10A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which requires
that the auditor evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the issuer to continue as a going
concern during the ensuing fiscal year.
43
These conditions and events may include negative trends (e.g., recurring operating losses, working capital
deficiencies, negative cash flows from operating activities, or adverse key financial ratios), indications of financial
difficulties (e.g., default on loan agreements, restructuring of debt, need to seek new sources or methods of
financing), internal matters (e.g. work stoppages or substantial dependence on the success of a particular project), or
external matters (e.g., legal proceedings that might jeopardize an entity’s ability to operate, loss of a key license or
patent, or loss of a principal customer).
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that such plans can be implemented effectively. 44 After evaluating management’s plans, the
auditor should conclude whether substantial doubt exists about the entity’s ability to continue as
a going concern for a reasonable period of time. If substantial doubt exists, an explanatory
paragraph is included in the auditor’s report.
2.175 Authoritative accounting pronouncements contain no explicit going concern disclosure
requirements. The established practice is for the entity to include going concern disclosures in
the financial statements. SAS No. 59 requires that an auditor consider the adequacy of any going
concern disclosures in the financial statements, whether or not an explanatory paragraph has
been added to the auditor’s report. Such disclosures might include the conditions and events
giving rise to the assessment of substantial doubt, including their possible effects and
management’s evaluation of their significance; mitigating factors; possible discontinuance of
operations; and management’s plans.
2.176 SAS No. 59 does not require an auditor to predict future conditions or events and states
that the absence of a reference to substantial doubt in an auditor’s report should not be viewed as
providing assurance that an entity will continue as a going concern.
Findings
2.177 The QPR reviewers sought to assess whether engagement teams were alert to the audit
risks relating to an entity’s liquidity, particularly when there may be substantial doubt about an
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern or when there are severe concerns about the
entity’s liquidity. Indications of significant audit risks involving the entity’s viability existed on
49 of the 126 QPR engagements. For these 49 engagements, QPR reviewers made inquiries
specifically targeted at the audit risks and issues resulting from concern over the entity’s
viability.
2.178 The reviewers agreed that in all cases the engagement teams were alert to the presence of
information that could give rise to the need to evaluate whether there was substantial doubt about
the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, evaluated management’s plans in sufficient
depth, reached supportable conclusions regarding the entity’s ability to continue as a going
concern, and gave appropriate consideration to the need for financial statement disclosure when
the substantial doubt was alleviated. Generally, reviewers agreed with engagement teams’
decisions regarding the need to consult and the depth of such consultations.
2.179 Similar to other areas in the QPR, corroboration of management’s representations and,
more frequently, documentation were cited as areas for improvement, particularly in connection
with the evaluation of prospective financial information that is significant to management’s
plans. Even in those cases, however, the reviewer still agreed with the engagement team’s
overall conclusions.
2.180 In addition to evaluating the generally positive QPR results, the Panel also considered
factors in the current economic environment that highlight the importance of the auditor’s going44

Management’s plans may include plans to dispose of assets, borrow money, restructure debt, reduce
expenditures, or increase equity ownership.
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concern responsibilities. Some entities rely heavily on the availability of external financing,
rather than profitable operations, for continuing in business. The current economic climate has
accommodated these entities; but that could quickly change. Liquidity pressures can arise quite
suddenly, raising the question of the adequacy of the current required financial statement
disclosures about financial flexibility and the possible consequences on an entity’s goingconcern status. Furthermore, formalizing the notion that management, not the auditor, has the
primary responsibility for going concern assessments and disclosures would provide a sound
conceptual underpinning for users’ understanding of the going concern concept. As a result, the
Panel concluded that, in addition to its recommendations designed to improve audit performance,
it also should address certain of its recommendations to the FASB.
Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.181 The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Provide expanded guidance and specific examples of the auditing procedures to be
performed and the audit evidence to be obtained when considering management’s
plans for mitigating the adverse effects of conditions and events that raised the
auditor’s substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.
Particular consideration should be given to circumstances in which reliance is placed
on proposed cost reductions and other prospective financial information. The nature,
timing and extent of the procedures to be performed should be specified.
To audit firms:
2.182 The Panel recommends that audit firms incorporate the following matters into their
training programs and audit methodologies:

• Specific guidance on considering management’s plans for mitigating the adverse
effects of conditions and events that created the auditor’s substantial doubt about the
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, including guidance on evidence
supporting proposed cost reductions or other prospective financial information

• Practice aids, such as a template for confirming plans involving third-party financial
support, and “real life” examples of evidential matter that will corroborate
representations regarding management’s plans, as well as examples of evidential
matter that will not
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.183 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Evaluate the adequacy of the firms’ guidance and training (and any changes in them)
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in the area of going concern considerations

• Request that peer reviewers include their findings in this area in their reports to the
SECPS Peer Review Committee
To the Financial Accounting Standards Board:
2.184 The Panel recommends that the FASB:

• Define the going concern concept and clarify that management, not the auditor, has
the primary responsibility to assess whether the entity is a going concern.

• Consider the appropriateness of the one-year time horizon in SAS No. 59. The FASB
should challenge this time horizon and recognize its importance to auditors in framing
their audit reports.

• Promulgate

explicit going concern disclosure requirements to fit various
circumstances. Such requirements should include disclosures about the entity’s
reliance on the financial support of related or third parties to mitigate the adverse
effects of conditions and events that create substantial doubt about the entity’s ability
to continue as a going concern.

USE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS
2.185 Internal auditors are responsible for providing analyses, evaluations, assurances,
recommendations, and other information to an entity's management and audit committee or
others with equivalent authority and responsibility. To fill this responsibility, internal auditors
must be objective with respect to the activity being audited. Although the functions of internal
audit vary from company to company, most internal audit functions monitor the performance of
the entity's controls.
Overview of GAAS
2.186 SAS No. 65, The Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal Audit Function in an Audit of
Financial Statements, provides guidance on the independent auditor’s use of internal audit. It
requires the independent auditor to obtain an understanding of the internal audit function
sufficient to identify those internal audit activities that are relevant to planning the audit.
2.187 If, after obtaining an understanding of the internal audit function, the independent auditor
concludes that the internal auditors' activities are not relevant to the financial statement audit, the
independent auditor does not have to give further consideration to the internal audit function,
unless the independent auditor requests direct assistance from the internal auditors. Even if some
of the internal auditors' activities are relevant to the audit, the independent auditor may conclude
that it would not be efficient to consider further the work of the internal auditors. If the
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independent auditor decides that it would be efficient to consider how the internal auditors' work
might affect the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests, the independent auditor should assess
the competence and objectivity of the internal audit function. The internal auditors' work may
affect the procedures the independent auditor performs in obtaining an understanding of the
entity's internal control and assessing risk, and the substantive tests he or she performs.
2.188 When the work of the internal auditors is expected to affect the audit, the independent
auditor should consider the extent of the effect, coordinate the audit work with the internal
auditors, and evaluate and test the effectiveness of the internal auditors' work. These tests may be
accomplished by either (a) examining some of the controls, transactions, or balances that the
internal auditors examined or (b) examining similar controls, transactions, or balances not
actually examined by the internal auditors.
2.189 In performing the audit, the independent auditor may request direct assistance from the
internal auditors. This direct assistance relates to work the independent auditor specifically
requests the internal auditors to perform to complete some aspect of the independent auditor's
work. When direct assistance is provided, the independent auditor should assess the internal
auditors' competence and objectivity and supervise, review, evaluate, and test the work
performed by the internal auditors to the extent appropriate in the circumstances.
Findings
2.190 The QPR reviewers reported that on 16% of the engagements reviewed, the independent
auditors made significant use of the work of internal audit, or used internal audit to provide
direct assistance to the engagement team to document internal control, test internal control, or
perform substantive tests of details.
2.191 The reviewers generally agreed that the people involved in assessing the overall
effectiveness of internal audit and reviewing its work had the appropriate knowledge and skills to
do so, that the engagement teams had a sufficient basis for making use of the work of internal
audit or for using internal audit to provide direct assistance to the engagement team, and that the
engagement team’s review of the direct-assistance work was sufficient to support its use. Some
questioned the sufficiency of the engagement team’s review of the direct-assistance work and
whether adequate re-testing of internal audit work was performed.45

45

The Panel noted during its study of AAERs (see Appendix F) a very limited number of situations in which the
external auditors may not have tested, supervised, and reviewed the internal auditors’ work as thoroughly as would
have been desirable.
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Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.192 The Panel recommends that the Auditing Standards Board:

• Revise SAS No. 65 to establish more definitive and specific criteria and requirements
for testing the work performed by internal audit
To the audit firms:
2.193 The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Review the adequacy of their policies requiring auditors to test the work performed
by internal audit and document their work relating to internal audit

• Consider during their internal inspection programs whether engagement teams are
using the work of internal audit excessively, especially on large engagements
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.194 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Address the adequacy of the firm’s policies, procedures, and guidance on the testing
of internal audit work and the documentation of the auditor’s consideration and work
related to internal audit

• Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer Review
Committee

COMMUNICATING WITH AUDIT COMMITTEES
Background and Overview of GAAS
2.195 Audit committees of boards of directors have become a well-recognized and important
element in the governance of U.S. public entities, and increasingly in other countries.
2.196 The SEC has long supported strong, independent audit committees. In 1974 and 1978, the
SEC adopted rules requiring annual disclosures about the existence and composition of the audit
committee, the functions it performs, and the number of meetings it held. In 1999, the SEC
adopted new rules and amendments that, among other things, require companies to include
reports by their audit committees in their proxy statements and disclose whether their audit
committee is independent and has a charter. Listing requirements of the New York Stock
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Exchange, the American Stock Exchanges, and the NASDAQ national market require that listed
companies have audit committees with membership limited solely to independent directors.
2.197 The skills and experience required of audit committee members, as well as the
committees’ roles, responsibilities, and operating practices, historically have not been specified
by the stock exchanges or the SEC. "Best Practices" have evolved over time and have been
published by various professional organizations and firms. Audit committees, the independence
of committee members, and committee best practices have been studied in depth, most notably
by the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting,46 the Advisory Panel on
Auditors' Independence,47 and the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees.48
2.198 Several auditing standards govern external auditors’ communications with audit
committees. In general, SAS No. 61, Communications with Audit Committees, establishes
communication requirements about the auditor’s responsibilities under GAAS for the financial
statement audit and other information in documents containing audited financial statements.
Those requirements also include informing audit committees about significant accounting
policies and their application, management judgments and the process used in formulating
particularly sensitive accounting estimates, significant audit adjustments, disagreements with
management, consultation by management with other accountants, major issues discussed with
management prior to being retained, and difficulties encountered in performing the audit. The
ASB recently amended SAS No. 61 with SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments, and SAS No. 90, Audit
Committee Communications. SAS No. 89 requires auditors to communicate to audit committees
uncorrected misstatements whose effects management believes are immaterial. SAS No. 90
requires auditors to discuss with the audit committee their judgments about the quality, not just
the acceptability, of the entity’s accounting principles and the estimates underlying its financial
statements. In addition, auditors are required to attempt to discuss with the audit committee
certain matters identified in their quarterly review of interim financial information before it is
filed with the SEC.
2.199 SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, requires auditors to assure themselves that audit
committees are adequately informed about illegal acts that come to the auditors’ attention. SAS
No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, calls for reporting to the audit
committee fraud involving senior management and fraud (whether caused by senior management
or other employees) that causes a material misstatement of the financial statements.
2.200 In addition to GAAS, SECPS requires its member firms to report annually to audit
committees the total fees received by the audit firm for management advisory services during the
year under audit. Lastly, Independent Standards Board Standard No. 1, Independence
Discussions with Audit Committees, calls for auditors to discuss with and confirm to audit

46

Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (October 1987).
Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor, Report to the Public Oversight Board of the SEC
Practice Section, AICPA, from the Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence (1994).
48
Report and recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on improving the effectiveness of audit committees
(1999).
47
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committees their independence and disclose all relationships between the auditor and the entity
that in the auditor’s professional judgment may reasonably bear on independence.
Findings
2.201 The QPR revealed that audit committees had been established for all but five of the 126
public entities whose audits were reviewed. The reviewed engagements included eight
companies where no committee meetings were held during the year and eight where the
reviewers considered the number of meetings (typically one) to be inadequate. There were three
additional instances in which the reviewers questioned the timeliness of the meetings.
2.202 The QPR reviewers addressed the following areas:

• The substance of the audit engagement partner’s relationship with the committee
•
•
•
•

chair
The timeliness, frequency and quality of interaction among the auditors, audit
committees and management
The extent of the audit engagement and other partners’ involvement with the
committee
The relevance and completeness of the auditor’s written and oral communications
with the audit committee
Whether the audit committee had established and communicated its expectations to
the auditors and management

2.203 The reviewers found a large number of comprehensive, well written reports to audit
committees that demonstrated candid and complete communications on numerous matters,
including business and financial statement risks, audit scope and approach, analyses and
discussion of important financial statement issues, and waived adjustments. The communications
required by SAS No. 61 were complete and well documented in almost every situation. In one
area, however, namely, the requirement in SAS No. 61 to "determine that the audit committee is
informed about the process used by management in formulating particularly sensitive accounting
estimates and about the basis for the auditor’s conclusions regarding the reasonableness of those
estimates,” the reviewers found that the relevant written communication was very often limited
to the auditor simply indicating agreement with management's position.
2.204 The reviewers also found that certain topics considered important to audit committees
often were not communicated. These included:

• The overall quality of annual financial reporting (not communicated on 20% of the
•
•
•
•

engagements)
Financial statement risks (15%)
Estimates and judgments (12%)
Internal control matters (13%)
Risk of fraud (20%)
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• Compliance with laws and regulations (19%)
• Interim financial reporting (21%)
2.205 Many situations were identified in which auditor-audit committee relationships were
excellent and reflected timely, candid communications and an apparent sense of mutual trust.
There is clear evidence, however, that the frequency of contact and substantive interaction
between the auditor and the audit committee or its chair can and should be improved.
2.206 The results of the Panel survey, focus groups, and interviews reflect very strong support
for audit committees. Many participants commented, however, that the effectiveness of audit
committees can and should be improved and communications and other relationships between
audit committees and auditors need to be increased.
2.207 The reviewers sought to identify best practices regarding audit committees and specific
opportunities to improve the committees’ effectiveness. Essentially all of the best practices
observed related to activities involving auditor-audit committee relationships, and more
specifically, to the frequency of formal and informal contacts between the auditor and the
committee or its chair. Not surprisingly, opportunities to improve were largely focused on more
auditor and audit committee contact, more frequent committee meetings, a higher level of
committee activity, and the committee’s establishment of explicit expectations of the auditors.
2.208 The Panel supports the work of the Blue Ribbon Committee and the published responses
of the following groups to which its report was addressed:

•
•
•
•

The Securities and Exchange Commission
The Auditing Standards Board
The New York Stock Exchange
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.

2.209 In addition, the Panel strongly supports more proactive audit committees and the
development of stronger relationships between boards of directors (and their audit committees)
and auditors that recognize that the auditors are ultimately accountable to the board of directors
and the audit committee as representatives of shareholders. The Panel also believes the
development and discussion of explicit mutual expectations of the board and audit committee,
management, and auditors are essential initial steps in the process.
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Recommendations
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.210 The Panel recommends that the ASB:

• Expand the existing standards and guidance on required communications to audit
committees to address explicitly more responsive and substantive communications by
auditors (at least annually) regarding:
•

information system and financial statement risks

•

internal control

•

evidence of management attempting to manage earnings inappropriately

•

the company’s processes for complying with laws and regulations that could
directly affect the financial statements

To audit firms:
2.211 The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Recognize the board of directors and audit committee as the parties to whom they are
accountable and tailor their relationships and communications accordingly

• Make sure the audit committee’s expectations are fully understood and that their
communications with the committee are directly responsive to those expectations

• Reexamine firm guidance for reporting to audit committees, and if applicable,
modify the guidance to ensure consistent, candid, responsive reporting to the
committee on:
•

information system and financial statement risks

•

internal control

•

the company’s processes for complying with laws and regulations that could
directly affect the financial statements

•

evidence of earnings management
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To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
2.212 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Address the adequacy of the firm’s guidance on reporting to audit committees
• Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer Review
Committee
To audit committees:
2.213 The Panel recommends that audit committees:

• Specify in their charters and reflect in their actions, as recommended by the Blue
Ribbon Committee, “that the outside auditor is ultimately accountable to the board of
directors and the audit committee, as representatives of the shareholders, and that
these shareholder representatives have the ultimate authority and responsibility to
select, evaluate, and where appropriate, replace the outside auditors (or to nominate
the outside auditors to be proposed for shareholder approval in any proxy statement).”

• Develop a formal calendar of activities related to those areas of responsibility
prescribed in the committee charter, including a meeting plan that is reviewed and
agreed to by the entire board. The meeting plan should include communications
between the committee chair or full committee and the auditors before the release of
interim or year-end financial data. In addition, the Panel recommends a minimum of
two face-to-face meetings during the year with the external auditors and at least one
executive session with the internal and external auditors without management’s
presence.

• Take charge of their agenda and assure, in particular, that it focuses on, among other
matters, financial statement risks, key controls, interim financial information, policies
and practices for management’s communications with analysts, and the qualitative
aspects of financial reporting.

• Inquire about timing pressures on the auditors, and their potential effects on audit
effectiveness.

• Review the internal and external auditors’ performance on an annual basis; exercise
the committee’s responsibility, as the auditors' primary client, to assess the auditors’
responsiveness to the committee’s and board of directors’ expectations; and be
satisfied that the auditors are appropriately compensated for performing a thorough
audit.

• Require the auditors and management to advise the committee of the entity’s plans to
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hire any of the audit firm’s personnel into high-level positions, and the actions, if any,
that the auditor and management intend to take to ensure that the auditors maintain
their independence.

ESTABLISHING AUDITING STANDARDS
The GAAS Hierarchy
2.214 Various forms of guidance in addition to the SASs are provided to auditors by the
AICPA, for the most part under the auspices of the ASB. For example, the ASB’s Audit Issues
Task Force (AITF) issues auditing interpretations on the application of the SASs. While these
interpretations are reviewed by the ASB, they are not as authoritative as the SASs. In addition,
the AICPA from time to time issues other forms of auditing guidance, such as audit and
accounting guides, auditing practice releases and statements of position. These other forms of
guidance often are related to specific industry issues or accounting pronouncements. Guidance
also is provided by the AICPA through other communications (e.g., audit risk alerts),
conferences and seminars (e.g., an annual conference on SEC developments), and other means.
Textbooks, reference materials, and training materials and courses also are available to auditors
from a wide variety of sources.
2.215 The guidance to auditors in the SASs alone is formidable. Yet many SASs lack
imperatives that compel auditors to take definitive steps in specified circumstances. For example,
in some cases a SAS may impose an imperative on an auditor by indicating what an auditor
definitively “should” do, while in other cases the SAS might only indicate what an auditor
“should consider,” allowing significant latitude for the exercise of judgment based on the
circumstances of the engagement and on the auditor’s assessment of risk and materiality.
2.216 Furthermore, the SASs do not indicate in an organized fashion the vast array of other
guidance discussed above that is available to auditors from the AICPA. In addition, some of that
other auditing guidance is not readily accessible to auditors, although the AICPA has made
efforts to improve retrieval of some of its literature via its website. As a result, auditors might
feel less compelled to comply with auditing guidance that goes beyond the SASs and related
AITF auditing interpretations. In summary, there is no formal GAAS “hierarchy” that establishes
the authoritative status of auditing pronouncements.
Working Papers and Documentation
2.217 SAS No. 41, Working Papers, calls for auditors to prepare and maintain working papers,
the form and content of which should be designed to meet the circumstances of a particular
engagement. Working papers provide the principal support for the auditor’s report, including the
auditor’s representation regarding observance of the standards of fieldwork. They also aid in
planning, conducting and supervising the audit. The SAS provides broad guidance on the nature
of working papers and the documentation to be contained in them, indicating that they may be in
the form of data stored on tapes, films or other media. SAS No. 41 observes, however, that there
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is no intention that the auditor would be precluded from supporting the auditor’s report by other
means in addition to working papers.
2.218 In addition to this broad standard relating to working papers, some individual SASs
require the auditor to document certain matters specified by the standard (for example, SAS No.
82 requires documentation in the working papers of the auditor’s fraud risk assessment and
response). For the most part, however, the standards leave the extent of documentation to the
judgment of the auditor. Individual firms’ methodologies also specify certain documentation to
meet their own needs.
2.219 The Panel believes working papers and the documentation contained in them constitute
an important quality control safeguard. Working paper documentation often is reviewed by
persons other than the auditors who prepared them. For example, auditors who are new to an
engagement may review the prior year’s working papers to gain an understanding of the work
performed to aid in planning and performing the current audit. Supervisory personnel on an audit
review the working papers prepared by assistants. Engagement partners or concurring partners
may review all or selected working papers. Successor audit firms often review the predecessors’
working papers. Internal inspection teams review engagement working papers as part of a firm’s
annual quality control review. Peer reviewers review the working papers on engagements
selected for external peer review. Working papers also may be subject to review by other parties,
for example by representatives of a party to an acquisition, by regulators or by litigants’ legal
counsel.49 Access to auditors’ working papers may be granted voluntarily by the audit firm
(usually with client approval and some restrictions) or obtained by legal action, such as by
subpoena.
2.220 The Panel is aware that the ASB adopted a strategic plan in 1997, Horizons for the
Auditing Standards Board – Strategic Initiatives for the Twenty-First Century, which it updates
annually. Among the actions taken by the ASB to implement its initiatives was establishing a
task force on working paper documentation, and this task force is looking into some or all of the
areas discussed in the Panel’s recommendations. The Panel applauds the efforts by the ASB to
reevaluate and update its strategic plan on an ongoing basis. The Panel believes that many of its
recommendations addressed to the ASB will provide it with guidance on setting its future
priorities.
Recommendations
2.221 A number of the Panel’s recommendations contained in this chapter urge the ASB to
modify, amend or improve its standards by making them more specific and definitive. Other
recommendations to the ASB suggest that clarification is needed to enhance audit effectiveness.
2.222 The Panel believes that auditing standards must serve to provide both reasonable and
measurable benchmarks for performance by auditors. Standards need to be reasonable in that
they should not force auditors to adhere to rules that do not take into account the myriad of
circumstances that may exist on audits. To serve as effective measures of the quality of
49

The Panel is aware that in certain cases regulatory requirements prescribe minimum guidelines for working paper
contents.
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performance, however, auditing standards need to provide clear, concise and definitive
imperatives for auditors to follow.
2.223 The QPR disclosed that working paper documentation often was less than adequate from
the reviewers’ perspective, and some of the Panel’s individual recommendations address
documentation. The Panel also was informed that documentation deficiencies are common in
many peer reviews, although the criteria for asserting such deficiencies are subjective.
2.224 The Panel understands that working papers and the documentation contained in them
taken alone cannot be expected to support fully all of the activities comprising an audit,
including the subtleties of judgments made throughout the audit process. No one expects the
auditor’s working papers to duplicate the entity’s records or to contain unnecessary information.
At the same time, reasonable documentation requirements can inhibit a tendency to shift the
burden of demonstrating that work was performed to the recollections of those who performed it
– a potential consequence of reduced documentation as firms seek to streamline their audit
methodologies and processes. The Panel believes that, within reasonable limits, the work of
auditors needs to be appropriately documented.
2.225 It is with these points in mind that the Panel has developed the following
recommendations.
To the Auditing Standards Board:
2.226 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
GAAS Hierarchy

• Definitively set forth the “hierarchy” of GAAS, including the authoritative status of
existing AICPA guidance. The SASs should specify the guidance auditors should use
in performing audits, whether that guidance is explicitly in the SASs or elsewhere.
All such guidance should be readily accessible to auditors.
Auditing Standards and Quality Control Standards Generally

• Review all of the standards of fieldwork not addressed elsewhere in this report for the
purpose of ensuring that they are specific and definitive, either within the SASs or
elsewhere in the GAAS hierarchy. While the ASB may decide to differentiate its
auditing standards between those applicable to both non-public and public entities
and those applicable only to public entities, in general, however, the Panel
discourages such practice, especially with standards of fieldwork, since investors
might be confused with the varying levels of audit quality that could ensue.50
50

Some auditing standards are designed to address matters unique to either public or non-public entities. For
example, much of the guidance in SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information, applies only to engagements to
review interim financial information or statements of a public entity. The auditor communications called for by SAS
No. 61, Communications with Audit Committees, are applicable only to audits of entities with audit committees (or
the equivalent) and to audits of public entities. SAS No. 72 (as amended), Letters for Underwriters and Certain
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• Perform a similar review of the Statements on Quality Control Standards to ensure
that they are specific and definitive.
Materiality

• Evaluate the guidance in SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an
Audit, on the auditor’s consideration of materiality in planning the audit and
designing audit tests and on how materiality and risk assessments are related. Some of
the findings and observations in this report that have resulted in recommendations to
the ASB implicitly or explicitly raise questions about whether materiality guidelines
used by auditors are too liberal or are not appropriately modified to reflect
information obtained and conditions encountered in the course of the audit.
Materiality judgments are an integral part of the audit risk model and inevitably
influence decisions on the areas of audit emphasis and the extent of audit testing,
including the size of samples. Accordingly, as part of this effort, the ASB also should
review its auditing standard on audit sampling, SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling. The
ASB’s review should address whether more definitive guidance in the area of
materiality -- including the effects of materiality judgments on decisions about audit
emphasis, the extent of audit testing, and sample sizes related to specific objectives -might lead to more effective audits.
The ASB should request the firms to share their guidance on materiality with the
board to assist it in its deliberations. The ASB also should consider appropriate
research (possibly with the cooperation of firms, academic researchers and peer
reviewers) on how the materiality concept is applied in practice.
The Panel believes that this effort likely would result in modifications to auditing
standards, unless the ASB is satisfied on the basis of its research that the present
guidance is sufficient to drive effective materiality judgments in planning the audit
and designing audit tests.
Working Papers and Documentation

• Enhance SAS No. 41, Working Papers, to include criteria regarding the minimum
documentation working papers should contain. The criteria for documentation to be
included in working papers should be sufficiently specific to enable reviewers to
understand the audit work performed, who performed and reviewed the work, and the
nature of the audit evidence examined.

• Provide sufficient guidance in the quality control standards about working paper
documentation to enable firms and peer reviewers to judge the quality of engagement
Other Requesting Parties, is designed primarily for engagements related to registration statements filed with the
SEC. Those SASs generally interpret the standards of reporting, not the general or fieldwork standards.
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performance (including the supervision of the work of assistants). The ASB should
link the two sets of working paper standards to each other.

• Review all of the fieldwork standards to ensure that there is definitive guidance
within the SASs (or elsewhere in the GAAS hierarchy) on the type and extent of
documentation that should be contained in the working papers. For example, the ASB
should consider where specific documentation requirements similar to those
contained in SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,
would likely enhance audit effectiveness, and it should amend or modify its SASs
accordingly.
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CHAPTER 3 – EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND FRAUD
3.1
This chapter describes earnings management and fraud. It summarizes the profession’s
standards that define the auditor’s responsibilities for, and provide guidance to auditors on, the
detection of fraud. It also explores the concepts of “earnings management” and “quality of
earnings,” and how earnings management is related to and may constitute fraud. The chapter
concludes with the Panel’s findings on the effectiveness of audits in detecting fraud and its
recommendations for improving the conduct of audits through strengthened standards that would
include a number of steps -- including a "forensic-type" fieldwork phase -- to improve the
likelihood that auditors will detect fraudulent financial reporting.

DEFINITIONS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3.2
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit, distinguishes fraud from error on the basis of whether the underlying action that
results in a misstatement of the financial statements is intentional or unintentional. The SAS
notes that, while fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditor’s concern with fraud specifically
relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement of the financial statements.1 SAS
No. 82 not only is a complex and detailed standard, but it also calls for the exercise of
considerable judgment.
3.3
Two types of intentional misstatements are relevant to the auditor's consideration of fraud
– misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets. Fraudulent financial reporting involves intentional misstatements or
omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements, perhaps as part of a scheme to
“manage earnings.”
3.4
Misappropriation of assets (sometimes referred to as defalcation) involves the theft of an
entity's assets, accompanied by financial statement misrepresentation. Misappropriation of assets
can be accomplished in various ways, including embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing
an entity to pay for goods or services not received. Misappropriation of assets may involve one
or more individuals among management, employees, or third parties.
3.5
SAS No. 82 explains many of the limitations under which an auditor operates, including
the fact that fraud may be concealed through falsified documentation, including forgery. A
financial statement audit rarely involves authentication of documentation, and auditors are not
trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication. Fraud also may be concealed through
collusion among management, employees, or third parties. Auditors also do not possess
1

In Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud, A Corporate Governance Guide (2000 Edition, p. 4), Michael
R. Young, a litigation partner of Willkie Farr & Gallagher specializing in securities and financial reporting, observes
that, “Technically, a distinction can be drawn between an irregularity and fraud insofar as an irregularity consists of
an intentional misstatement in financial statements, whereas an irregularity evolves into fraud only when those
financial statements are shown to another who then justifiably relies on them to his or her detriment. In common
parlance, though, the terms are being used interchangeably. . . .”
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investigative powers, such as the power to subpoena witnesses and obtain evidence under oath.
Furthermore, the evidence that auditors gather in an audit is often only persuasive; it is rarely
conclusive. And lastly, audits are designed to detect only material misstatements.
3.6
Accordingly, a financial statement audit performed in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards (GAAS) is not a “fraud audit” or a detailed forensic-style examination of
evidence. Forensic audit procedures are typically performed on a limited number of accounts –
as a separate engagement and not as part of an audit of financial statements performed in
accordance with GAAS – to determine the extent of a known or suspected fraud. In the absence
of such knowledge, even a forensic type of audit cannot guarantee that fraud will be detected. It
is widely believed that converting GAAS audits to fraud audits would involve costs far in excess
of the foreseeable benefits to the public. SAS No. 82 recognizes that, because of the nature of
evidence generated in a GAAS audit and the characteristics of fraud, a GAAS audit provides
only reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstatements will be detected.
3.7
Auditors are required to assess the risk of fraud in all audits. SAS No. 82 requires the
auditor specifically to assess the risk of material misstatement from fraud; it indicates risk factors
that the auditor should consider and provides guidance on how the auditor should respond to the
risk assessment. The auditor has a responsibility “to plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement,
whether caused by error or fraud.”
3.8
The general standard of due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional
skepticism, which means having an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical
assessment of audit evidence. The standard states that “the auditor neither assumes that
management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty.”2 This differs from the assumptions
normally made by forensic auditors and investigators empowered by law. Forensic auditors, for
example, generally assume dishonesty unless there is evidence to the contrary.
3.9
SAS No. 82 categorizes risk factors related to fraudulent financial reporting. Among the
risk factors are those related to management’s characteristics and influence over the control
environment, some of which relate to the motivation for management to engage in fraudulent
financial reporting, and personal characteristics bearing on integrity and management style. SAS
No. 82 also discusses risk factors specifically related to misappropriation of assets: the
susceptibility of assets to theft and the lack of controls designed to prevent or detect
misappropriations. It provides examples of risk factors in each of these two categories and
guidance on other matters that auditors may become aware of that should be considered in
assessing the risk of material misappropriation of assets.
3.10 Many of the factors cited in SAS No. 82 are subjective and difficult to assess, and risk
factors may exist in circumstances where fraud does not. Even when risk factors are present, the
auditor’s response to them is not definitively prescribed by the standard. SAS No. 82 states that
“the auditor’s judgment may be that audit procedures otherwise planned are sufficient to respond
to the risk factors.”

2

Some observers characterize this standard as proffering a “neutral” concept of professional skepticism.
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3.11 The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) has commissioned research to evaluate the
effectiveness of SAS No. 82. The results of the research are expected to be available in 2000.3

EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: THE CONTINUUM FROM LEGITIMACY TO
FRAUD
3.12 Reports and allegations of inappropriate earnings management were influential in
prompting the Panel’s project, and the Panel devoted considerable attention to earnings
management.4
Framing the Issue
3.13 The term earnings management covers a wide variety of legitimate and illegitimate
actions by management that affect an entity’s earnings. The Panel neither sought nor formulated
a precise definition of earnings management.5 Rather, it sought to understand the phenomenon
that ranges from legitimate managerial activities at one end of the spectrum to fraudulent
financial reporting at the other. It focused on the entire spectrum and how the auditor’s role in
enhancing the credibility of financial information is affected by the different ways in which
earnings can be managed.
3.14 Virtually all managerial activities have a potential effect on earnings, and in that sense
constitute earnings management; otherwise, the activities presumably would not be undertaken.
Earnings management generally implies, however, that the activities undertaken are designed
3

In October 1998, the AICPA issued a Request for Research Proposals for an Assessment of SAS No. 82. The broad
objectives sought are to assist the ASB in its assessment of the effectiveness of SAS No. 82 and in its efforts to
improve related guidance by addressing how emerging businesses and technology affect the process of detecting
material misstatements caused by fraud.
4
In his speech, The “Numbers Game” (NYU Center for Law and Business, September 28, 1998), Arthur Levitt, Jr.,
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), remarked, “Well today, I’d like to talk about another
widespread, but too little challenged custom: earnings management. This process has evolved over the years into
what best can be characterized as a game among market participants. A game that, if not addressed soon, will have
adverse consequences for America’s financial reporting system.”
5
The Panel is not aware of a single accepted definition of the term “earnings management.” In fact, differing
characterizations or definitions of the term can be found. For example, in “Commentary on Earnings Management,”
Accounting Horizons (December 1989, p. 92), Professor Katherine Schipper observes that “by ‘earnings
management’ I really mean ‘disclosure management’ in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the external
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the
neutral operation of the process).” In “A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for
Standard Setting,” Accounting Horizons (December 1999, p. 368), Professors Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen
state, “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” In
Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud, A Corporate Governance Guide, p. 13 (see note 1), Michael R.
Young describes the term as embracing two types of “managed earnings” and observes, “Now in talking about
managed earnings, one has to be careful. There are two types of managed earnings. One type is simply conducting
the business of the enterprise in order to attain controlled, disciplined growth. The other type involves deliberate
manipulation of the accounting in order to create the appearance of controlled, disciplined growth – when, in fact,
all that is happening is that accounting entries are being manipulated.”
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either to smooth earnings over two or more interim or annual accounting periods or to achieve a
designated earnings level, perhaps to meet securities analysts’ forecasts.6
3.15 Some earnings management activities involve legitimate discretionary choices of when to
enter into transactions that require accounting recognition, not unlike legitimate year-end tax
planning decisions made to accelerate deductions or defer taxable income. For example,
advertising expenditures, which generally should be expensed when incurred, may be accelerated
in the fourth quarter if the entity is exceeding its earnings target or deferred if it is failing to meet
that target. Other earnings management activities involve legitimate choices of how to account
for transactions and other events and circumstances – particularly those involving accounting
estimates and judgments – in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
For example, implementation of a decision to enhance the entity’s credit and collection activities
may legitimately support reducing the estimate of bad debt expense. These are legitimate
management decisions that affect reported earnings whose consequences are accounted for in
conformity with GAAP.7
3.16 Earnings management also may involve intentionally recognizing or measuring
transactions and other events and circumstances in the wrong accounting period or recording
fictitious transactions – both of which constitute fraud. Choosing the appropriate period in which
to recognize a transaction requires both management’s and the auditor’s understanding of all the
relevant facts and circumstances. For example, assume that an entity announces that – either in
response to higher costs, to meet current-period sales targets, or for any other reason – it will
increase prices at the beginning of the next quarter, thereby stimulating some customers to
purchase unusually high quantities before the end of the current quarter. If the sales meet all the
criteria for revenue recognition, the entity should recognize the sales when the product is
shipped, possibly resulting in an effective and legitimate management of earnings.8 If, however,
there is an unusual right-of-return privilege and there is no basis for estimating the returns that
will take place, the transaction essentially becomes a conditional sale, and recognizing the
revenue when the product is shipped violates GAAP and misstates the financial statements. If the
right-of-return privilege has been concealed from the auditor as part of a scheme to increase
reported earnings, the financial statement misstatement involves fraudulent financial reporting.
This suggests that the wide variety of earnings management activities, which cannot always be
easily classified, constitutes a continuum that ranges from complete legitimacy at one extreme to
fraud at the other.
The Quality-of-Earnings Concept in the Continuum
3.17 Earnings management that constitutes “fraud” is distinctly different from earnings
management that is perceived as reducing the quality of earnings. Similar to the term earnings
6

Many factors may influence how earnings management is carried out, even in entities that do not have “earnings”
in the traditional sense. The valuation of securities can be influenced by financial measures such as revenue growth,
operating margins, income tax ratios, and cash flows from operations, among many others. In this chapter, earnings
management subsumes all such factors.
7
In certain circumstances, GAAP requires disclosure of the effects of these decisions in the financial statements.
Disclosures also may be required by the SEC’s rules and regulations under Item 303 of Regulation S-K,
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A).
8
Disclosure may be required by the SEC’s rules and regulations for MD&A (see note 7).
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management, the term quality of earnings has no universally accepted definition and what it
means to one individual may not be what it means to another. For example, some might say that
a company whose fixed asset depreciation policy results in higher reported earnings than it
would have using that of competitors has a lower quality of earnings than its competitors. On the
other hand, if the particular depreciation policy reflects a better utilization of fixed assets by, for
example, implementing asset maintenance programs that extend their lives, the quality of
earnings might be equal to or maybe even higher than the competitors’. In the end, most would
agree that inappropriately increasing earnings results in a lower quality of earnings.
3.18 It is the acceptability of an accounting policy under GAAP that draws the line on the
continuum distinguishing legitimate earnings management from fraud. However, determining
whether or when the behavior in the earnings management continuum crosses the line from
legitimacy to fraud in a specific situation is not always easy. Where legitimate earnings
management is present, there indeed may be issues and debates about the quality of an entity’s
earnings, but not about whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material
respects, in conformity with GAAP. On the other side of the line is fraudulent financial reporting
(unless the departure from GAAP is unintentional, in which case it constitutes “error”) and not
merely a lower quality of earnings.
3.19 The auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud was discussed earlier in this chapter, and
responsibilities to report fraud to the audit committee were noted in Chapter 2. Auditors’
responsibilities with regard to the quality of an entity’s earnings, when fraud is not an issue, are
distinctly different from their responsibilities to detect and report fraud. SAS No. 90 on audit
committee communications requires the auditor to discuss with audit committees the auditor’s
judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the entity’s accounting principles and
the estimates and judgments underlying its financial statements. For example, the auditors should
inform the audit committee when they believe that an entity’s accounting policies are
approaching unacceptability, even if the policies have not yet crossed into that territory. (The
SAS was prompted in large part by the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees.) Increased
communications between audit committees and auditors should enhance the understanding by
audit committees about quality of earnings’ issues and thereby improve financial reporting.
Motivation for Earnings Management and Fraud
3.20 The motivation to manage earnings comes in part from management’s responsibility to
direct the entity’s operations in a way that achieves targeted results. The motivation also comes
from pressures on management from sources both outside and inside the entity. External
pressures come principally from the capital markets. Many observers believe that Wall Street’s
expectations significantly affect both appropriate and inappropriate management behavior.9
9

In his speech, The “Numbers Game” (see note 4), Chairman Levitt observed, “Increasingly, I have become
concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business
practices.” He further stated, “As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and
therefore, the quality of financial reporting.” Chairman Levitt also remarked, “Many in corporate America are just as
frustrated and concerned about this trend as we, at the SEC, are. They know how difficult it is to hold the line on
good practices when their competitors operate in the gray area between legitimacy and outright fraud.”
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Members of top management are especially subject to pressures to demonstrate that shareholder
value has grown as a consequence of their leadership. Boards of directors are subject to pressures
from stakeholders to enhance the value of the organization, and they in turn create internal
pressures on management to meet financial and other goals and ensure the growth and prosperity
of the organization. Boards oversee the stewardship of management and prescribe the basis for
measuring and rewarding or penalizing performance. Pressures by top management on others at
different levels of the organization are everyday occurrences and are a natural part of the
performance evaluation process.
3.21 Not only are these pressures commonplace in today’s environment, but also the personal
consequences to management of meeting or failing to meet financial goals can be extraordinary.
The system for financial rewards to management is frequently skewed toward participation in the
growth of a company’s worth in the marketplace, especially, though not exclusively, for top
management.10 At many levels within an organization, financial incentives based directly or
indirectly on accounting results can be significant. At some point in the continuum, the
motivation behind earnings management may become strong enough to result in fraud.
3.22 Opportunity is a necessary feature of fraud, and it explains why management is in a
unique position to perpetrate it. As the stewards of the entity, management possesses the power
to manipulate the accounting records and prepare fraudulent financial reports.11 Whatever
internal controls might be present in an organization, management often has the ability to
override them. Management can solicit whatever “help” it needs to carry out the fraud by
directing or enlisting subordinates to assist. Thus, if collusion is needed to carry out the fraud,
management can facilitate the collusion. If false documents need to be prepared, management
can see that it is done.
3.23 Another feature of fraud perhaps is obvious – concealment. Concealment usually is an
all-important goal of the perpetrator of a fraud, and the schemes for concealment vary from the
patently simple to enormously complex. Concealment of fraud from the auditors often is a
paramount objective, and for that reason successfully assessing the risk of fraud and designing
audit procedures for its detection can be very difficult. At best, some might assert that observable
risk factors present in a given situation could raise the possibility of fraud.12
Crossing the Line: From Trickle to Waterfall

10

For example, compensation plans for management-level personnel based on the notion of “pay-for-performance”
or “pay-for-value” often involve the use of stock options or other equity-type instruments, the ultimate
compensatory value of which largely depends on the increase in the company’s stock price over time.
11
The Panel recognizes that, in the vast majority of cases, management exercises a high level of integrity and
professionalism in preparing financial reports.
12
SAS No. 82 lists risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting in three
categories: management’s characteristics and influence over the control environment, industry conditions, and
operating characteristics and financial viability. It also discusses risk factors relating to misstatements arising from
misappropriation of assets.
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3.24 Academics and others have conducted a substantial amount of research on fraud.13 Some
of the research as well as anecdotal evidence suggest that fraud often starts out small, like a
trickle.14 What ends up as a massive financial fraud – in effect, a waterfall – rarely starts with a
grand plan or conspiracy. It often starts so small that the participants do not believe they are
stepping over the line. Rather, they believe that they are doing nothing more than legitimately
managing earnings, merely exploiting ambiguities in the accounting rules.15
3.25 Frauds often start in one of the first three quarters of a company’s fiscal year.16 Auditors
have limited responsibilities for interim financial information (generally quarterly financial
reports). Auditors are engaged to review that information, but it is not subjected to the same
scrutiny as are the full year’s audited financial statements.17 Furthermore, matters potentially
material to an interim financial report might not be material to the annual financial statements,
and therefore may not receive scrutiny from the auditors either in their limited quarterly reviews
or the annual audit. Perpetrators may use this fact to their advantage in their efforts at
concealment. In addition, manipulations of earnings in interim periods often are rationalized by
management as being only temporary “borrowings,” since there is plenty of time left in the year
to correct the problem. The rationalization also may include a belief that the manipulations are
intended to avoid earnings volatility and surprises and therefore are in the shareholders’ best
interests.
3.26 The trickle becomes a waterfall when this “borrowing” accelerates and the perpetrators
end up either taking positions that are indefensible or developing a scheme for concealment that
will avoid discovery.18 Sometimes by the end of the fiscal year, the “borrowing” is still relatively
small, but may continue to grow in future years. Sometimes by the end of the fiscal year, the
manipulations have grown but they may either escape detection by the auditors, or if found, are
judged to be “immaterial errors.”19 When these manipulations come to light and they are
13

Some of that research involves certain “high profile” cases of fraud involving public entities, while other research
focuses on frauds that receive little or no press coverage. An example of research involving public entities is that
commissioned by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, published in March 1999 (1999 COSO Report). The
Panel also undertook its own research and analysis that is described in Appendix F, Analysis of SEC Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).
14
Young, p. 11 (see note 1).
15
While the concept of “materiality” generally is not viewed as an accounting ambiguity, it too can be exploited. For
a discussion of the concept of materiality, see the section in Chapter 2 titled “Materiality, Waived Adjustments, and
Analysts’ Expectations.”
16
The 1999 COSO Report, p. 34 (see note 13) states, “From our readings of AAERs, we observed that many frauds
allegedly were initiated in a quarterly Form 10-Q, with the first manipulation sometimes at relatively small amounts.
After observing that the fraud was undetected in initial attempts, the fraud scheme was repeated in subsequently
issued quarterly or annual financial statements, with the fraud amount often increasing over time and generally
stretching over two fiscal years.”
17
SAS No. 71 (as amended), Interim Financial Information, addresses the limitations of auditors’ reviews of that
kind of information.
18
“Taking positions” is not limited to management taking positions to justify its actions with the external auditors.
Management also can “take positions” with other members of management, internal auditors, and boards of directors
(or audit committees) unbeknownst to auditors, regulators, or others.
19
If judged to be material, the financial statements would not be issued until they had been corrected. If the auditors
have determined that evidence of management fraud may exist, they are required to communicate the matter directly
to the audit committee, and under certain circumstances to the SEC.
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material, they often lead to a restatement of the financial statements and usually to allegations of
“audit failure.” Restatements of financial statements that had been previously audited raise
questions about whether the system that provides assurances about both the quality of audits and
the reliability of financial reports is operating effectively.
The Panel’s Perspectives about Auditors’ Responsibilities
3.27 The Panel is concerned that the auditing profession has not kept pace with a rapidly
changing environment. The Panel believes that the profession needs to address vigorously the
issue of fraudulent financial reporting, including fraud in the form of illegitimate earnings
management. It believes that audit firms should have a “zero defects” policy and endeavor to
eliminate audit failures completely.20 They should instill that attitude in all their personnel
starting on their first working day. Constant reminders and reinforcements should be present
throughout the careers of all professionals, and compliance with firm policies and procedures
should be a major factor in their advancement and compensation. Professional skepticism should
mean more than only words in the auditing standards – it should be a way of life for auditors.
The objectives in an audit should include detecting material financial statement fraud – that goal
should drive both auditing standards and the way they are applied. By meeting that objective,
audits will serve to deter fraud as well as detect it.
3.28 The Panel accepts the premise that a GAAS audit is not, and should not become, a fraud
audit. It accepts the premise that reasonable, not absolute, assurance is a sufficiently high
standard of responsibility. It believes that this is a high enough standard to provide the assurance
about the reliability of audited financial information that the capital markets need for their proper
functioning. While accepting these premises, the Panel is nonetheless concerned that auditors
may not be requiring as much evidence to achieve reasonable assurance as they have in the past,
especially in areas where they believe that the risk is low.
3.29 The Panel’s perspective is that, even in the face of the strengthened auditing standards
issued over the past 15 or so years, the audit firms may have reduced the scope of audits and
level of testing, at least in part, as a result of redesigning their audit methodologies.
3.30 It is with these perspectives in mind, as well as its findings, that the Panel has formulated
the recommendations in this chapter.

FINDINGS
QPR Findings
3.31 The QPR probed the risk assessment process and responses related to the risk of
fraudulent financial reporting, as well as the risk of misappropriation of assets when called for in
selected key areas. The QPR also looked into the overall integration of the fraud risk assessment
20

The Panel notes that an allegation of an audit failure does not necessarily mean there was one. However, the
Panel’s research and analysis of cases alleging audit failures (Appendix F) and cases that have been resolved
demonstrate a sufficient basis for its concerns about the effectiveness of audits in detecting fraud.
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process with engagement risk (client acceptance and continuance) assessments discussed in
Chapter 2. Furthermore, it probed into the involvement of concurring review partners in the risk
assessments.
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
3.32 The QPR reviewers agreed in virtually all cases with the assessment of the risk of
fraudulent financial reporting and agreed that the right people were involved in this assessment.
They agreed that the assessment process was appropriate and thorough. The QPR also affirmed
that the risk of fraudulent financial reporting was considered in evaluating the overall audit
results and in determining whether additional audit tests or follow up actions were necessary. In
general, the QPR found that the engagement risk and fraud risk assessments were appropriately
linked. In addition, the QPR confirmed the appropriate involvement of concurring review
partners in the process. Lastly, the QPR disclosed concern in about 12% of the engagements
regarding the adequacy of documentation.
3.33 One area considered by the QPR that is closely related to the issue of fraud and whether
audit tests are adequate to address the possibility of fraud is the area of non-standard entries.21
Financial statement misstatements are often perpetrated by using non-standard entries to record
fictitious transactions or other events and circumstances, particularly near the end of the
reporting period. The QPR disclosed that in about 15% of the engagements the auditors did not
have an adequate understanding of the client’s system for preparing, processing, and approving
non-standard entries. Furthermore, in about 31% of the engagements reviewed, the auditors did
not perform procedures to identify and review non-standard entries, whether made at the end of
the period or at other times. When the auditors did perform such procedures, the reviewers
generally believed that the procedures were appropriate and that the individuals who identified
and reviewed the entries had the appropriate knowledge and skills to do so in a meaningful
manner.
Misappropriation of Assets
3.34 The QPR probed into the risk of material misappropriations of assets for key areas where
the reviewers believed that the risk was significant. Only in a few such key areas did reviewers
believe that was the case. For the most part, the QPR reviewers agreed that the risk assessments
related to misappropriation of assets were appropriately made, the right people made them at the
right time, and the responses to the results of the assessments were appropriate. In one
engagement, the reviewer agreed with the risk assessment but observed that a relatively
inexperienced person had made the assessment without the benefit of specialized industry
knowledge; however, the reviewer did not quarrel with the response to the assessment by the
engagement team.

21

“Non-standard entries” is a term that is not precisely defined, although it is in common use among accountants
and auditors. They are sometimes referred to as “top-side entries,” “post-closing entries,” “manual adjustments,”
“management entries,” or “unusual adjustments.” In general, they are financial statement changes or entries made in
the books and records (including computer records) of an entity that usually are initiated by management-level
personnel, and are not routine or associated with the normal processing of transactions.
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3.35 In these same key areas, the QPR reviewers also reviewed the inherent risk and control
risk assessments distinct from the risk of misappropriation of assets. The reviewers also
addressed the involvement of information technology specialists and the appropriateness of the
substantive tests carried out in the areas. The QPR reviewers indicated that the procedures
performed in these key areas generally were consistent with the procedures in all of the key
areas. This may indicate that the auditors did not place any special emphasis on the areas where
the risk of material misappropriation of assets was considered significant. This fact by itself is
neither good nor bad, but it may indicate a tendency of auditors not to place much importance on
the risk of asset misappropriation. 22
The Panel’s Broader Consideration of Fraud
3.36 The Panel undertook a broad consideration of the auditor’s responsibility for the
detection of fraud. In addition to the QPR, the Panel studied the input received from focus
groups, interviews with forensic auditors, public hearings and responses to its survey
questionnaire. The Panel reviewed the 1999 COSO Report and discussed the results of the
litigation research undertaken on its behalf. It also considered the views of the legal profession
and regulators, including the testimony received at its October 1999 public hearings. Writings by
a number of authors knowledgeable in the area of fraudulent financial reporting also were
considered.23
3.37 In some cases, auditors interviewed in focus groups and other settings expressed
uncertainty about their responsibility to detect fraud. They also expressed doubt about their
ability to detect fraud, especially fraud involving collusive activities or falsified documentation.
While many auditors expressed general familiarity with forensic auditing techniques, no
evidence pointed to any significant use of such techniques in GAAS audits.
3.38 The Panel’s analysis of recent SEC AAERs (Appendix F) involving the Big 5 audit firms
or their clients provided insights into the apparent causes of actual or alleged fraudulent financial
reporting or audit failures (or weaknesses in the auditing procedures employed) and some of the
characteristics that frequently were present.
3.39 Most of the misstatements involved relatively routine accounts and transactions as
opposed to complex judgmental areas and more esoteric accounts and transactions, such as
derivatives or other complex financial instruments, restructuring reserves, business
combinations, or in-process research and development charges. Approximately 70% of the cases
involved the overstatement of revenue – resulting from either premature revenue recognition or
fictitious revenue.
3.40 The entities with the most sophisticated frauds often were concerned about concealing the
fraud from the auditors and particularly about making the numbers and the relationships among
them “look right” to the auditors when they performed their analytical procedures. A favorite
22

The Panel noted during its study of AAERs (see Appendix F) a few instances of materially misstated financial
statements resulting from misappropriation of assets.
23
For example, the Panel considered Young (see note 1) and Joseph T. Wells, CPA, CFE, founder and chairman of
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Occupational Fraud and Abuse (1997).
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technique for accomplishing this was to “play around” with the numbers, often through the use
of non-standard entries, until they “looked right.”
3.41 Other common characteristics of the cases included registrants using information
technology to facilitate the frauds, significant changes in the registrant’s business that increased
the registrant’s inherent risk, management override of controls, material frauds at relatively small
divisions or subsidiaries that the auditors did not visit, inadequate substantive tests, and audit
engagement personnel not appearing to have adequate training, experience, or supervision.
*****
3.42 The Panel arrived at certain fundamental conclusions. First, the basic responsibility of
auditors to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the financial statements are not
materially misstated sets the responsibility at an appropriate level.24 To raise the level of
assurance from that of reasonable to a higher standard, such as high or virtually certain, would
put an unreasonable burden on the auditing profession and place an unjustified cost burden on
entities subject to audit. Survey respondents and commentators at the October 1999 public
hearings generally agreed with that assessment.
3.43 Second, the premise of professional skepticism being based on an assumption of neither
management’s honesty nor dishonesty should be continued, but auditing standards need to better
operationalize the concept. The cooperation of management is critical to both an effective and an
efficient audit. Converting GAAS audits to forensic, fraud-type audits would not be justified
from a cost-benefit perspective and because of the potentially detrimental effects on the conduct
of business. For example, a forensic audit likely would require significant additional time by
management in dealing with the auditors and might distract management from effectively
performing its day-to-day operations.
3.44 The Panel realizes, however, that management generally is the party that precipitates
fraudulent financial reporting.25 Management ordinarily is in a position to collude or cause others
to collude, and management may create or facilitate the creation of falsified documentation, all to
the end of avoiding detection by auditors through normal auditing procedures. Management
often has at least some motivation to perpetrate financial reporting fraud, management is in a
position to create opportunities for doing so, and management can facilitate its concealment. This
poses a quandary to auditors: on the one hand, to accomplish the audit requires the cooperation
of management; on the other hand, management is in a position to mislead the auditors in their
quest for valid evidence.
3.45

In summary, the Panel found that:

24

Some commentators observed that attempts should be made (or continued) to educate users about the
responsibility of auditors to provide only reasonable assurance. The Panel does not discourage such efforts, but it
believes that such efforts might be perceived as overly defensive on the part of the auditing profession.
25
The 1999 COSO Report disclosed that top senior executives were frequently involved in financial statement
frauds. For example, it notes that, in 72% of the cases reviewed, the chief executive officer was named in the SEC’s
AAER, and in 43% of the cases the chief financial officer was associated with the financial statement fraud. Other
management individuals named included controllers and chief operating officers. The Panel noted similar findings in
its study of AAERs (see Appendix F).
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• The risk assessment and response process called for by SAS No. 82 falls short in
effectively deterring fraud or significantly increasing the likelihood that the auditor
will detect material fraud, largely because it fails to direct auditing procedures
specifically toward fraud detection.

• GAAS do not adequately operationalize the concept of professional skepticism
because management usually is judged as possessing integrity (despite the fact that
management often has at least some motivation to perpetrate fraudulent financial
reporting). Presumably, if auditors judged management to not possess integrity,
auditors would not continue to serve those clients. The Panel’s findings, however,
suggest that auditors do not always sufficiently pursue conditions discovered during
an audit or adequately corroborate management representations made to the auditor.26

• GAAS dismiss collusion as impossible or too difficult to detect and pointedly explain
the lack of expertise of auditors with respect to determining the authenticity of
documents. The Panel acknowledges that these factors are and will continue to be
inherent limitations of an audit. The reality is, however, that all or most financial
reporting frauds involve collusion and many involve falsified documentation.

• Auditors do not appear to place any special emphasis on the areas where the risk of
misappropriation of assets is considered significant.

• Audit committees rarely address the potential for management to commit financial
statement fraud or request auditors to perform specific tests to detect that possibility.
3.46 Based on these findings, the Panel sought to develop substantive recommendations
consistent with the auditor’s responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance that would both
enhance the prospects for the detection of material financial statement fraud and implicitly serve
to deter or prevent such fraud.27 The Panel was cognizant of the dangers of either going too far,
or not far enough.

RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Auditing Standards Board:
3.47 The Panel recommends that the ASB develop stronger and more definitive auditing
standards to effect a substantial change in auditors’ performance and thereby improve the
likelihood that auditors will detect fraudulent financial reporting. The Panel envisions that the
26

The term “red flags” is sometimes used to describe these conditions. The term often is used in a pejorative way,
however, to imply an auditor’s failure to pursue the obvious. The Panel recognizes that what might appear obvious
in hindsight is not always obvious at the time and accordingly avoided the term.
27
The Panel recognizes that, notwithstanding its recommendations, complying with GAAS cannot and will not
guarantee that auditors will detect all material fraud.
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new requirements would be over and above those that are now contemplated by a GAAS audit.
The Panel further believes it is reasonable that the strengthened standards would be effective
starting with audits of financial statements for the period ending December 31, 2001.
The Panel recommends that the ASB require the following in all audits:
Planning and Supervision

• Discussion by supervisory engagement personnel (including the auditor with final
authority, usually the engagement partner) with other engagement team members
about the vulnerability of the entity to fraud.
This discussion should encompass what is expected of team members in dealing with
a potential for fraud in the specific areas of the audit assigned to them. An important
objective of these discussions would be to identify the appropriate engagement team
members to address the potential for fraud (e.g., the engagement team members who
should interview company personnel) and how their work is to be supervised and
reviewed.
This recommendation requires a significant strengthening of the first standard of
fieldwork that “the work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be
properly supervised.” The objective of a strengthened standard is to ensure a
substantive dialogue among members of an engagement team about “what could go
wrong” and how such members might address the possibility of fraud, including how
procedures (including inquiries) might be designed to address that possibility. The
strengthened standard should be sufficiently specific that these activities are carried
out by engagement teams (and thus involve engagement partners) at all significant
locations. The engagement team members to be involved in this dialogue should
include information technology and other specialists assigned to the audit. Decisions
about the actions to be taken by individual engagement team members should be
documented.
Forensic-type Fieldwork Phase

• Introduction of a forensic-type fieldwork phase. Not unlike the traditional planning,
interim, final, and review phases of audits, this new forensic phase should become an
integral part of the audit, with careful thought given to how and when it is to be
carried out.
During this phase, auditors should modify the otherwise neutral concept of
professional skepticism and presume the possibility of management (at various levels)
dishonesty, including their involvement in collusion, the possible override of internal
controls and falsification of documents.28 The key question that auditors should ask

28

See note 2 regarding the “neutral” concept of professional skepticism in the auditing standards.
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is “where is the entity vulnerable to financial statement fraud if management were
inclined to perpetrate it?”
Auditing standards should require in this phase:
•

Performance of substantive tests directed at the possibility of fraud, including
tests to detect the override of internal controls by management (recognizing that
management includes many levels of personnel in an organization, including
personnel outside of the U.S., and not just top corporate-level management). The
nature, timing and extent of such tests should be guided (at a minimum) by the
following criteria:29
•

Tests should be centered around the balance sheet date, in the following areas
(some of which may overlap):
•

High-risk areas (at the specific account and assertion level) identified by
the engagement team as being areas where the opportunity to perpetrate
fraud is higher than normal. Candidates for such identification would
include balance sheet or income statement accounts affected by revenue
recognition policies, deferred costs, asset additions resulting from complex
transactions such as business combinations accounted for as purchases,
reserves that are highly dependent on management’s intentions or
representations, accounts (or elements of them) not subject to systemsdriven internal controls, and related party transactions.

•

Areas for which Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20 requires
disclosure of significant accounting policies.30

•

Material balance sheet accounts that generally “turn over” several times
throughout the year (e.g., trade receivables, inventory, payables, cash and
securities).

•

Non-standard entries (including entries made to computer records)
requiring management’s involvement or approval. (The ASB should
define the term “non-standard entries” for this purpose.31 )

29

The ASB might consider providing guidance on procedures thought to be especially useful in forensic (fraudtype) audits that also could be applied, as an option, in GAAS audits. The Panel recognizes that fraud-type audits
usually are conducted only after fraudulent activity has been suspected or detected and that many procedures
employed in those audits would be impractical or impossible to apply in a GAAS audit. For example, in some fraudtype audits, company personnel are interviewed with their own legal counsel present or under grants of immunity.
30
A number of cases of fraudulent financial reporting have involved these areas, and the disclosed accounting
policies inaccurately portrayed the entity’s actual accounting policies. Accounting policy disclosures often relate to
industry practices or matters unique to the specific entity.
31
See note 21.
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•

•

Auditors should consider incorporating a surprise or unpredictability element
in their tests. Examples of what they should consider include the following:
•

Recounts of inventory items or visits to locations on an unannounced
basis.

•

Interviews of financial and non-financial company personnel in different
areas or locations. Interviews of company information technology
personnel may be appropriate to inquire about possible overrides of
computer-related controls. Inquiries of company personnel (including
legal personnel) responsible for addressing reports by company employees
or others alleging irregularities also should be made. (For example, some
companies have employee “hot lines” that enable confidential reporting of
possible improprieties or violations of company policies.)

•

Requests for written confirmations from company employees regarding
matters about which they have made representations to the auditors.

•

Requests for written confirmations from customers or vendors that would
not otherwise be undertaken that are carefully tailored to address the
nature and specific terms of the underlying transactions, for example, to
assist in identifying “side agreements” allowing a right of return or other
concessions.

•

Tests of accounts not ordinarily performed annually.

•

Tests of accounts traditionally or frequently deemed “low risk.”

•

The tests should be either tests of details or precise substantive analytical
procedures, but not tests of controls. (Tests of controls may not be effective in
detecting fraud because management can override controls.)

•

The external auditor should not use the work of the internal auditor in carrying
out the tests directed at the possibility of fraud. The internal auditor may
provide limited direct assistance to the external auditor, and may perform
similar procedures to supplement the work of the external auditor.

•

Use of technologically advanced auditing tools should be encouraged.

•

Non-corporate and non-U.S. locations should be covered by substantive tests
directed at the possibility of fraud. Some rotation over a reasonable number of
audit periods would be acceptable.

Re-review by supervisory audit personnel at the conclusion of the audit of high
risk areas to re-assess whether conditions identified during fieldwork or test
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results (for example, exceptions and related explanations by entity personnel)
might call for additional tests.
Retrospective Audit Procedures

• Introduction of retrospective audit procedures, calling for an analysis of selected
opening balance sheet accounts of previously audited financial statements. The
accounts should be selected using risk-based or other criteria specified by the ASB.
The ASB also should provide guidance on the types of tests to be applied to the
accounts. The objective of the audit tests should be to assess how certain issues
involving accounting estimates and judgments, for example, an allowance for sales
returns, were resolved with the benefit of hindsight. This “retrospective look at” and
testing of accounts that previously had been audited is intended to act as a fraud
deterrent by posing a threat to the successful concealment of fraud, not to “secondguess” reasonable judgments based on information available at the time the financial
statements were originally issued. Consequently, the auditor should modify the
otherwise “neutral” concept of professional skepticism as discussed above.
Review and Documentation

• Review and documentation as follows:
•

Debriefing of engagement team members assigned to perform retrospective
procedures and procedures during the “forensic phase” by supervisory personnel
and assessing the propriety of follow-up actions and conclusions reached, both of
which should be documented.

•

Specific documentation relating to the retrospective procedures and the
procedures carried out during the “forensic phase” of the audit, including the
results of the assessments made.

The Panel also recommends, with respect to interim financial information, that the ASB:
Procedural Guidance for Interim Periods

• Modify SAS No. 71 to include guidelines for the application of procedural guidance
using a “forensic-type” approach equivalent to that described above. In this
connection, the Panel believes that the ASB should consider the observations in the
1999 COSO Report that many frauds are initiated in interim periods.32

• Provide criteria for the areas that should be addressed in reviews of interim financial
32

The 1999 COSO Report states, “These observations highlight the importance of active review of quarterly
financial statements by audit committees and external auditors. Close scrutiny of quarterly financial information and
a move toward continuous auditing strategies may increase opportunities for earlier detection of financial statement
improprieties.”
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information. Such criteria might include, for example, areas involving a high degree
of subjectivity (e.g., merger-related or restructuring reserves), areas involving
complex accounting standards (e.g., software revenue recognition), related party
transactions, and areas where controls can be overridden (for example, sales cut-off).

• Provide guidance on how procedures employed in interim periods that address the
potential for fraud in financial reporting also may be useful as “continuous auditing”
techniques to improve full-year audits.33 The Panel understands the need to separate
auditors’ responsibilities in an audit of financial statements from those in a limited
review of interim financial information. However, it encourages the ASB to research
and address concepts of “continuous auditing” in furtherance of a more effective audit
model.
To audit firms:
3.48

The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Begin working immediately with the concepts in the recommendations to the ASB to
enhance the auditor’s ability to detect financial statement fraud. The results of those
efforts should be shared with the ASB for consideration in developing its standards,
with the intent of expediting the standards-setting process.

• Develop or expand training programs for auditors at all levels oriented toward
responsibilities and procedures for fraud detection. These programs should emphasize
interviewing skills and the exercise of professional skepticism, as well as testing
techniques. They also should emphasize (especially to staff and in-charge personnel)
that misappropriation of assets is a significant risk and being alert to its possibility at
any level in an organization is necessary.34 Training programs should include case
examples of how defalcations might be effected, the types of controls over the
safeguarding of assets that are effective in preventing and detecting defalcations, and
how defalcations are concealed. Special emphasis should be given to how information
technology might be used to misappropriate assets and disguise the results.
Using auditors with forensic audit backgrounds to assist in this training would be
beneficial. Personnel with experience in industries where the risk of material
misappropriations of assets is believed to be high (for example, in certain cashintensive industries) also might be used to assist in such training.

33

The Panel is aware that the ASB adopted a strategic plan in 1997, Horizons for the Auditing Standards Board –
Strategic Initiatives for the Twenty-First Century, which it updates annually. Those initiatives include defining and
developing guidance on “continuous auditing” or “continuous assurance.” Another initiative involves evaluating the
efficacy of SAS No. 82, which the ASB plans to review in the context of the academic research that it commissioned
(see note 3).
34
The Panel noted during its study of AAERs (see Appendix F) a few instances of materially misstated financial
statements resulting from misappropriation of assets.
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These programs should be implemented as soon as practicable, but in any event no
later than when the ASB issues its strengthened standards. Furthermore, training
programs of this nature should not be one-time events. Firms should be committed to
refreshing and improving these programs as circumstances in clients and industries
evolve and more is learned about fraud.

• Discuss with audit committees the vulnerability of the entity to fraudulent financial
reporting and the entity’s exposure to misappropriation of assets.
To the SEC Practice Section Peer Review Committee:
3.49 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer
reviewers:

• Evaluate the implementation of the strengthened auditing standards issued by the
ASB and evaluate the training programs developed in response to the Panel’s
recommendations to audit firms. The Committee should develop the guidance for
peer reviewers to conduct these evaluations. The evaluations should address the
priority given by the firms to fraud-related training; the involvement of supervisory
engagement personnel in planning, supervision and review; and the adequacy of
documentation.

• Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer Review
Committee.
To audit committees:
3.50

The Panel recommends that audit committees:

• Accept the responsibility of ascertaining that the auditors are receiving the necessary
cooperation from management to carry out their duties in accordance with the
strengthened auditing standards to be developed by the ASB.
To the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee:
3.51

The Panel recommends that the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC):

• Assess the results of the ASB’s research on the effectiveness of SAS No. 82, together
with information that it has on litigation involving allegations of fraud, to determine
whether it believes that the ASB should consider providing further guidance on fraud
risk assessment.35

• Initiate periodic (at least annual) reviews with the ASB, the SECPS Peer Review
35

The Panel recognizes that QCIC’s access to information about allegations of audit failure in litigation cases is
limited.
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Committee, and the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee regarding
factors that appear to be influencing audit performance, with a view toward
enhancing auditors’ fraud detection capabilities. (QCIC is in a unique position to
conduct these activities because it usually is the group that addresses allegations of
audit failure on a timely basis and thus can act as a catalyst for appropriate action.)
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CHAPTER 4 – AUDIT FIRMS
4.1
Approximately 15,0001 entities file financial statements with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC); about 1200 of those entities are foreign registrants.2 Those financial statements are
audited by international, national, regional and local accounting firms, most of which are members of the
SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA. 3 The Panel studied, among other things, the overall
“tone at the top” in the firms, their hiring and employee retention policies, the professional development
of auditors, the assignment of personnel to audits, the performance measures used by the firms to
evaluate audit personnel, and time pressures on auditors.4 The Panel focused primarily, but not
exclusively, on the eight largest firms.5

PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP – THE TONE AT THE TOP
4.2
The “tone at the top” of an audit firm is a major influence on its culture. It determines, for
example, whether the culture is quality-oriented or sales-oriented, and whether top management extols
the important role audits play in the capital markets or acts as if audits are little more than minimumvalue commodities.
4.3
Audit personnel constantly receive messages from firm management on such topics as audit
efficiency and effectiveness, client service, client relationships, profitability, marketing of services, and
development of personnel. These messages often only indirectly infer that quality audit work is an
integral part of quality client service. They often do not focus directly on audit quality in the context of a
service provided to protect the interests of the investing public.
Findings
4.4
Focus group participants often indicated that not only clients, but also engagement partners and
firm leaders, treat the audit negatively – as a commodity. Some respondents to the Panel’s survey and
some engagement teams interviewed in the QPR process expressed a similar view, in some cases
inferring that the audit was viewed as a commodity from the more positive comments made about the
firms’ other service lines and their perceived higher levels of growth and profitability. The emphasis on
providing profit-enhancing ideas to the client’s management, so the audit would appear to have value
1

Internal SEC staff estimates as of March 2000.
SEC staff estimates, above.
3
The SECPS has approximately 1,300 member firms; however, only approximately 800 of them audit SEC registrants.
There are approximately 50 U.S. accounting firms that audit U.S. domiciled registrants but are not SECPS members.
4
The Panel makes no recommendations on firms’ hiring and retention policies and the assignment of personnel, and
accordingly they are not discussed in this chapter.
5
Appendix B provides additional information about the firms.
2
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beyond meeting statutory requirements, also contributed to the perception that the audit itself had little
value. Some firms have indicated that, following the divestiture of their consulting practices, they will be
placing more emphasis on their audit practices. The Panel views this as a positive development.
Recommendations
To audit firms:
4.5

The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Emphasize to all audit personnel the importance of performing high quality professional
work. This message should be delivered frequently by the CEO, COO, leaders at the firm’s
regional and office levels, and the head of the audit practice, as well as by the firm’s top
technical partners. It should stand out above all other messages.

• Address the importance of the role and responsibility of audit professionals, as well as the
concepts of objectivity, independence, professional skepticism, and accountability to the
public.

• Develop marketing and advertising messages targeted to users of audited financial
statements, coordinated with similar AICPA messages, that indicate the importance of
audits.
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
4.6

The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer reviewers:

• Assess the frequency and appropriateness of internal messages from firm leaders about
audit quality

• Include their findings in their report to the Peer Review Committee
To the AICPA:
4.7

The Panel recommends that the AICPA:

• Develop messages targeted to users of audited financial statements that promote the
importance of audits
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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
4.8
Auditors have faced major challenges in recent years in maintaining the necessary level of
professional competence. The challenges include increased business complexities and risks, the rapid
pace of technological change, the globalization of business, significant regulatory changes, and new and
often complex accounting and auditing standards.
Findings
4.9
Average continuing professional education (CPE) hours per audit professional, across all levels
of experience in the large firms, are well above professional and regulatory requirements, but have
changed little in recent years. Formal CPE is in addition to on-the-job training, which is the primary
vehicle for the professional development of auditors. The firms also have invested heavily in new
technology-driven information-sharing systems, which include extensive databases of technical, industry,
and other resource materials that are important sources of professional self-development.
4.10 The firms support an impressive array of instructor-led and self-study programs directed at
developing broad-based business professionals and skilled auditors. Professional development
programs typically are standardized for less experienced personnel and focus on interpersonal skills,
technical accounting knowledge and audit skills, industry knowledge, and administration of work
assignments. Programs for more experienced professionals generally are more tailored to the
individual’s needs and most often include technical topics, industry programs, and skills related to
personnel development (including coaching and mentoring), relationship building, and practice
development. Formal training at all levels also includes using technology to deliver internal
communications, research resources, and individual learning. The Panel supports the emphasis on
coaching and mentoring and the use of high-quality, technology-based delivery tools as supplements to
traditional instructor-led programs.
4.11 Participants in focus groups and other panel activities indicated that partner and other
supervisory personnel, and sometimes the firms themselves, do not always view professional
development as a high priority. This negatively affects on-the-job learning, and at times interferes with
attendance at scheduled formal training programs and use of self-study programs. The participants also
noted that auditors need improved knowledge and skills to meet the kinds of challenges that were
identified in Chapters 2 and 3 of this Report. The participants indicated that current professional and
regulatory CPE requirements are focused on the attainment of a specified number of training hours and
are, in general, less than effective in providing auditors with the necessary levels of skills and
competence. Output measures, such as assessment against desired knowledge and specific professional
competencies, would be more effective in improving auditors’ skills.
4.12 The profession’s approach to professional development has started to move toward selfdirected, competency-based learning. Several firms have developed "competency models" that reflect
the firm’s skills and competency expectations for each experience level, which are then incorporated
into their performance management process. The AICPA, working cooperatively with the National
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Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA), has issued an exposure draft of a Statement
on Standards for Continuing Professional Education that incorporates the core competency
concept and would grant CPE credit for self-directed learning activities measured by learning outcomes.
The Panel supports these steps to improving the focus, relevance, and effectiveness of CPE.
Recommendations
To audit firms:
4.13

The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Support and adopt the concepts in the AICPA exposure draft, Statement on Standards
for Continuing Professional Education, and use the AICPA core competency model, or
a similar model, as a basis for self-assessed performance measurements and career planning

• Make increased knowledge and skills a high priority for all experience levels with a
particular focus on meeting the challenges identified in Chapters 2 and 3 of this Report
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
4.14

The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer reviewers:

• Assess engagement teams’ knowledge and skills
• Make qualitative assessments of firms’ policies and performance related to professional
development

• Include their findings in their report to the Peer Review Committee
To the AICPA:
4.15

The Panel recommends that the AICPA:

• Assist the firms in adopting the concepts in the AICPA exposure draft, Statement on
Standards for Continuing Professional Education, and in using the AICPA core
competency model, or a similar model, as a basis for self-assessed performance
measurements and career planning

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
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4.16 Audit firms devote significant time and resources to personnel management. Each firm has
unique policies and procedures, but their evaluation criteria generally encompass industry knowledge,
client relationship building, practice development activities (including cross-marketing), and
interpersonal, administrative, and technical skills. Incentive compensation programs exist in most firms.
Quantifiable incentive measures typically are related to practice development, revenue growth, and
practice profitability. Measures related to technical skills and quality of professional work – which are
considered in firms’ internal inspection programs and in peer reviews – typically are more subjective.
Findings
4.17 The Panel found that generally there is an appropriate focus on technical skills and quality of
professional work and a reasonable balance of these items with other criteria. Focus group and QPR
participants expressed few concerns about the attention firms give to personnel evaluations and rewards
or their overall effectiveness. Participants at all levels spoke positively about the benefits of mentoring
programs. Some audit managers believed that the firms sometimes overemphasize new business
development in measuring performance. Other participants commented about the need for firms to
develop innovative compensation plans, consistent with professional independence standards, that
would add to the attractiveness of auditing as a profession.
Recommendations
To audit firms:
4.18

The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Review performance measures for all experience levels, and assure that performing high
quality audits is appropriately recognized as the highest priority in performance evaluations
and compensation, promotion, and retention decisions for all personnel

• Work cooperatively with the AICPA in developing effective measures of audit quality and
incorporate those measures into the internal inspection process
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
4.19

The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer reviewers:

• Assess the role that performing high quality professional work plays in performance reviews
and in compensation, promotion, and retention decisions at all levels of audit personnel

• Include their findings in their report to the Peer Review Committee
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TIME PRESSURES ON AUDIT ORS
4.20 Time pressures have been a pervasive and long-standing issue within the profession. The
Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities (the “Cohen Commission”) initially raised the issue of time
and budget pressures as a factor in sub-standard audits.6 Over time, these pressures may reflect
negatively on job satisfaction, on the desirability of choosing a career in auditing, and ultimately on the
profession’s ability to attract and retain high quality personnel.
Findings
4.21 The Panel believes that time and fee budgets, unexpected turnover of engagement personnel,
and sometimes unrealistic client-imposed or internally-imposed deadlines can place significant, and
sometimes pervasive, pressures on engagement teams. These pressures can create an environment in
which audit quality might be compromised if engagement team members, at any level, perceive that their
individual performance is measured primarily by meeting time deadlines and budget estimates. These
threats to audit quality frequently appear at or near the completion of the engagement in the form of
client pressures on the engagement team to “finalize the audit” and hurry the issue-resolution process.
4.22 No focus group participant indicated any personal involvement in either self-imposed or clientimposed time pressures that resulted in compromised audit quality, and this generally was confirmed by
the QPR process. Focus group participants, however, suggested that time pressures can and often do
place stress on the audit process and have the potential to affect audit quality adversely. The AAER
study indicated that in a limited number of instances succumbing to time pressures may have contributed
to the auditors’ failure to detect material misstatements.7 Conversely, in other situations the auditors’
resistance to time pressures may have facilitated the detection of material misstatements.
4.23 The Panel recognizes that client deadlines and engagement budgets are a necessary part of the
audit process. Managing the potential risks from excessive time pressures on engagement teams,
however, must be a high priority. Performance measures need to be balanced and clearly and carefully
communicated to all professionals to assure that all personnel understand that quality work is the
ultimate priority, not meeting time deadlines and budget estimates.

6
7

Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations, 1978.
See Appendix F.
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Recommendations
To audit firms:
4.24

The Panel recommends that audit firms:

• Expand the client continuance assessment process to include inquiries about possible time
pressures on specific engagements that could create an environment in which audit quality
might be compromised

• Provide guidance on actions that engagement partners should consider in managing time
pressures

• Incorporate appropriate measures of partners’ and other supervisory personnel’s abilities to
manage time pressures in upward evaluations or other similar feedback processes

• Reaffirm periodically with partners and managers the importance of establishing realistic
budgets and work loads
To the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
4.25

The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request that peer reviewers:

• Assess the extent of time pressures on audit engagements and the firm’s success in
managing those pressures

• Include their findings in their report to the Peer Review Committee
SMALLER FIRM CONSIDERATIONS
Findings
4.26 The Panel staff met with several partners from smaller firms, each of whom had extensive
experience performing peer reviews of firms of similar size. Discussions with these and others indicated
that smaller firms generally have a strong commitment to quality audit work. The focus group members
also thought the professionalism of people working in these firms was very high.
4.27 Some concerns were expressed, however, about limited sources available in smaller firms for
consultation on technical accounting and auditing issues, difficulties in obtaining concurring partners with
the appropriate technical and industry skills, and difficulties in assessing engagement risk (client
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acceptance and retention), especially when considering whether to accept a new client that has been
with a larger firm.
4.28 The findings and related recommendations in each of the preceding subsections generally apply
to smaller firms as well as the large firms.
Recommendations
To the AICPA:
4.29

The Panel recommends that the AICPA:

• Provide greater audit-related assistance to smaller firms, particularly technical and industry
accounting and auditing support and consultation

• Consider additional means by which smaller firms can meet the SECPS concurring partner
requirement

• Develop software and other tools to assist smaller firms in assessing engagement risk (client
acceptance and retention)
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CHAPTER 5 – AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
NON-AUDIT SERVICES
Introduction
5.1
Independence is fundamental to the reliability of auditors’ reports. To be credible, an
auditor’s opinion must be based on an objective and disinterested viewpoint. As expressed by the
Council of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in a statement
adopted in 1947:
Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the foundation of the
public accounting profession and upon its maintenance depends the profession’s
strength and its stature.1
5.2
The combination of well-developed accounting standards and independents audits has
helped make the U.S. capital markets a national asset. Because the auditor’s objectivity is critical
to investor confidence, regulators and others become concerned when they detect any actions
that may impair, or appear to impair, independence.
5.3
The Panel examined certain auditor independence issues. It observed the extent to which
an objective, independent view was brought to bear on difficult, complex audit judgments and
decisions encountered during the Quasi Peer Reviews (QPRs). In addition, the Panel sought to
assess the potential for impaired independence, both in fact and in appearance, resulting from
providing non-audit services to public audit clients. Non-audit services have long been an area of
concern, compounded by significant increases in the scope and amounts of non-audit services
provided by auditing firms.
Prior Considerations of Non-Audit Services
5.4
Non-audit services and the potential impact on independence of an auditor’s providing
services to an audit client have been studied frequently by a wide assortment of constituencies
and other observers. These include the U.S. Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Public Oversight Board (POB), the AICPA and academics. Appendix D to this report
contains a brief chronicle and summary description of these studies, spanning a period of over
forty years.
Background
5.5
In The Rise of the Accounting Profession – To Responsibility and Authority, 1937 19692 , John L. Carey described independence concepts as a state of mind and a matter of
1

John L. Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession – To Responsibility and Authority, 1937-1969, (New York,
1970), p. 182.
2
See note 1, p. 175.
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character. In the early part of the twentieth century, the concepts of integrity, honesty and
objectivity were so familiar and ingrained that it was not considered necessary to have formal
independence rules. The profession felt that written rules would have merely stated the obvious.
5.6
In 1932 the AICPA Council considered prohibitions against auditors serving as officers
or directors of clients, and rejected them as unnecessary. However, the proposal indicated the
first concerns over a need to preserve the appearance of maintaining objectivity, as well as being
independent in fact. After enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, the Federal Trade
Commission3 issued rules not only barring auditors from serving as officers or directors of public
clients, but also prohibiting an auditor from holding a substantial financial interest in a public
client.4 Thus, the appearance as well as the fact of independence was officially introduced into
independence concepts. As John Carey noted, no one accused an auditor who owned a few
shares in a company of losing integrity, but “The point was, what would other people think –
what would the public think?”5 In 1941 the AICPA adopted similar prohibitions for all clients,
not just for public companies.
5.7
Independence is a major issue in connection with an auditor’s providing non-audit
services to a public audit client. The Panel is not aware of any instances of non-audit services
having caused or contributed to an audit failure or the actual loss of auditor independence.
However, as the POB noted in its study on scope of services, “Specific evidence of loss of
independence through MAS [management advisory services], a so-called smoking gun, is not
likely to be available even if there is such a loss.”6 Many have expressed concerns that these
services – and pressures to sell these services – may cause an auditor to consciously or
unconsciously subordinate his or her judgment to a client’s desires. Also, as non-audit services
have grown, concern has been expressed that management of the firms may have tended to focus
more on these services than on auditing.
5.8
An early recognition of the expanding scope of services offered by auditors was found in
a statement adopted by the AICPA Council in 1947. The services described were tax advice,
accounting assistance, advice to business in the installation of accounting and cost systems,
budgeting, and internal control. However, independence concerns were not raised at that time.
5.9
The 1947 AICPA statement suggested that many non-audit services have their roots in
the audit practice. They evolved from requests by audit clients for additional services that their
auditors seemed best suited or capable of providing, as well as from the special skills needed to
audit new and complex business transactions. Today, effective audits depend more than ever on
specialists. For example, specialists used in audits include:

• Technology and systems specialists

3

The FTC administered the federal securities laws until the SEC was established in 1934.
It was not until 1950 that the SEC removed the word “substantial” and barred any financial interest by the auditor
in a public client. Previously, the Commission had held that “substantial” meant more than 1% of the accountant’s
personal worth.
5
See note 1, p.180.
6
Public Oversight Board Report – Scope of Services by CPA Firms (AICPA, 1979).
4
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• Actuaries, to help evaluate risk management controls, insurance companies’ reserves,
and pension and other benefit accruals

• Treasury specialists, to help evaluate controls over cash management, financing,
currency, and derivatives

• Tax specialists, to help evaluate tax liabilities and deferred tax assets
• Valuation specialists, to help evaluate the reasonableness of valuations of financial
instruments, stock issued for assets or services, and allocations of the purchase price
of acquired businesses
5.10 The evolution of specialty skills into “consulting” practices was a logical extension of
services as the firms began hiring specialists for audit support. That evolution expanded the
scope of the specialists’ activities, helping the firms attract and retain people with these skills
that are increasingly important to effective auditing. Providing services in addition to audit
support also led to enhanced profits for the firms and often to increased overall knowledge of the
clients’ businesses.
5.11 However, the firms’ management consulting practices7 have expanded far beyond those
skills required for audit support and the traditional areas related to financial planning and
controls. In recent years, for example, some firms have added certain investment banking and
legal services, outsourcing of a variety of corporate functions, strategic business planning, and
business process re-engineering advice. Independence questions arise when these services are
marketed to audit clients.

7

References to consulting services usually exclude special assurance services. Recently the firms have tended to
carve out as special assurance practices certain services demanded by the market from those with audit skills -- for
example, transaction-based services such as due diligence studies in connection with proposed business
combinations, litigation support and internal audit outsourcing.
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5.12 The mix of revenues of the Big 5 firms has continued to shift toward consulting services.
The growth of consulting services is illustrated by the following table, showing those firms’ mix
of practice as a percentage of gross fees:8
1990
All clients SEC clients
Accounting and audit
Tax
Consulting
Total

1999
All clients SEC clients

53%
27
20

71%
17
12

34%
22
44

48%
20
32

100%

100%

100%

100%

Thus, the audit firms’ fees from consulting services for their SEC clients increased from 17%
(12% / 71%) of audit fees in 1990 to 67% (32% / 48%) in 1999.
5.13 For 1999, 75% of the Big 5 firms’ SEC clients received no consulting services from their
auditors, down from 80% in 1990. 4% of those firms’ SEC clients had consulting fees that
exceeded the audit fees, up from 1% in 1990.
5.14

Similarly, the growth of consulting in the next three largest firms is shown below9 :
1990
All clients SEC clients

Accounting and auditing
Tax
Consulting
Total

1999
All clients SEC clients

56%
33
11

81%
16
3

44%
28
28

74%
16
10

100%

100%

100%

100%

5.15 For 1999, 79% of those firms’ SEC clients received no consulting services from their
auditors, approximately the same as in 1990. Less than 1% of those firms’ SEC clients had
consulting fees that exceeded the audit fees in either 1999 or 1990.
Panel Process
5.16 The Panel sought to obtain information about the effects of non-audit services on the
independence of auditors. In the QPR, 37 engagements were identified as ones for which
services other than audit and tax services had been provided. (This represented 29% of the QPR
population, which is similar to the average of 25% of all SEC clients as reported by the eight
firms in their 1999 reports to the SECPS.) Supplemental questionnaires were completed in these
instances, and in some instances the reviewers interviewed the firm personnel who performed the
non-audit services.
8
9

Compiled from annual reports submitted by the firms to the SECPS.
Compiled from annual reports submitted by the firms to the SECPS.
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5.17 The QPR reviewers did not identify any instances in which providing non-audit services
had a negative effect on audit effectiveness. On about a quarter of the engagements in which
non-audit services had been provided, the QPR reviewers concluded that those services had a
positive impact on the effectiveness of the audit. On the balance of the reviewed engagements,
the reviewers were either neutral regarding the effects of non-audit services or concluded that the
services had no particular impact on the effectiveness of the audits.
5.18 Of the 37 engagements, 15 involved (i) systems or processes used by the client to prepare
its financial statements (or management reports directly integrated with its financial statements)
or (ii) financial-statement amounts that were involved in, or derived as part of, the non-audit
services. In all these engagements, the reviewers agreed that the engagement team’s audit
procedures were sufficient to bring an objective view to the area, provide sufficient competent
evidential matter regarding the systems, processes, or amounts, and that the procedures were
adequately documented. In addition, the reviewers agreed that the engagement team and/or the
firm took appropriate steps to assure themselves that the non-audit services would not impair the
firm’s independence and that the auditors’ independence was not adversely affected by the nonaudit services.
5.19 Also, respondents to the Panel’s survey were asked for their views on the matter, and
participants at the Panel’s public hearings expressed views on the issue. The Panel found that
many people continue to be concerned – some very concerned – that the performance of nonaudit services could impair independence or that at least there is an appearance of the potential
for impairment. Almost two-thirds of the respondents to the Panel’s survey from outside the
profession who addressed non-audit services expressed such concerns.
5.20 A recent survey commissioned by the Independence Standards Board (ISB) indicated the
following views of respondents:

• They believed that the evolution of audit firms into the consulting fields was logical
• Many felt that the provision of most consulting services was not likely to create a real
problem of audit independence

• However, almost all agreed that the potential for appearance problems was quite
significant10

Panel Considerations
5.21 The Panel discussed at length the subject of non-audit services and their potential impact
on auditor independence. It also debated whether it should consider recommending a ban on
some or all non-audit services to public audit clients. During its deliberations the Panel became
10

Earnscliffe Research & Communications, Report to the United States Independence Standards Board – Research
into Perceptions of Auditor Independence and Objectivity (November 1999). Those interviewed in the survey
included public company CEOs, CFOs and audit committee chairs, as well as buy- and sell-side analysts, audit
partners and regulators.
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aware that:

• Many of the major firms have announced an intent to split off some or all of their
consulting practices from their audit and tax practices. The expected results would
include the reduction or elimination of potential conflicts of interest and renewed
emphasis on core audit services.

• In a recent speech11 the Chairman of the SEC stated that he is asking the SEC staff to
prepare a rulemaking initiative related to the expanded non-audit services offered to
public company audit clients. He noted that the initiative should address a few
fundamental public policy questions, including whether there should be limits on the
types of services that an auditor can render to a public audit client, how firms should
be structured to assure independence, and whether firms should be permitted to
affiliate with entities that provide services to the firms’ audit clients that the firms
themselves would not be allowed to provide to those clients. The Chairman added
that any proposal resulting from the initiative would be supplemented by public
hearings to garner the broadest possible input.
5.22

During its discussions, the Panel agreed that:

• Independence is essential for promoting public confidence in the audit process, and
must be monitored continuously.

• So long as auditors provide non-audit services to audit clients, there will be at least an
issue with respect to the appearance of independence.

• There has been an explosive growth in non-audit services in recent years, to the point
where many large firms’ revenues from these services exceed audit revenues.

• In their zeal to emphasize the array of services that CPAs offer, the accounting firms
and the AICPA scarcely acknowledge auditing services in the public images that they
portray. This only tends to exacerbate the independence issue and to downplay the
importance of auditing.
5.23 Considering the history of the issue of non-audit services and all the prior studies, the
Panel asked itself the fundamental question: is there a conflict here, and if so, how should it be
addressed?
5.24 Panel members have two distinct viewpoints on this question, which are presented
separately in this chapter beginning at paragraphs 5.31 and 5.39. Some Panel members believe
there should be an exclusionary rule that would prohibit an audit firm from providing non-audit
or non-tax services, except in very limited circumstances, to its public audit clients. Under this
view, there is a fundamental conflict of interest arising from the fact that the audit firm is really
11

Arthur Levitt, “Renewing the Covenant with Investors,” address at New York University Center for Law and
Business, May 10, 2000.
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serving two different sets of clients: management in the case of management consulting services,
and the audit committee, the shareholders and others who rely on the audited financial statements
in deciding whether to invest, in the case of an audit.
5.25 Other Panel members believe that audit firms can provide both audit and non-audit
services to the same public audit client, and with the proper safeguards and disclosures, maintain
independence and objectivity. They believe that nothing in the long history of the profession’s
providing non-audit services has indicated otherwise. They believe it is incorrect to suggest that
the interests of management must be at variance with those of the audit committee and the
stockholders, or that the interests of management must be inimical to good financial reporting.
The company and shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of consulting services that “benefit
management.” Thus, in the absence of compelling evidence of a problem, these members believe
that such an extreme measure is unwarranted and could well have a negative effect on audit
effectiveness.
5.26 Accordingly, the Panel makes no recommendation regarding an exclusionary rule.
However, the Panel did agree on the importance of the independence issue and that audit
committees should not await the results of the SEC’s rule-making initiatives to become actively
involved in monitoring proposed non-audit services.
5.27 The Panel’s recommendations are intended to assist the SEC in its rule-making initiatives
while providing for an immediate plan of action, as described below, that should be implemented
by the ISB, audit committees, and management pending any SEC rule proposals.
Recommendations
To the Independence Standards Board:
5.28 The Panel recommends that, whatever the outcome of the SEC’s rule-making initiatives,
the ISB identify factors to be considered by auditors, audit committees, and client management
(i) when implementing ISB Standard No.1 and the SEC’s new audit committee disclosure
requirements and (ii) when determining whether a specific non-audit service is appropriate. In
determining the appropriateness of a particular service, one guiding principle should be whether
the service facilitates the performance of the audit, improves the client’s financial-reporting
process or is otherwise in the public interest. Some of the important factors to consider could be:

• Whether the service is being performed principally for the audit committee
• The effects of the service, if any, on audit effectiveness or on the quality and
timeliness of the entity’s financial-reporting process
• Whether the service would be performed by specialists (e.g., technology specialists)
who ordinarily also provide recurring audit support
• Whether the service would be performed by audit personnel, and if so, whether it will
enhance their knowledge of the entity’s business and operations
• Whether the role of those performing the service would be inconsistent with the
auditors’ role (e.g., a role where neutrality, impartiality and auditor skepticism are
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•
•
•
•
•

likely to be subverted)
Whether the audit firm personnel would be assuming a management role or creating a
mutuality of interests with management
Whether the auditors, in effect, would be “auditing their own numbers”
Whether the project must be started and completed very quickly
Whether the audit firm has unique expertise in the service
The size of the fee(s) for the non-audit service(s)

The Panel recognizes that considerable judgment may be required in reaching a conclusion
regarding the appropriateness of an audit firm’s performing a specific non-audit service for a
specific public audit client.
To Audit Committees:
5.29 The Panel recommends that audit committees pre-approve non-audit services that exceed
a threshold determined by the committee. This recommendation is consistent with the
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Committees regarding auditors’ services. The threshold should be at a level that ensures
that significant services are pre-approved, but not so low that the committee assumes a
management function.
When audit committees determine whether to approve specific non-audit services, the Panel
recommends that they consider the factors listed above.
To the SEC and the Independence Standards Board:
5.30 The Panel recommends that the SEC and the ISB evaluate on a continuing basis the
effectiveness of the disclosures made under ISB Standard No. 1 and the SEC’s new audit
committee disclosure rules, as well as any new rules issued by the ISB or by the SEC pursuant to
its rule-making initiatives.
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STATEMENT SUPPORTING AN EXCLUSIONARY BAN ON NON-AUDIT
SERVICES
5.31 Some members of the Panel believe that, with very limited exceptions, audit firms and
their affiliates should be excluded by rule from marketing and furnishing management services
to their audit clients that do not directly advance the interests of investors in objective and
reliable financial reports on the stewardship of management. This position rests on the belief of
these Panel members in (a) the central importance of independence to the profession of auditing
in general, and to the effectiveness of the audit process in particular, and (b) the severe and
growing challenges to independence that the audit profession faces in the current environment.
The Exclusionary Rule Described
5.32 For the reasons set forth below, we believe the Panel should recommend a rule (the
“Non-Audit Services Rule”) that, with the very limited exceptions described below, bars the
provision of non-audit services to an audit client by either (a) the audit firm itself or (b) any firm
affiliated with the audit firm, whether by reason of a control relationship or strategic or other
business alliance or other arrangement that gives the audit firm or its partners a financial stake in
the provision of non-audit services to such audit client by such other firm.
5.33 The Non-Audit Services Rule should be adopted by the SEC and should contain
delegations of authority to (a) the Independent Standards Board for the purpose of issuing
detailed rules of implementation, and (b) the Public Oversight Board for the purpose of assuring
effective enforcement of the Non-Audit Services Rule and the detailed rules of implementation.
5.34 The Non-Audit Services Rule would have application only to SEC registrants. Of course,
the profession would be free to adopt the same or similar rules for application more generally to
all audits conducted in the United States.
5.35 The Rule would define the category of services (“Non-Audit Services”) to be barred as
including everything other than the work involved in performing an audit and other work that is
integral to the function of an audit. In general, the touchstone for deciding whether a service
other than the straight-forward audit itself should be excluded from Non-Audit Services is
whether the service is rendered principally to the client’s audit committee, acting on behalf of
investors, to facilitate, or improve the quality of, the audit and the financial reporting process
rather than being rendered principally to provide assistance to management in the performance of
its duties. The range of services, skills and personnel thus permitted to be employed in
furtherance of the financial reporting process is in no way limited. The Non-Audit Services Rule
adopted by the SEC would provide general guidelines to the ISB in writing detailed rules of
implementation, which the Panel expects would evolve over time as the nature of the audit and
the services changed. We do not believe the Panel need resolve the many difficult definitional
issues that the Rule will undoubtedly create. That would be the task of the ISB.
5.36 Without prejudging, we offer the following brief observations on two types of non-audit
services. Tax work, although typically performed for management, is also frequently performed
for, and subject to close scrutiny by, the audit committee and has traditionally been thought of as
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tightly related to audit work. Given the history, we believe tax work that does not involve
advocacy should probably be treated as outside the barred category of Non-Audit Services. So
too should attest work rendered as auditor in connection with SEC registrations or other SEC
filings.
5.37 We believe the SEC’s Non-Audit Services Rule should contain a carefully circumscribed
exception to permit Non-Audit Services to be rendered by the audit firm to its client where
special circumstances justify so doing. Use of the exception would require the following:
(a)

Before any such Non-Audit Service is rendered to the audit client, a
finding by the client’s audit committee (which must consist only of
independent directors) that special circumstances make it obvious that the
best interests of the company and its shareholders will be served by
retaining its audit firm or affiliate to render such Non-Audit Service and
that no other vendor of such service can serve those interests as well;

(b)

Forthwith upon the making of such finding by the audit committee,
submission of a written copy thereof to the SEC and the POB; and

(c)

In the company’s next proxy statement for the election of directors,
disclosure of such finding by the audit committee and the amount paid and
expected to be paid to the audit firm or affiliate for such service.

Reasons Why the Exclusionary Rule Has Become Necessary to Protect Independence, both
Now and Especially in the Future
5.38 There are a number of important and convincing arguments in favor of an exclusionary
rule. In contrast, no other solution is likely to achieve the goal of protecting independence from
the growing temptations and pressures that exist. A brief outline of the most important arguments
appears below.
1.

Of fundamental importance in understanding the conflict of interest that
arises from the provision of non-audit services to audit clients is the fact
that in so doing the audit firm is really serving two different sets of clients:
management in the case of management consulting services (“MCS”), and
the audit committee, the shareholders and all those who rely on the audited
financials and the firm’s opinion in deciding whether to invest, in the case
of the audit. The firm is a fiduciary in respect to each of these client
groups, duty-bound to serve with undivided loyalty. It is obvious that in
serving these different clients the firm is subject to conflicts of interest that
tear at the fragile fabric of loyalty owed to one client or the other. And it is
equally obvious that the existence of dual loyalties creates a serious
appearance problem, regardless of whether, in particular cases, the fabric
actually tears apart or not.

2.

Our concerns with providing non-audit services to audit clients derive only
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in part from the well developed notions that (a) an auditor, directly or
indirectly through others in the firm or affiliates, ought not to be put in the
position of reviewing its own work, a concern clustered by the
Independent Standards Board12 around the term “self-review” and (b) an
auditor, directly or indirectly, ought not to be put in the position of playing
a management role through, for example, the exercise of managerial
responsibilities or participation in management decisions. The essence of
the concerns is the potential for impairment of independence, both in
appearance and in fact, that emanates from the wearing of more than one
fiduciary “hat” in the services provided, creating, willy-nilly, a dual set of
loyalties. It is for this reason that our concern, and the solution advanced
above, extend beyond non-audit services of the types identified in (a) and
(b) above.
3.

Given the conflict of interest, it is not realistic to expect the firm itself to
decide on its own independence. Even if the firm is correct in concluding
that the existence of non-audit business with a particular audit client will
not impair its independence, the conflict of interest inherent in the firm
attempting to address this issue for itself, given its sharp self-interest in an
outcome permitting the conduct of non-audit business, creates in the
minds of objective observers a serious loss of credibility.

4.

Nor is it feasible to expect independence to be assured by approval of the
audit committee, because it is impossible to identify when the problem
exists, and to challenge the auditor’s judgment on the matter is to
challenge its integrity, something audit committees are highly unlikely to
do. Independence is a state of mind, necessary to maintain the skepticism
and objectivity that are hallmarks of the accounting profession. Being
subjective and invisible, it is not something an audit committee can apply
any known litmus test to determine. Moreover, the credibility problem
would remain whenever there are substantial levels of non-audit services
being provided. This problem has long been seen as of profound
importance to the public maintenance of confidence in the audit function.

5.

In a real sense the audit committee will remain blind to the existence of an
independence problem unless the auditor acknowledges its existence.
Regardless of the independence of the audit committee, and its willingness
to cut back or eliminate entirely the non-audit services that have given rise
to conflicting interests, the committee is wholly dependent on the auditor
to identify whether a problem exists and how serious it may be. Such
dependency is a very weak reed on which to base a solution that looks to
the audit committee to assure independence, case by case, through a “facts
and circumstances” test.

12

See, e.g., Discussion Memorandum of Independence Standards Board, September 1999, “Appraisal and Valuation
Services” and Discussion Memorandum of Independence Standards Board, December 1999, “Legal Services.”
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6.

No one has suggested that the audit committee can be a substitute for clear
rules where the problem of conflicts is most serious. Thus, for example
there is no suggestion that the audit committee be charged with discretion
to assess independence despite the existence of financial interests by the
audit firm in its audit client. Stock or other financial interests in one’s
audit client have long been viewed as creating too clear a conflict of
interest to become the subject of discretion. The need for an exclusionary
rule on non-audit services is rooted in the same ground: prospective
revenues from the provision of non-audit services, extending into the
future, create precisely the kind of financial stake that produces a conflict
of interest capable of impairing independence.

7.

An exclusionary rule is relatively easy to administer. It does not preclude
an audit firm from engaging directly or through affiliates in non-audit
services. All business entities other than its audit clients are available for
business. Thus, the Non-Audit Services Rule affirms the freedom of audit
firms to engage widely in non-audit services and to attract and hold topflight experts in IT and other non-audit services who must be available to
assist in audit work from time to time. As the Panel’s data show,
consulting staff and practice have burgeoned in recent years, even though
75% of the Big Five firms’ SEC clients receive no consulting services
from their auditors.
The SEC made the same observation in somewhat analogous
circumstances in 1989. In rejecting an application by Arthur Andersen to
enter into an MCS venture with a client on the basis of Andersen’s claim
of immateriality, the SEC said: “the petition argues that the staff
interpretation is anticompetitive in that it denies the accountant an
opportunity to compete by providing services in combination with its audit
clients. The accountant is precluded only from entering into a direct
business relationship with an existing audit client. The accountant is thus
free to enter into the relationship with any party unless the direct business
relationship is in effect during the period when the accountant is
conducting an audit of that party.”
In this same opinion the SEC rejected the argument that an exclusionary
rule is contrary to the public interest in denying potential clients their
choice of service providers, an argument likely to be advanced against the
suggested rule as well. Thus: “the petition also asserts that the staff
interpretation is injurious to the public interest because the public is
deprived of the efficient delivery of the prime/subcontractor’s technical
non-attest services. The public interest with which the Commission is
concerned, however, is the assurance of the integrity of financial
statements filed with it. As discussed above, it is this objective which
requires independence…” Moreover, the Non-Audit Services Rule allows
the ban to be lifted when special circumstances make it compelling to do
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so.
8.

As the Panel’s report indicates in “Personnel Management” of Chapter 4,
the system of compensation within the audit firms may not presently give
adequate weight to performing the audit function with high levels of skill
and professionalism. This fact may well adversely impact audit
effectiveness. Success in marketing an audit firm’s consulting services is a
significant factor in the compensation system. The skills that make one
successful in marketing non-audit services to management are not
generally consistent with the professional demands on an auditor to be
persistently skeptical, cautious and questioning in regard to management’s
financial representations. As long as the marketing of non-audit services
by auditors to their audit clients is encouraged, expected and rewarded,
there will exist a tension counterproductive to audit excellence. An
exclusionary rule will eliminate both this tension and its harmful effects.

9.

Some have considered addressing the problem of conflicts by banning this
or that non-audit service that is thought to be especially troublesome.
Legal and valuation services, for example. Our underlying objection to
this case by case approach is that it would produce the sort of finely tuned
evasion and concomitant enforcement proceedings that always follow
from efforts to define narrowly what is a prohibited practice. (The
essentially futile rules and re-rules of the FASB to determine when the
lease of an asset must be shown on the balance sheet as a liability are a
classic case in point.) Consider the recent announcement by one of the
Big Five that it will be acquiring a high-profile lobbying concern, one that
would, in the words of one of its principals, enable the audit firm to help
clients “get a law enacted . . . and work with the actual statutory
language.” Are the halls of Congress so different from those of the
courthouse that these would be permitted, “non-legal” services, as the
acquiring audit firm apparently contemplates? This approach also puts the
burden on those seeking to ban a particular non-audit service. We believe
it is essential to start with an exclusionary rule for all non-audit services,
and then to create limited exceptions where the risk of impairing
independence is slight.

10.

An exclusionary rule would be effective in rewarding those audit firms
most sensitive to the independence issue and most scrupulous in seeking
to avoid a real problem or the appearance of a problem. Exhortation and
even disclosure, by itself, often encourage those willing to sail close to the
line, or even cross over it. This result has the real and perverse impact of
hurting the competitive position of the most sensitive and scrupulous
auditing firms, and in time encourages even those firms to drop their
guard, and exploit the laxness in standards as well.

11.

An exclusionary rule is a low cost premium on an important insurance
policy for the whole profession, against governmental intervention to deny
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auditing firms the right to do any non-audit work. The rule would go far
toward eliminating the possibility of a major audit failure being linked to
the influence of non-audit service business on the audit firm’s diligence
and skepticism, an event that would provide a basis, and possibly the
momentum, for some radical solution like a total ban.
12.

Independence is given important meaning in many analogous situations
where potential conflicts, while not always certain to impair
independence, nonetheless are prohibited in the interest of avoiding the
problem entirely. Some observers would describe this strictness as an
effort simply to preserve the appearance of independence. We agree, but
only in the sense that it is solely by looking to what is observable directly
that we can set the bar for the fact of independence, which is inherently
indeterminate. Appearances matter, in sum, because the visible conflicts of
interest are all that we have to go on. The rules forbidding audit partners
from owning stock in the clients they audit and the rules tightly restricting
the eligibility of corporate directors to serve on audit committees are but
two examples of rules based not on the proven, but rather the presumed,
dangers of conflicting interests.
For example, the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness
of Corporate Audit Committees determined that, for a director to be
independent for purposes of meeting the membership requirements of the
audit committee, he or she must not accept compensation from the
corporation for any service other than service as a director and committee
member. The Blue Ribbon Committee noted that “…common sense
dictates that a director without any financial, family or other material
personal ties to management is more likely to be able to evaluate
objectively the propriety of management’s accounting, internal control and
reporting practices.” The parallel to the auditor is both exact and
compelling. Compensation for any service other than the audit would
impair the auditor’s independence.

13.

Another useful analog is found in the NYC Bar Association report on law
practice within the auditing firm. This Statement of Position on
Multidisciplinary Practice, appearing in The Record, September/October
1999, emphasized the incompatibility of the auditor’s independence with
the lawyer’s duties of confidentiality. As a result, the Executive
Committee of the NYC Bar Association stated its belief that “those roles
are always intrinsically incompatible, and that any regime permitting
MDPs should make clear that the same MDP may not provide both legal
and audit services to the same clients.” As early as 1962, looking at the
same issue from the auditing side, the SEC decided that the independence
of an audit firm was tainted when a partner in the firm rendered legal
services to the audit firm’s client. American Finance Company, Inc., 40
SEC 1043 (1962).
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14.

The provision of non-audit services is and can consistently be a profitable
business without the door-opener of already serving a prospective client as
its auditor. See, e.g. Andersen Consulting. As noted in paragraph 7 above,
notwithstanding the rapid growth in management consulting services, and
the dominant share of firm revenues they now command, the provision of
non-audit services to most audit clients remains relatively small. Adoption
of the exclusionary rule now would not have as large an impact on firm
profits as many in the profession seem to fear. If the rule is put off,
however, its likely impact on the firms when ultimately adopted will
surely increase. Continued rapid growth in management consulting work
is likely to mean an increase in the provision of such work for audit
clients.

15.

Audit services, standing alone, have been, are often today, and can
consistently be a profitable profession because it is a monopoly, in the
sense that only licensed professionals can render the service, and because
that monopoly is dominated by a small oligopoly. In our hearings, the
auditing firms claimed their auditing work was profitable, standing alone.
Other commentators seemed to dispute this claim, believing the firms too
often use auditing as a loss leader for marketing non-audit services. In
either case, the rule we recommend will make it unnecessary to treat
auditing as any kind of loss leader, because there will be no other services
to be cross-marketed. The incentive to compete on price will be sharply
reduced. Thus, charges for auditing will be adequate to attract and hold the
quality professionals necessary to perform quality audits. Overall the
quality of audits should go up. To quote the Economist (1/15/00): “Of
course, if accountants are barred from selling other services to their audit
clients, then the cost of audits may well go up. But companies should be
happy that they are not having their arms twisted into buying other sorts of
advice from their auditor’s colleagues. Auditors too would be freed from
the insidious pressure of selling or reviewing colleagues’ work. And for
shareholders, surely the price of truly independent audits is one worth
paying?”

16.

Whatever its merits in 1978, where ASR 250 was adopted, disclosure of
non-audit services will not suffice today or for the future. In 1978
disclosure was widely seen as an indirect way to deter too much non-audit
work for audit clients. The use of disclosure to shape substantive behavior
has a long and often successful history at the SEC. In repealing ASR 250
in 1982, the SEC noted a lack of “utility to investors.” The question of
usefulness to investors is equally true today. How are shareholders
expected to deal with the disclosure? For most, this or that piece of
consulting work might not seem material, but independence is not for
shareholders to choose, one by one. It is a public choice issue, much like
clean streets; there is independence for all the shareholders or for none.
More importantly, the scale of management consulting work and the

113

pressures to cross-sell that we have described are of such growing
magnitude that the less intrusive, and indirect, solutions of an earlier day
are no longer adequate. The problem is structural, across our financial
markets as a whole, and must be dealt with in those terms.
Using disclosure to assure independence in fact and appearance is a lot
like pushing the string rather than pulling it. To some extent, with some
clients, it may act as a brake on the growth of non-audit services sold to
audit clients. Again, however, it will often serve to harm the most
sensitive and scrupulous, while rewarding those willing to push the limits,
despite transparency. We conclude, for all these reasons, that a direct rule
of exclusion is far superior to the indirect route of disclosure.
17.

There are arguments from the perspective of both the service provider and
the service user that favor combining audit and non-audit services for the
same client. In marketing terms, there is an attractive link between audit
and management consulting. The one provides continuing access and
credibility for the other. Auditing provides a matchless opportunity to
uncover the competitive opportunities and risks of the client, which the
management consulting group is then prepared to address. No other
profession has the same ability, year in, year out, to work with large,
public clients, on a worldwide basis, division by division. No other
profession has the same privileged opportunity to reach regularly into the
very sinews of the client, on a basis of complete candor and access.
Indeed, for the profession of auditing, the law requires it. But this legally
compelled access carries with it responsibilities importantly affected with
the public interest. In these terms, management consulting is a business,
not different from a host of others, and as the AICPA Professional
Standards state, “differ[ing] fundamentally from the CPA’s function of
attesting” services. The paramount importance of independence to
auditing means that to the extent cross-marketing, however efficient it
might be to the audit firm, impairs independence, whether in fact or in
appearance, the right to cross-market must give way. For those in the
profession who value the audit function, this should be an easy trade-off to
make.

18.

Auditing firms also argue on behalf of their clients that they are simply
giving corporate management greater choice. But independence is not
about management choice. Corporate management is the client for
management consulting services, but for the audit the clients are
shareholders (and the audit committee as surrogate), creditors and the
investing public, all of whom need an objective, reliable report on
management’s stewardship. If offering corporate management a choice of
using its audit firm to supply a full range of other services threatens to
impair this oversight function, on which the credibility of our markets
depends, that’s simply a cost – a minor one at that – of preserving investor
confidence in our financial system. Indeed, the proposed rule is the least
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intrusive method we could imagine for achieving this essential goal.
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STATEMENT OPPOSING AN EXCLUSIONARY BAN ON NON-AUDIT
SERVICES
Introduction
5.39 Those members of the Panel who oppose a so-called exclusionary rule believe strongly in
the absolute need for independence, objectivity and integrity in auditors. However, they believe
that audit firms can provide both audit and non-audit services to the same public audit client and
maintain independence, objectivity and integrity. Nothing in the long history of the profession’s
providing non-audit services has indicated otherwise. These Panel members have confidence that
audit committees, management and auditors are fully capable of exercising their responsibilities
and making relevant, appropriate judgments. Thus, there is no need to default to extreme
measures that, while well intended, may produce negative unintended consequences.
5.40 These members believe that the conclusion of the POB in its study on scope of services
by CPA firms13 is still valid. In that study the POB considered and rejected any broad prohibition
against non-audit services as a “draconian measure” that, among other things, would deprive
audit clients of services that they obviously deem valuable. The POB noted that “otherwise
lawful and productive activity” should not be prohibited unless “clearly in the public interest and
no other measures are available.”
5.41 Why is the POB’s view still valid? First, the Panel has identified no new issues related to
consulting services. Although the appearance problem has been spotlighted by the steady growth
of consulting services over more than forty years, there is little if any difference in the nature of
the issue regardless of the comparative mix of a firm’s revenues. These Panel members also note
that the cause of much of the recent concern – the continued growth of non-audit services – may
in large measure be reversed by the planned divestiture of consulting practices by many of the
firms.
5.42 Most importantly, these Panel members are persuaded by the lack of any specific link
between audit failures and the rendering of non-audit services - which is consistent with the facts
at the time of the POB study. This is not a momentary phenomenon; for about a century, CPAs
have been providing valuable non-audit services without these services being linked to audit
failures.14 These Panel members are reluctant to change the rules in the absence of any
compelling evidence of a problem.
5.43 They believe that many non-audit services are, indeed, both in the public interest and
beneficial to audit effectiveness. As one of many examples, a company may seek the assistance
13

See note 6.
In addition to a lack of evidence of a causal relationship between audit failures and non-audit services, the Panel’s
QPR findings indicated that auditors’ independence was not imp aired when non-audit services were provided (see
paragraphs 5.16 – 5.18). This is wholly consistent with the results of the regular peer review process. In that process
certain engagements where the client also engaged the audit firm for management consulting services are selected,
and the peer reviewer must evaluate the effects, if any, on independence. The SECPS staff reported that 67 such
engagements were selected during the 1999 peer reviews, and consistent with prior years, no instances were found in
which independence or objectivity appeared to have been impaired.
14
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of its auditors to correct control weaknesses identified during the audit. The public interest is
served by the controls (and the company’s financial reporting process) having been strengthened
through the auditors’ knowledge of the company and its operations, and audit effectiveness is
enhanced through the auditors’ increased understanding of the client’s systems. Similarly, a preacquisition review of a potential target company by the acquirer’s auditors provides timely
identification of accounting and operations issues to the acquirer, facilitates the combining of
two previously unrelated accounting and financial reporting systems, and enables the auditors to
plan a more effective audit of the newly-combined enterprise.
5.44 Thus, these members question how the public interest is served if auditors are expected to
identify problems but have to decline if asked to help solve them. A client should not have to
make continuous choices about whether it wants a firm solely as its auditors or solely as a
provider of other services, and a client should not have to dismiss a firm as its auditors to obtain
other necessary services from that firm. Also, these members fear that companies that most need
to improve their controls may opt not to do so because of the potential added costs and efforts of
identifying and using firms other than their auditors.
5.45 Those who support an exclusionary ban assert that an audit firm has divided loyalties
when it provides non-audit services to audit clients because it serves “different clients” in doing
so, i.e., management in the case of non-audit services, and the board and stockholders in the case
of audits. The Panel members opposing such a ban believe that it is incorrect to suggest that the
interests of management must be at variance with those of the audit committee or stockholders,
or that the interests of management must be inimical to good financial reporting. The company
and shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of consulting services that “benefit management.”
5.46 In addition to the public interest criterion, the POB felt a ban could be justified only if no
other measures are available. Since that time, many additional measures have been instituted,
including the establishment of the ISB, enhanced peer reviews, significant strengthening of the
role and scope of audit committees, and the combined effects of ISB Standard No. 1 and the
SEC’s recent proxy statement disclosure requirements for audit committees (described more
fully later in this Statement). These Panel members question the efficacy of proposing a whole
new rule at the same time other rules to address the issue are being implemented. These rules
have been publicly supported by the Chief Accountant of the SEC, who stated that they should
“bring independence issues to audit committees’ attention and stimulate their participation in
identifying and resolving independence issues.”15
5.47 Clients voluntarily purchase these services. These Panel members believe that client
management, boards and audit committees are in the best position to assess the terms and
conditions of these voluntary contracts, which include independence considerations. They view
any notions that audit committees have not made or cannot make reasoned judgments about
independence matters as unfairly impugning the abilities and integrity of these committees.
5.48 Indeed, a ban might appear to make life simpler for those who would prefer not to accept
what these Panel members see as a normal business responsibility. However, given the lack of
15

Report on SEC auditor independence initiatives, Lynn Turner, January 19, 2000, in a memorandum to Chairman
Levitt responding to correspondence from Congressman John D. Dingell.
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identified independence impairments, making matters simpler for audit committees would hardly
justify depriving clients of needed services. Thus, these Panel members see a proposed ban as
potentially punitive to clients, shareholders, and auditors. They believe that audit committees
should be afforded an opportunity to do their job, and that the current audit committee and
disclosure initiatives should be given a chance to work. They note also that, even if a ban were
imposed, audit committees would still have to make judgments, albeit less frequently, regarding
whether certain services were included in the scope of banned services.
5.49

Other factors supporting this view include:

• Audit firms increasingly need specialists (information technology and treasury, for
example) to provide critically needed audit support. The QPR results reinforced that
access to these resources will only become more vital in the future. Attracting and
retaining these resources, and motivating them to provide direct audit support, may
well be hampered significantly if they were to be prohibited from providing non-audit
services to public audit clients. Further, these professionals maintain and build their
skills by providing non-audit services. Thus, another unintended consequence of a
prohibition could be to reduce audit effectiveness.

• The ISB and the SEC recently have taken actions to bring independence matters to
audit committees and stimulate their participation in identifying and resolving any
potential independence issues.16 These actions are consistent with the
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees. They should result in significant additional
consideration being given to auditor independence, particularly since the SEC’s rule
will require audit committees to report on these activities in companies’ proxy
statements.

• There are demonstrated benefits of non-audit services both to audit effectiveness and
to clients, as the POB pointed out in its study on scope of services, to cite one
example.17 As noted in this chapter under “Non-Audit Services – Panel Process,” the
QPR findings indicated that non-audit services had either a positive effect or no effect
on audit effectiveness, but no negative effects.

• When timing of a project is critical and requires the rapid deployment of skilled
personnel, a company should not be denied access to the services of its audit firm.
This is particularly true when the company believes that the firm, because of its
knowledge of the client, is best capable of providing the services, and doing so on a
timely basis. This is a frequently occurring, very practical consideration that ought
not be overlooked.
16

Independence Standard No. 1, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees, January 1999: SEC Release No.
34-42266, Audit Committee Disclosure, December 22, 1999. Also, in Practice Alert 99-1, Guidance for
Independence Discussions with Audit Committees, the SECPS issued guidance designed to assist firms in evaluating
and enhancing their policies and procedures for identifying and communicating with audit committees those
judgmental matters that may reasonably be thought to bear on the auditor’s independence.
17
See note 6.
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• The ISB already has under active consideration the independence ramifications of
certain specific non-audit services and is the proper body to evaluate, with due
process, the need for any proscriptions on these services.
5.50 Those with this view also point to the POB’s having observed in its study on scope of
services that there would be occasional trade-offs between avoidance of all conflicts and audit
effectiveness:
Integrity is an element of character, and objectivity relates to the ability of an
auditor to maintain impartiality of attitude and avoid conflicts of interest. All
conflicts are not avoidable and some conflicts of interest produce countervailing
benefits. Such conflicts are accepted, consistent with the concept of
independence, because of the practical necessity and the realization of important
benefits, coupled with the fact that auditor integrity and various legal incentives
provide adequate public protection. This helps explain public acceptance of the
fact that auditors can be “independent” even though the client selects them and
pays their fee. It also helps explain why there has been public acceptance of
accounting firms furnishing a variety of tax advisory services to clients.
Recognizing, therefore, that independence in an absolute sense cannot be
achieved, when evaluating whether certain services should be prohibited, it is
necessary to consider the potential benefits derived from the service and balance
them against the possible or apparent impairment to the auditor’s objectivity.18
5.51 Opposition to an exclusionary rule does not mean that, after careful study, debate and due
process, the SEC or ISB should not proscribe certain types of services in some or all
circumstances. Indeed, these Panel members believe that the ISB should continue to review the
independence ramifications of various specific non-audit services with the full support of the
SEC. In so doing, the ISB should carefully consider the aforementioned arguments against an
exclusionary ban, especially those concerning the potential effects on audit effectiveness and the
public interest that could result from prohibiting the service, as well as the factors that follow
regarding audit personnel and specialists who provide audit support.
Non-audit Services Provided by Specialists Who Also Provide Recurring Audit Support
5.52 These Panel members strongly believe that services that ordinarily are performed by
specialists who also provide recurring audit support should not be prohibited. They urge the SEC
and/or the ISB to consider the following:

• Non-audit services by technology specialists who also provide recurring audit
support – Throughout its process the Panel has seen an ever-increasing need for
technology skills. Auditors must have access to skills that are as current and
sophisticated as the increasingly complex systems and processes they must audit.
Technology specialists help the engagement team understand computerized systems
and processes, evaluate and test controls, and devise and execute sophisticated
18

See note 6.
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computer-assisted audit techniques. Thus, the assessment of the potential benefits of
proscribing any services provided by these technology specialists must be balanced
against the potentially adverse effects on the firms’ abilities to use their expertise in
support of critical audit support services and to attract and retain them.

• Non-audit services by others who also provide recurring audit support such as
actuaries, treasury specialists, and valuation specialists – Similar consideration should
be given to evaluating the potential benefits and adverse effects of proscribing any
non-audit services these specialists provide to public audit clients.
5.53 Audit firms believe that they cannot attract and retain those with specialty skills if they
will be limited to providing audit support. These specialists generally are not CPAs and their
primary professional interest is not auditing. They likely will not consider working for an audit
firm if they are limited to working only on audits and cannot build their skills and gain job
satisfaction by performing other services.
5.54 These Panel members believe, based on discussions with these specialists and others, that
these specialists likely would resist audit-support assignments if they were prohibited from
providing other services to these clients. Further, if they are assigned to provide audit support on
such restricted engagements, they would be less likely to demonstrate the same vigor and
creativity that they would on an engagement where they could provide other services. This
neither enhances audit effectiveness nor serves the public interest. Thus, one question to ask
when considering a ban on specific non-audit services is: do those who ordinarily provide the
services also provide recurring audit support services?
Other Services Provided by Audit Personnel
5.55 In addition to asking specialists to provide non-audit services, clients may ask the
members of the audit engagement team or other audit personnel of the firm to perform a wide
variety of special projects. For example, a client may request that an auditor perform a due
diligence review of a potential acquisition. The knowledge gained in such a project enhances the
auditor’s understanding of the target’s business and systems, which is critical to planning and
performing an effective audit. Also, audit personnel enhance their inventory of skills in these
special projects, which broadens their business knowledge and audit capabilities.
5.56 Again, in evaluating other services that auditors typically perform, practical
considerations are essential. The most effective audits will be performed by the most competent
auditors. But attracting and retaining those people requires providing them with work that is
interesting and intellectually challenging. The more their professional experiences expand their
business acumen, the better auditors they become and the more likely they will be satisfied with
their jobs.
Other Considerations
5.57

In arriving at this position, these Panel members are mindful that, in its study on scope of
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services,19 the POB admonished the profession to exercise restraint and judgment before entering
into new areas of service. These members believe that that advice continues to be appropriate
and seems particularly timely as many of the major firms are about to undergo significant
restructurings and have an opportunity to reemphasize their core audit services. One could argue
that, despite the profession’s enviable track record in having performed both audit and non-audit
services, the current outcry over non-audit services would not be so shrill had the profession
better heeded the POB’s advice. These members urge the profession to consider this advice.
5.58 Also, these members believe that the SEC’s rule-making initiatives can be a constructive
exercise to analyze the fundamental policy questions raised by Chairman Levitt. They expect a
complete, fair, and non-biased airing through means such as concepts releases and public
hearings. They believe that the SEC is perfectly capable of reaching a reasoned conclusion after
gathering all the relevant evidence and hearing from all sides. However, these members urge the
SEC to be wary of proposals whose principal thrust appears to be more punitive than practical
and that have the real potential to damage audit effectiveness. They hope that, consistent with the
concept of self-regulation under a strengthened POB, the SEC will exercise restraint in its rulemaking authority by delegating to the ISB the determination of any services that audit firms may
not provide to their audit clients.

19

See note 6.
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FORMER FIRM PERSONNEL IN CLIENT MANAGEMENT
Introduction
5.59 The partners and professional staff of an auditing firm have always represented an
attractive pool of potential employees for industry, clients and non-clients alike. In fact, most
personnel who join auditing firms eventually move to a job in industry. Industry views public
accounting as a unique training ground because it offers a broad variety of industry and client
experiences, as well as the development of specialty skills. Further, dealing directly with auditors
gives clients the ability to assess the abilities of individuals far better than any interview process
of prospective employees.
5.60 From the standpoint of the auditor, once he or she accepts a position in industry, it is
likely to be at a higher level in the company than he or she would have attained at the same point
in his or her career without the public accounting experience. One of the attractions of the
profession has always been that one has a significant opportunity for professional and financial
success, either by remaining in the profession or by accepting an attractive offer outside the
profession. In fact, AICPA members in business and industry outnumber those in public
accounting.20
5.61 There are concerns about threats to independence when clients hire firm personnel. For
example, did the individuals exercise appropriate audit skepticism prior to departure? Would the
departing auditor’s knowledge of the audit allow him or her to circumvent it as a member of the
client? Will the former auditor be able to exercise undue influence over the audit team? Further,
there have been instances where the former engagement partner or manager joined the client in a
high-level position and was alleged to have become involved subsequently in a fraud scheme.
5.62 The degree of concern depends primarily on the stature of the auditor in the firm, the
former auditor’s new position with the client, and whether the former auditor had been involved
in the audit of the client. For example, a client’s hiring the audit engagement partner to become
its CFO would generate more concerns than the client’s hiring a staff member (who is not
assigned to the audit) onto its corporate staff.
5.63 The AICPA’s ethics ruling No. 77 on Independence, Integrity and Objectivity, Individual
Considering or Accepting Employment With a Client, requires that, while considering an
employment offer from a client, an auditor remove himself or herself from the engagement.
Also, the firm should consider whether any procedures performed by a former partner or staff
should be reperformed or additional procedures performed. Several firms have policies and
procedures to assist firm personnel in complying with this ruling, and to provide guidance on
additional or reperformed procedures.
5.64

The AICPA’s ethics interpretation 101-2, Former practitioners and firm independence,

20

Members in business and industry represented 46.2% of the AICPA’s membership in 1999, up from 39.9% ten
years earlier. Members in public accounting were 39.5%, down from 45.8% in 1989 (1998-1999 Annual Report,
AICPA). And, only a fraction of those in public accounting participate in audits of public companies.
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describes the required severing of financial and other firm ties with a former partner in order for
the firm to maintain its independence.
5.65 The Panel sought to assess the potential for threats to independence when clients hire
former personnel. In the QPR, sixteen engagements were selected in which a former partner or
manager of the firm had accepted a position in client management21 within the last three years.
The reviewers were asked to complete a supplemental questionnaire to evaluate any effects on
independence. Also, survey respondents and participants of some focus groups were asked for
their views on audit personnel taking jobs with clients.
Findings
5.66 In all but one of the sixteen QPR engagements the reviewers agreed that the engagement
team and the firm had put into place appropriate safeguards or had taken appropriate steps to
make sure the audits were effective. In one instance the reviewer believed that additional steps
should have been considered, although the reviewer did not believe that the effectiveness of the
audit had been impaired.
5.67 Focus group participants and respondents to the survey generally did not view this as an
area of major concern. Several noted that a client’s hiring audit personnel is a benefit to the client
and very important to attracting good people to the profession. Some believed that safeguards are
necessary and a few suggested a “cooling off” period after employment, during which contact
with the former auditing firm would be restricted.
5.68 In December 1999 the Independence Standards Board issued an Exposure Draft (ED 992), Employment with Audit Clients. The Panel observes that the ISB has captured the concerns
and has proposed various safeguards to eliminate or reduce threats to independence when clients
employ their auditors. The Panel believes that the ISB is dealing with the issue appropriately.
5.69 Also, see “Communicating with Audit Committees” in Chapter 2 of this report, in which
the Panel recommends that audit committees require the auditors and management to advise the
committee of (i) plans to hire any of the audit firm’s personnel into high-level positions, and (ii)
the actions, if any, the auditors and management intend to take to assure the auditors maintain
their independence.

21

Chairperson, CEO, CFO, COO or Controller.
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CHAPTER 6 – GOVERNANCE OF THE
AUDITING PROFESSION
6.1
This chapter describes the auditing profession’s current governance system, 1 the limitations of
that system, and the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening the system. The chapter also briefly
discusses the current relationship between the profession and the SEC.

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT GOVERNANCE
6.2
Auditors are subject to a system of controls that, taken as a whole, constitutes the regulation of
the profession. The principal elements of that regulation are the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), state boards of accountancy, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the AICPA, the Independence Standards Board (ISB), and the
Public Oversight Board (POB) – a combination of public regulation and self-regulation.
Public Regulation
6.3
The state boards of accountancy and the SEC, with their statutory responsibilities to protect the
public, both play important roles in regulating the profession.
6.4
The profession has significant interaction with the SEC through the Office of the Chief
Accountant (OCA) and the Division of Corporation Finance. The OCA is the principal advisor to the
Commission on accounting and auditing matters. It works closely with domestic and international
private-sector accounting and auditing standards-setting bodies and consults with registrants, auditors
and other SEC staff regarding the application of accounting standards and financial statement disclosure
requirements. The Division of Corporation Finance oversees the disclosure of important information to
the investing public and routinely reviews the disclosure documents filed by public companies with the
SEC.
6.5
One of the powers and responsibilities delegated to the SEC is disciplining independent auditors
of publicly held companies, among others. The Division of Enforcement investigates possible violations
of the securities laws and recommends SEC action when it deems appropriate, either in a federal court
or before an administrative law judge, and negotiates settlements on behalf of the SEC. All such
investigations are conducted privately. The SEC has exercised its disciplinary power over the years,
using prosecutorial discretion in deciding which cases to pursue. In addition, the Panel understands from
a presentation by the heads of the Division of Enforcement and the OCA that for a variety of reasons,
including limited resources, the SEC ordinarily only pursues cases against accountants involving alleged
reckless conduct. The number of enforcement actions varies from year to year, depending on the SEC’s
1

See Appendix C for a more detailed description of the current governance system.
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allocation of resources among the many competing demands for enforcement efforts and on the number
of cases in which the SEC believes the accountants were reckless.
6.6
Although the profession enjoys a national image through the AICPA,2 CPA licenses are granted
by the individual states (typically by the state board of accountancy), and the state boards are the only
agencies that can revoke them. States also register or license auditing firms to practice within their
jurisdictions.
Self-Regulation
6.7
A profession may be subject to varying degrees of self-regulation, for example, a statutory selfregulatory organization (SRO), like the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) or the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or a voluntary system of self-regulation, like the auditing profession.
The auditing profession’s self-regulatory system includes the bodies that set professional standards as
well as those that monitor and discipline CPAs and audit firms. The profession’s self-regulatory system
supplements public regulation in some areas, for example discipline, where it extends beyond the realm
of the law and public regulation, while in other areas, such as standards setting, it largely takes the place
of public regulation.
Standards Setting
6.8
Professional standards for auditors include technical, ethical and quality control standards as
well as standards for continuing professional education.3 Those standards are set by the AICPA’s
Auditing Standards Board (ASB), the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC), and
the ISB. The ASB promulgates generally accepted auditing standards and quality control standards,
while the PEEC is responsible for changes to and interpretations of the AICPA’s Code of Professional
Conduct. The ISB was established in 1997 by the SEC and the AICPA to establish standards on
auditor independence with respect to audits of public entities.4
Monitoring and Discipline
6.9

The audit firms and the AICPA and its components carry out practice monitoring and discipline.

6.10 Audit firms establish, maintain and enforce quality control policies and procedures that are
designed to provide each firm with reasonable assurance that it complies with professional standards,
2

The Uniform CPA Examination, which is prepared and graded by the AICPA and must be passed before obtaining a
CPA license in any state, is an important contributor to the national image.
3
Professional standards also include accounting standards that are promulgated by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), and the Accounting Standards
Executive Committee (AcSEC) of the AICPA. While this Report includes recommendations to the FASB about
accounting standards, it does not discuss or make recommendations related to the governance and structure of
accounting standards-setting bodies.
4
Independence standards for all AICPA members are established by the PEEC. Auditors of public entities must meet
independence standards established by PEEC, the ISB, and the SEC.
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maintains its technical capabilities, applies the appropriate expertise on all audits, and meets the SECPS
membership requirements. Effective self-regulation by individual audit firms is an essential part of an
effective self-regulatory system.
6.11 The AICPA bodies involved in the monitoring and disciplining of auditors include the
Professional Ethics Division, the Joint Trial Board, and the SECPS. The Professional Ethics Division
and the Joint Trial Board enforce technical and ethical standards by investigating and adjudicating
disciplinary charges against auditors. Unlike the SEC, the Professional Ethics Division and the Joint Trial
Board do not have subpoena power, their disciplinary authority extends only to a CPA’s membership
rights in the AICPA or a state society of CPAs, and their disciplinary proceedings are deferred while
litigation or regulatory proceedings are in process.
6.12 The SECPS was created to improve the quality of audit firms’ practice before the SEC by
establishing requirements for member firms and a program for monitoring compliance with those
requirements and professional standards. SECPS members must undergo peer reviews of their
accounting and auditing practice every three years, or at such additional times as determined by the
SECPS Executive Committee that governs the section’s activities. The SECPS Peer Review Committee
(PRC) establishes the Standards for Performing and Reporting on Peer Reviews, oversees the
SECPS peer review program, accepts peer review reports, and determines the appropriateness of
firms’ actions in response to those reports. The peer review process is overseen by the POB. In
addition, certain peer review working papers and the related reports (masked to protect the
confidentiality of individual registrants) are made available for review and oversight by the staff of the
SEC’s OCA.
6.13 The Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC) of the SECPS conducts an investigation when
allegations of an audit failure are made against a member firm with respect to an audit of an SEC
registrant. The purpose of the investigation is to determine if there are deficiencies in the firm’s system of
quality control, in its compliance with that system, or in professional standards. QCIC also serves a
disciplinary function in that it may require remedial action if it finds deficiencies in a firm’s system or in
compliance with it. Member firms are required to report to QCIC, within thirty days of being served, all
matters of alleged audit failures arising from litigation, regulatory investigations, and criminal indictments.
The QCIC process begins almost immediately after a matter is reported; it is not deferred while legal or
regulatory proceedings are in process. The QCIC process is overseen by the POB as well as by the
SEC. The POB participates in all aspects of QCIC’s analysis, investigation and closing of each matter,
while the SEC reviews QCIC’s closed case summaries and the POB’s oversight files.
6.14 The POB oversees and reports on the activities of the SECPS. Its objective is to safeguard, and
act as an advocate of, the public interest. The POB consists of five members, primarily nonaccountants, with a broad spectrum of business, professional, regulatory and legislative experience.
Besides overseeing the peer review and QCIC processes, the POB may commission special reviews by
ad hoc bodies created to investigate and report on issues involving the quality of practice. Examples of
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special reviews include reports by the Panel on Auditor Independence5 and the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness.
Limitations of the Current Governance System
6.15 While the auditing profession’s system of voluntary self-regulation is extensive, it suffers from
certain limitations, some of which are inherent in any voluntary system. Those limitations, which are
discussed in this chapter, include:

• Lack of sufficient public representation on the various self-regulatory bodies
• Lack of unified leadership of the various self-regulatory bodies
• Constraints on effective communications with the SEC and among the various entities in the
current system

• Differing interests and divergent views of the AICPA’s priorities on the part of its diverse
members

• A disciplinary system that is perceived to be ineffective and slow
6.16 As Chairman Levitt asked in his remarks to the Panel at its public hearings, “…has the
accounting profession become so big and complex that perhaps we need a full-time SRO? Are the
alphabet of regulatory bodies, the POB, the AICPA’s PEEC, the SECPS, the ASB and the ISB, really
workable?"
6.17 These limitations have resulted in a less effective governance structure and erosion of the
public’s confidence in the independent auditor. The Panel’s recommendations are intended to strengthen
the profession’s voluntary self-regulatory system by minimizing the limitations while enabling the public
and the profession to benefit from the strengths of a voluntary system.

PROPOSED SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE
6.18 The Panel believes that some of the limitations of the current voluntary self-regulatory system
can be mitigated by building on the POB’s experience and reputation and giving it increased authority.
The recommendations in this chapter are designed to provide for a more effective unifying oversight
body that ensures that the governance system works more effectively and that the public is the system’s
primary beneficiary.

5

Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, “Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor,” Public
Oversight Board, September 1994.
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6.19 To be effective, a self-regulatory system must include establishing standards, monitoring and
measuring performance, ensuring accountability for improper acts and sub-standard performance
through an effective disciplinary system, and studying and reacting to major emerging issues and changes
in the environment and the profession. In the Panel’s proposed self-regulatory system, as in the existing
system, the standard-setting function will be performed by the ASB and the ISB; the monitoring function
will be performed by the PRC; the disciplinary function will be performed by the QCIC, the PEEC, and
the Joint Trial Board; and reacting to major issues and changes in the environment will be performed by
the aforementioned bodies as well as by special review panels convened by the POB and others.
6.20

To command the public’s respect, the POB must:

• Have a majority of public members whose primary responsibility is to serve the public
• Report periodically to the public regarding its activities
• Develop mutual respect and confidence with public regulators
• Maintain independence from both the profession and public regulators
6.21 During its 23-year history, the POB has been a strong voice for enhancing quality in auditing and
financial reporting, strengthening the professionalism of the independent auditor, and safeguarding the
public. The Panel believes not only that the POB should continue in this capacity, but also that a
strengthened POB with an expanded role can meet the preceding requirements and be an effective
leader in a unified governance system. To do so, the POB will need a charter that commits the firms, the
SECPS, the AICPA and the SEC to its expanded role and to the new system of self-regulation.
6.22 For the POB to be successful in its expanded role, certain changes in the profession's system of
governance are needed. These are described in the following recommendations. (The chart following
paragraph 6.51 of this chapter depicts the Panel’s recommended system of governance.)
Recommendations
To the Public Oversight Board
6.23 The auditing profession’s system of governance should be unified under a strengthened,
independent POB that oversees the profession’s activities with respect to standards-setting, monitoring,
discipline, and special reviews. Accordingly, it would oversee the ASB, the ISB, the SECPS Executive
Committee, QCIC, the SECPS Peer Review Committee, the Professional Issues Task Force (PITF),
and the SEC Regulations Committee. It would serve as an effective oversight body to whom the SEC,
the auditing profession and the public can look for leadership. This leadership position should enhance
communications among the profession’s self-regulatory bodies to facilitate the profession’s continuous
improvement efforts and to identify and resolve important issues on a more timely basis.
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6.24 The Panel recommends the POB work with the AICPA, the SECPS, and the SEC in creating a
formal charter that would include the additional responsibilities and powers enumerated in this Report.
The charter should be agreed to by the SEC, the AICPA, the SECPS, and the major firms. The POB
and SEC also should acknowledge the need to maintain a continuing dialogue that will foster an effective
relationship, protect and enhance mutual respect and confidence, and increase the public’s respect for
the profession and its role in the capital markets. Periodically, the POB should review the charter to
ensure its continuing relevancy in the light of changing circumstances, and if appropriate, seek to amend
it.
6.25 Effective self-regulation requires that the self-regulator be financially independent of the
regulated. The charter should acknowledge the POB’s sole authority to determine its budget and
financial and other resources, and the profession’s obligation to provide those resources. This will
ensure the continued financial viability of the self-regulatory system.
6.26 The charter should establish term limits of two five-year terms for POB members, with
staggered terms to ensure continuity. In addition, the charter should establish a nominating committee as
a standing body responsible for identifying and nominating new POB members. The nominating
committee would be appointed by the POB from names suggested by public and private institutions that
are most concerned with the quality of audits and financial reporting in the United States.
6.27 The Panel recommends the POB consider establishing an advisory council after it has assumed
its expanded role and begun to exercise its additional responsibilities. The advisory council would be a
standing body to advise the POB on issues related to projects on its agenda, new agenda items, project
priorities, and related matters. The POB would appoint the council members, whose service would be
limited to two three-year terms. The Council should be comprised of nine to fifteen people selected
from the constituencies that are concerned with audit quality and financial reporting matters, thus
ensuring the broadest spectrum of participants in the self-regulation of the auditing profession. Council
members would serve on a voluntary part-time basis and be available to meet with the POB at regularly
scheduled intervals (e.g., two to four times per year).
6.28 The POB should consider establishing a coordinating task force, which would be a standing
committee of the chairs of each body within the POB’s oversight and which would be responsible for
exchanging information related to each body’s activities. The task force should meet periodically (e.g.,
two to four times per year) to ensure effective communication among the bodies subject to POB
oversight. For example, this body would provide a formal means for the QCIC and Peer Review
Committee to communicate their findings and the resulting implications for changes in standards to the
ASB and the ISB.
6.29 The Panel recommends that the POB commission special reviews related to significant
professional matters that affect the public’s confidence in the profession. One such matter is the
perceived lack of candid and timely public reporting of why and how highly publicized audit failures and
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frauds occurred, together with an analysis of the effectiveness of generally accepted auditing standards
in such circumstances and possible remedies.
6.30 The implementation of the changes to the SECPS peer review process recommended
throughout this report would require the POB to increase its resources, including augmenting its staff
with additional qualified technical professionals (e.g., retired national office partners) who would assist
the POB on a part-time basis in overseeing the peer reviews of the largest firms. The Panel recommends
the POB identify such professionals as soon as possible.
6.31 Through their oversight of peer reviews and QCIC investigations, the SECPS and POB staffs
should compile data to enhance the diagnostic value of the peer reviews and QCIC’s findings to
standards setters and the firms. This data could be communicated to the profession through the
coordinating task force, and when appropriate, to the public in the POB’s Annual Report. The data
might include the following:

• Disciplinary measures taken by member firms resulting from sub-standard performance
• The firms’ fraud risk assessments on audits where fraud is subsequently discovered
• Data related to emerging issues that identify needed modifications to professional standards
or best practices guidance
6.32 The Panel recommends that the POB periodically review the effectiveness of the ASB, the ISB,
the SECPS and other groups that it oversees and include its findings and conclusions in its Annual
Report.
6.33 The Panel recommends that the POB consider increasing its public communications for the
purpose of expanding the public’s awareness of the POB, its activities and its value to the capital
markets.
Jointly to the Public Oversight Board and the AICPA
6.34 The Panel recommends that the POB begin overseeing the activities of the ASB. The POB
should, as it deems appropriate, make written recommendations to the ASB regarding actions to be
taken by the ASB, including issues for the ASB’s agenda. The ASB should respond in writing to those
recommendations within a reasonable period of time. The POB’s recommendations to the ASB,
together with the ASB’s responses, should be made available to the public.
6.35 The Panel believes that the constituencies (both practitioners and non-practitioners) represented
on the ASB should remain unchanged; however, at least a majority of the members should be from
CPA firms that provide attest services to SEC clients, and all member appointments (limited to two
three-year terms) should be approved by the POB.
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6.36 The AICPA should provide the resources to the ASB necessary for it to meet its mandates;
annually the POB should review the adequacy of those resources. The ASB staff should remain
employees of the AICPA; however, the POB should oversee their evaluation, compensation, hiring and
promotion.
6.37 The Panel recommends that the AICPA distribute ASB pronouncements to all AICPA
members who provide attest services.
Jointly to the Public Oversight Board and the Independence Standards Board
6.38 The Panel recommends the POB begin overseeing the activities of the ISB. The POB should, as
it deems appropriate, make written recommendations to the ISB regarding actions to be taken by the
ISB, including issues for the ISB’s agenda. The ISB should respond in writing to those
recommendations within a reasonable period of time. The POB’s recommendations to the ISB, together
with the ISB’s responses, should be made available to the public.
6.39 The ISB should reconstitute its membership to include four members representing the public and
three members representing the public accounting profession (currently the membership is four and
four). The public members should retain responsibility for the selection of their replacements, with the
POB being consulted on the selections. The POB should approve the members representing the public
accounting profession (two of whom should be selected by the SECPS Executive Committee from
member firms, with the third member remaining the AICPA president or his or her designee). The ISB
should retain its staff and responsibility for their hiring, supervision and compensation. The SECPS
should continue to fund the operations of the ISB. Members of the ISB’s Independence Issues
Committee (IIC) should be approved by the POB.
Jointly to the Public Oversight Board and the SEC Practice Section
6.40 The Panel recommends that the POB continue overseeing the activities of the SECPS. The
POB should, as it deems appropriate, make written recommendations to the SECPS Executive
Committee regarding actions to be taken by the Executive Committee, including issues for the Executive
Committee’s agenda. The Executive Committee should respond in writing to those recommendations
within a reasonable period of time. The POB’s recommendations to the Executive Committee, together
with the Executive Committee’s responses, should be made available to the public.
6.41 The POB should approve appointments to the Executive Committee, and the Executive
Committee should retain its responsibility for approving members of the SECPS Peer Review
Committee, the Quality Control Inquiry Committee, the SEC Regulations Committee, and the
Professional Issues Task Force. These four groups should continue to report to the Executive
Committee.
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6.42 The AICPA should provide the resources to the SECPS necessary for it to meet its staffing
needs. The SECPS staff should remain employees of the AICPA; however, the POB should oversee
their evaluation, compensation, hiring and promotion.
To the AICPA
6.43 The Panel recommends that the AICPA work with the POB, the SECPS and the SEC in
creating the POB’s new charter.
6.44 The AICPA should provide the QCIC with the resources needed to enable it to act quickly in
investigating alleged audit failures and thereby preserve the candid dialogue with SECPS member firms
that presently adds to the effectiveness of the QCIC process.
6.45 The Panel recommends the AICPA’s Ethics Division take all necessary actions to ensure timely
processing of investigations involving audits of SEC registrants when the civil litigation and publicregulatory investigations have been concluded. The Ethics Division should establish reasonable time
frames for these matters, and semi-annually report the status of all such matters to the POB, which
should summarize the status in its Annual Report.
To the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee
6.46 The Panel recommends that the QCIC establish a panel of industry specialists and experts,
whose members would be drawn from the practicing profession and industry and who would be
available to the QCIC members for consultation on various matters, such as industry issues and the
application of accounting standards. Because of the confidential nature of QCIC’s investigations, the
panel members would only provide advice and not be involved in the QCIC’s deliberations.
To the SECPS Executive Committee
6.47 The Panel recommends the SECPS Executive Committee work with the POB, AICPA and
SEC in creating the POB’s new charter.
6.48 In the early years of the Section, the representatives of the member firms that served on the
Executive Committee typically were the firm’s CEO, Senior Vice Chair, or a senior partner with the
authority to commit his or her firm on issues requiring a commitment to the public interest. The Panel
recommends that member firms make sure their representatives on the Executive Committee have
sufficient authority and responsibility to commit the firm to the protection of the public interest when this
conflicts with a more favorable “business” position, and make sure the public interest remains the
paramount objective in their decision making and voting.
To the SEC
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6.49 The Panel recommends the SEC, as the statutory overseer of the quality of audits of SEC
registrants, work with the POB, SECPS and AICPA in (a) creating a charter that would further
strengthen the POB, thereby enabling it to become a more effective, unifying leader of the profession’s
voluntary self-regulatory process, and (b) assisting in implementing the POB’s activities contemplated by
the charter.
6.50 The SEC retains ultimate authority over auditor independence with respect to SEC registrants.
The Panel recommends that the SEC encourage and support the ISB to carry out its independence
mission. The Panel also recommends that the SEC support the IIC and work with the ISB to clarify the
IIC’s role.
6.51 The Panel recommends that the SEC support the POB’s authority as enumerated in its charter
to enable the POB to serve as an effective, unifying leader of the profession’s voluntary self-regulatory
process.

*****
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ENHANCING PEER REVIEWS
6.52 From the inception of the SECPS, its peer review program has been the cornerstone of its
system of self-regulation. During its formative and developing years, the SECPS enjoyed continuing
success and the public’s respect, in no small part due to the effectiveness of the peer review program.
Its structure and operating rules evolved as experience was gained in implementing previously untried
concepts and procedures. No program can maintain its vitality and relevance, however, without
identifying, addressing and resolving challenges that are certain to arise.
6.53 To its credit, the SECPS generally has addressed and met those challenges that are within its
stated objectives. Its Executive Committee formed a Peer Review Process Task Force (the Task
Force) in March 1999 to determine ways of improving the effectiveness of peer reviews conducted
under the SECPS peer review program. A Panel staff member participated in the deliberations of the
Task Force, which issued its report in January 2000.6 The Panel acknowledges the efforts and
contributions of the Task Force. The Panel believes that, just as a continuous improvement environment
fosters an effective quality control system, a similar environment would enhance the effectiveness of the
peer review process. Therefore, the SECPS periodically should consider reconvening the Task Force.
6.54 Many of the Task Force’s recommendations resulted from experiences gained during the Quasi
Peer Reviews. The Task Force’s principal recommendations are:

• Provide for differences between the reviews of the largest firms and other firms, in
recognition of the greater public interest in the largest firms’ audit practices.

• Perform some portion of the review of the largest firms each year, and furnish an annual
report to the PRC and the POB. (A triennial report would continue to be available to the
public.)

• Integrate more thoroughly the reviews with the firms’ internal inspection programs.
• Place more emphasis on important issues that currently are facing the profession, the
industry, and the client whose audit is being reviewed.

• Put more emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the functional areas (elements of quality
control) and engagements reviewed and less on the routine, objective compliance aspects.

• Conduct focus groups of seniors and managers within the offices reviewed, and increase the
emphasis on interviewing members of the engagement teams whose audits are being
reviewed.

6

The Task Force’s report is included in Exhibit 4.
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• Expand the peer review report to provide more information about the scope and results of
the review performed.

• Use the peer reviews to identify best practices and matters for the attention of standardssetters regarding important issues facing the profession and disseminate this information.

• Enhance the training and quality of team captains and reviewers by establishing a standing
task force that would oversee the peer review training programs.

• Enhance the evaluation of peer review team captains by establishing a formalized system of
evaluations.

• Increase the frequency with which peer review guidance materials (checklists, etc.) are
revised so they address important new issues as soon as they are identified, and provide
easier access to these materials via the internet.
Recommendations
To the SEC Practice Section
6.55 The Panel recommends that the SECPS substantially improve the peer review process by
implementing all of the Task Force’s recommendations and the following additional recommendations.
Implementing the recommendations will require changes to the SECPS’ Standards for Performing
and Reporting on Peer Reviews. The SECPS should:

• Make clear to peer review team captains and reviewers that the POB, not the firm being
reviewed, is the primary client. Peer reviews are performed to enhance the public’s
confidence in independent auditors; the POB, as the public’s representative, should be
viewed as the principal stakeholder in this process.

• Emphasize the types of issues described in this report that affect audit quality, including the
more judgmental and less objective issues, such as the “tone at the top.” As noted
elsewhere in this Report, continuous quality improvement stems from a culture that is
created and nurtured by senior management. While cultural and environmental matters are
difficult to measure, their presence is evident and will affect the effectiveness of a firm’s
audits and quality control system.

• Make qualitative evaluations of the information obtained during peer reviews. For example,
with respect to the selected engagements, the reviews should include assessing the
adequacy and timeliness of engagement hours, both in total and at supervisory levels. This
assessment should be coordinated with focus group discussions about time and fee
pressures. The review should include assessing the adequacy of the training materials
137

distributed and available to all professionals.

• Reconsider the appropriateness of excluding the business aspects of the reviewed firm’s
practice from the peer review when they are closely related to the firm’s professional
practice.

• Increase the emphasis on which professionals perform various aspects of the audit, including
who makes the risk assessments, and whether they have the necessary knowledge and
skills. Other areas that should be emphasized include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Engagement risk assessment (client acceptance and continuance)
Knowledge and understanding of the client’s industry and business
Inherent risk assessment
Control risk assessment
Linkage of risk assessments to tests of controls and substantive audit procedures
Sufficiency and competency of evidence obtained
Appropriateness and effectiveness of analytical procedures
Timeliness of the risk assessments, resolution of issues, supervisory reviews, and other
work.

• Develop specific performance measures that relate to the quality of the firm’s
practice/effectiveness of audits to be included in the peer review report.

• Review selected financial reports/filings of foreign registrants that are audited by foreignassociated firms and for which the reviewed firm reviews the filing in accordance with the
membership requirements of the SECPS, and interview the “filing reviewers.”
To the Public Oversight Board
6.56 The Panel recommends that the POB, by using its augmented staff, expand its oversight
throughout the peer reviews of the largest firms on a “real-time” basis. The expanded oversight should
cover, at a minimum, the following phases of the review:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Approving the peer review firm and the review team captain
Planning the review
Overseeing the internal inspection program
Overseeing the practice office and National office reviews
Attending all important meetings, focus groups, and interviews with firm personnel
Debriefing the engagement reviewers at the conclusion of the reviews
Resolving issues that arise during the reviews
Reviewing the draft peer review reports before they are provided to others
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Jointly to the SEC Practice Section and the Auditing Standards Board
6.57 The Panel recommends that the Auditing Standards Board, in collaboration with the Peer
Review Committee and the QCIC, review the quality control standards and make them more specific,
definitive and rigorous for firms with public clients, especially for the largest firms. The Panel also
recommends that the three groups establish a mechanism for on-going monitoring of the standards to
keep them current.
To the SEC
6.58 The Panel recommends that the SEC mandate that all firms that audit SEC registrants be
enrolled in a peer review program that includes public oversight. With respect to foreign-based CPA
firms, the requirement should extend to the peer review programs/processes in their foreign locations.

ENHANCING THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
Current Disciplinary System
6.59 Self-regulation includes identifying violations of professional standards, establishing appropriate
consequences for those violations, and enforcing the standards through disciplinary measures in a fair,
consistent and timely manner. The profession’s current system for investigating violations and disciplining
the violators includes two vehicles: the AICPA’s Ethics Division (with respect to allegations of
improprieties against individual members)7 and the QCIC (with respect to allegations of improprieties
against member firms related to audits of SEC clients). While the profession’s current disciplinary
system is not totally satisfactory, the profession has made a significant effort to make it as workable as
practicable given its inherent limitations.
6.60 Typically, the profession’s disciplinary process involving audits of SEC clients begins after the
filing of civil litigation or the public issuance of findings by a public-regulatory body (e.g., an Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release [AAER] issued by the SEC). Civil litigation generally names the firm
as a defendant, while an AAER may name one or more individuals or the firm. Upon learning of these
events,8 QCIC and the Ethics Division open their respective case files. In accordance with a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between QCIC and the Ethics Division, the Ethics Division
defers its activities until QCIC concludes its investigation and reports its findings to the Ethics Division.

7

The Ethics Division is responsible for investigating all allegations against all AICPA members; however, the Panel’s
focus is on those allegations that involve audits of SEC clients.
8
A SECPS member firm must report such events to QCIC within thirty days of being served with the original
complaint or the publication of findings.
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6.61 The QCIC investigation focuses primarily on the effectiveness of the member firm’s system of
quality control and whether the audit engagement team complied with the system. The QCIC
investigation generally results in a determination of whether the allegations concerning sub-standard
performance might have merit. This determination is reflected in QCIC’s rating system.
6.62 QCIC assigns a rating of 1 to 4 to each concluded case.9 The Ethics Division has agreed to
close its case file on those cases rated a 1 or 2. For those cases rated a 3, the Ethics Division forms a
panel to review the QCIC files and case summaries to determine if it should commence an investigation
or close its file. With respect to those cases rated a 4, the Ethics Division will commence an
investigation.
6.63 Ethics Division investigations and findings are not privileged and are subject to subpoena.
Therefore, as a matter of fairness, the Ethics Division has historically granted individual members the
right to request a deferral of an ethics investigation while civil litigation and/or a criminal investigation
related to the subject matter is in process. As a voluntary membership organization, the AICPA believes
its members would be unwilling to participate in an investigation while civil litigation or a criminal
prosecution is in process. QCIC’s files also are subject to subpoena.10
6.64 The most powerful disciplinary measure available to the Ethics Division is the authority to expel
the individual member from the AICPA and to publish this action (which includes the individual’s name,
city and state, and violations of the Code of Professional Conduct) in The CPA Letter, an AICPA
publication for its members. Public regulatory bodies that have more drastic disciplinary powers (e.g.,
the SEC and state boards of accountancy) monitor these notices.
Discussion
6.65 State boards of accountancy can revoke a practitioner’s or a firm’s license. Because of limited
budgets and the lack of effective means to investigate allegations and impose discipline, some boards
have not been effective in disciplining sub-standard conduct. Similarly, competing demands on the
SEC’s resources and its own prosecutorial priorities limit its enforcement activities.
6.66 The profession’s disciplinary system also suffers from a number of limitations. The Ethics
Division has limited investigative powers; it cannot issue subpoenas or compel testimony; it must rely on
the cooperation of the individual being investigated; and it cannot talk to the plaintiff or the client
company involved. As previously noted, its proceedings are not timely since, as a matter of fairness to
the accused, all litigation must be concluded before an investigation can begin. The Division’s
disciplinary proceedings are confidential, and thus the public cannot determine what went wrong when a
sanction is imposed, and in some cases whether a sanction was imposed. Finally, the Division is able to
impose only limited sanctions, such as suspension or expulsion from the AICPA. The QCIC process
9

See Appendix C for a detailed description of the QCIC process, including the rating system.
A federal district court recently upheld a plaintiff’s subpoena of a QCIC case file (In the Matter of Mercury
Finance Company of Illinois, No. M8-85, slip op.[S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1999]).
10
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suffers from many of the same limitations, although generally its investigations are quite timely. The
corrective actions it imposes on firms are not made public.
6.67 The preceding limitations, especially the Ethics Division’s deferral, help to create public
frustration with the current system. They create a belief that the profession is not dealing with audit
failures on a timely basis, since the judicial and public regulatory processes may, and often do,
encompass many years. Thus, ethics investigations typically commence and conclude long after the
public’s memory of the matter has faded. The SEC staff has recently expressed concerns regarding
these delays and their effects on the public’s confidence in, and respect for, the profession’s selfregulatory system.
6.68 Market discipline may be as effective or more effective in dealing with sub-standard auditing
than more formal disciplinary processes. For example, reputation-damaging publicity surrounding civil
litigation, together with the potential for significant monetary damage awards, provides a powerful
deterrent to sub-standard performance. Thus, enlightened self-interest has led firms to emphasize the
importance of quality control and to discipline professionals who depart significantly from firm and
professional standards. Firm-imposed disciplinary measures typically are not deferred while civil
litigation is in process, nor are they made public.
6.69 The Panel has concluded that the profession’s self-regulatory system needs protection or the
right of privilege over its disciplinary activities if it is to resolve disciplinary matters on a timely basis –
protection that is obtainable only through legislation. The Panel would support such legislation if it would
ensure more timely resolution of alleged audit failures. There is no assurance, however, that such
legislation is attainable now or in the foreseeable future.11
6.70 Nonetheless, the Panel believes the profession’s current disciplinary process can be improved
to provide greater protection to the public without legislation and without any diminution of the current
fair treatment of firms and individuals. These improvements would require changes in the SECPS
membership requirements and in the QCIC process. The Panel’s recommendations, many of which are
based on the efforts of a joint AICPA/Big 5 task force, are as follows:
Recommendations
Jointly to the SEC Practice Section, the AICPA and the Public Oversight Board
6.71 The following procedures should apply when civil litigation or a criminal or public-regulatory
investigation contains allegations of an audit failure:
1. Cases would continue to be reported in accordance with the QCIC’s current
11

In 1995 the accounting profession supported federal legislation (S.240) that would have established a Public
Auditing Self-Disciplinary Board with certain protections against civil discovery of certain investigatory materials by
third parties. The proposed legislation was not enacted.
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requirement, but more resources would be devoted to QCIC to speed up the process.
2. A firm would, as soon as reasonably possible after the commencement of the litigation
against the firm, conduct an internal review of the subject engagement to evaluate the
performance of the senior engagement personnel. In addition, in its meeting with the
QCIC committee member and staff and the POB staff, the firm would respond to a
standard question regarding whether the firm has conducted such a review. The
partner(s) who performed the review should be present at the meeting.
3. QCIC would conduct its usual inquiries. If QCIC assigns a 3 rating and there is a
subsequent Ethics Division investigation, or assigns a 4 rating, the Ethics Division would
open a case file. The Ethics Division would then inform the firm that its consideration of
the matter is deferred in accordance with the Ethics Division’s policy, pending the
termination/completion of the litigation or public-regulatory investigation, or the end of
the threat of litigation.
4. Upon notification by the Ethics Division regarding its deferral, and in order to protect
the public, the firm would be required to select one of the following three options, if it
had not already done so, to apply to the engagement partner12 during the period of the
deferral, if the partner is still with the firm:
A. Terminate or retire the partner.
B. Remove the partner from all public company audit engagements until the Ethics
Division’s process is completed.
C. Perform an additional second partner review of all public company audit
engagements completed by the partner in the twelve months prior to the deferral.
The results of such review would be reported to both QCIC and the POB.
Subject the partner to additional oversight on all public company audit engagements
for at least one year, whereby an experienced senior technical partner, appointed by
the firm’s Managing Partner/CEO, would review such engagements at least at the
level of a concurring partner review, as defined in the SECPS membership
requirements. This review must include, at a minimum, timely involvement in:
•
•
•

All planning activities
Determination of risk assessments and the design of tests of controls and
substantive audit procedures
All consultations during the audit

12

There may be instances in which these options should apply to other members of the engagement team in addition
to, or instead of, the engagement partner.
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•

Conclusions on unadjusted differences.

Thereafter subject the partner to those additional oversight procedures that the
firm’s Managing Partner/CEO determines are necessary to protect the public,
based on the firm’s evaluation of the partner’s performance.
5. The processes implemented by SECPS member firms when they choose Option C
would be subject to peer review and oversight by the POB. At least one engagement to
which Option C is being applied would be a mandatory selection in the firm’s peer
review and annual inspection program. If the POB disagrees with a member firm’s
selection or method of applying Option C, it would promptly make its views known to
the firm, SECPS committee representatives, and the SEC through its normal
communication channels, and to the public through its Annual Report and other
publications.
6. The POB would report on these activities in its Annual Report on an aggregate, noname basis, including matters that reach a conclusion through the retirement of the
partner, Ethics decisions, or settlement of litigation.
7. SECPS member firms would apply one of the foregoing options to a professional that
joins a member firm while subject to one of the options at his or her former firm.
8. If the Ethics Division becomes aware of a matter (e.g., through a complaint letter or
newspaper report) involving the financial reporting of an SEC registrant and in which the
SECPS member firm has not been made a party, and would otherwise open an
investigation, it would instead refer the matter to QCIC for further action, and the firm
would be notified of such referral.
9. QCIC frequently may not have sufficient information to proceed in connection with
matters in which the firm has not been made a party. In such cases, QCIC would close
the matter without prejudice, and the Ethics Division would not open a case on this
matter. However, QCIC would retain the right to reopen the matter if it obtains
additional information. If the matter ends without the firm having been made a party, it
would remain closed. If the firm becomes a party at a later date, the QCIC reporting
requirement would be reduced to 15 days for this matter.
10. Once an Ethics Division deferral is lifted, the Ethics Division would expedite its
investigation of the matter. Additional resources would be allocated to both QCIC and
the Ethics Division to enable both bodies to perform their responsibilities promptly and
effectively.
6.72 The Panel recommends that the POB and SECPS review the results of implementing these
recommendations over a two to three-year period to determine their effectiveness. If the POB
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determines that these recommendations have not satisfactorily protected the public, the Panel believes
that the POB, in cooperation with the SEC, should then seek legislation to achieve the protections
necessary to make the disciplinary process more effective.
To the Public Oversight Board
6.73 Concurrent with its oversight of the disciplinary process outlined above, the POB should
leverage the knowledge it gains to determine if changes in professional standards or further guidance are
needed and communicate these findings to the appropriate standards setters and/or authoritative bodies.
To the SEC
6.74 The Panel recognizes that a finite budget imposes limitations on the SEC’s ability to apply its
investigative resources wherever needed. A larger budget allocation to enforcement efforts directed at
allegations of failed audits would have salutary effects on the accounting profession, and reassure the
investing public that the main “cop on the beat” recognizes the critical importance of audits and the
deterrent effects of vigorous enforcement. Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the SEC allocate
additional resources to its enforcement activities directed at allegations of failed audits.
6.75 Because the Panel believes the study of the AAERs described in Appendix F was very useful
and provided it with valuable information to supplement the evidence it obtained from other activities,
the Panel recommends the SEC:

• Periodically, such as annually or biennially, undertake a similar study and disseminate the
results.

• Document information on the auditors’ work in every enforcement investigation involving
materially misstated financial statements, not just those in which the auditor is named in an
AAER. (In making this recommendation, the Panel recognizes that the SEC staff routinely
examines the auditors’ involvement in each case.) The SEC staff may wish to employ the
Panel’s questionnaire13 as a guide in identifying the types of information to be documented.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROFESSION AND THE SEC
6.76 The federal securities laws require that the financial statements of public companies be audited
by independent auditors. Congress gave the SEC the broad authority to establish accounting standards
used by public companies as part of its mandate to administer and enforce the provisions of the federal
securities laws. However, the SEC has relied principally upon accounting standards established in the

13

The questionnaire was designed to gather the data discussed in Appendix F. The questionnaire has been provided
to the SEC staff.
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private sector, currently by the FASB. Similarly, the SEC has the statutory authority to modify or
supplement auditing standards, but it has looked to the ASB as the principal source of auditing
standards.
6.77 Since the enactment of the federal securities laws, the unique relationship between the
profession as auditor and standard setter, on the one hand, and the SEC as regulator on the other, has
been one of the key features of the success of the American capital markets. The Panel believes that the
relationship has helped engender extraordinary credibility in those markets and that continuing a healthy
working relationship is critical to maintaining that credibility.
6.78 While one would expect occasional tensions, the current relationship between the profession
and the SEC seems under unusual stress. The Panel views this situation as counterproductive to
continued improvement in financial reporting, which is a shared goal of both the profession and the SEC.
6.79 As in any relationship under stress, each participant typically has contributed to the pressure
points, and there is undoubtedly merit to the concerns of each party. The Panel believes that this
important relationship must be restored to its historic level of candor, trust and respect. A revitalized
relationship can facilitate progress in improving audit effectiveness and can enable the participants to
work in harmony for the public interest.
6.80 The Panel has recommended a strengthened POB as an effective oversight body to whom the
SEC, the accounting profession and the public can look for leadership. The Panel believes that the POB
can play an important role in assuring a strong, healthy working relationship between the profession and
the SEC.
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CHAPTER 7 – INTERNATIONAL
INTRODUCTION
7.1
The scope of the Panel’s project included seeking information on issues of audit
effectiveness from a global perspective. Several speakers at its October 1999 public hearings and
a number of respondents to the survey urged the Panel to consider the effects of globalization.
The QPR assessed the work of United States (U.S.) engagement teams on audit engagements
where significant auditing was performed outside of the U.S. by foreign affiliates of the U.S.
accounting firm.1 Issues of global significance were addressed in a number of interviews and
other settings. However, the Panel makes no claim of having made a comprehensive review of
audit effectiveness on a global basis.

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
7.2
The business environment continues to reflect the dynamic globalization of companies
and the markets they serve. Increased cross-border access to the worldwide capital markets has
helped fuel the international expansion of many businesses. Securities offerings that years ago
would have been limited to a company’s home country are now routinely extended to multiple
jurisdictions. The securities of many companies are now traded on exchanges located in many
countries of the world or through sophisticated trading networks that transcend country borders.
7.3
The number of foreign companies that have registered securities in the U.S. has almost
tripled since 1990. In its 1998 annual report, the SEC indicated that there were over 1,100
foreign companies from 56 countries reporting in the U.S.2 In 1990, there were 434 such
companies. (Foreign companies that file financial statements with the SEC are referred to in this
chapter as “foreign registrants.”) The securities of many U.S. companies registered with the
SEC are traded outside of the U.S. and the financial statements of those companies may be filed
with non-U.S. regulators. The financial statements of many U.S. companies and foreign
companies are available to investors or creditors in numerous countries of the world, irrespective
of the jurisdiction that regulates such companies.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION
7.4
The organization of the accounting profession on an international scale has many facets.
Accounting firms operate in diverse legal environments, as do their clients. The large accounting
and auditing firms portray themselves as global entities, but in reality their legal organizations
vary by jurisdiction. The standards that govern the profession vary widely from country to
1

See Multi-location Audits in Chapter 2.
1998 Annual Report, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, page vi (U.S. Government Printing
Office).
2
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country. Some countries have highly developed standards or rules for accounting, auditing,
independence, and quality controls over accounting firms’ practices. Other countries, generally
those that are less developed, have not promulgated their own standards. There are a number of
international organizations that play key roles in the international setting in which the accounting
profession is involved. However, in this chapter only the following organizations are discussed:

• IFAC – the International Federation of Accountants. IFAC is an organization of 143
national and regional organizations representing the accountancy profession in 104
countries. The AICPA is a member of IFAC.

• IASC – the International Accounting Standards Committee. IASC establishes
international accounting standards3 . These accounting standards are analogous to the
US GAAP 4 standards promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board.

• IAPC – the International Auditing Practices Committee. IAPC establishes
international auditing standards5 . These auditing standards are analogous to the US
GAAS6 standards promulgated by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB).

• IOSCO – the International Organization of Securities Commissions. This is a global
organization of individual country securities regulators. The SEC is a member of
IOSCO.

• IFAD – the International Forum for Accountancy Development. This is a group
comprised of the World Bank, IFAC, large accounting firms, the International
Monetary Fund and regulators, among others. Its objectives are discussed later in this
chapter.

THE GOAL OF TRANSPARENCY
7.5
Transparency simply means “openness.” It is a concept that calls for full and fair
disclosure of information to the constituencies needing that information. An effective and
efficient global capital market depends upon financial information that is reliable and
comparable, regardless of country of origin. For example, the recent Asian crisis raised questions
about the effectiveness of accounting and auditing in the affected countries. Critics cited
incomplete financial information, lack of transparency, inappropriate or inadequate accounting
standards and the inconsistent application of what standards did exist as contributing factors to
the seriousness of the crisis or to the delay in responding to it. Consequently, it has become
evident that the goal of “transparency” in the disclosure of information across borders is critical
3

These international accounting standards are referred to as “IASs.” The FASB staff periodically publishes nonauthoritative reports on the similarities and differences between IAS and US GAAP.
4
In this chapter, the terms GAAP or GAAS are preceded by “US,” “National” or “International” to indicate the
body that promulgates these standards.
5
These international auditing standards are referred to as “ISAs” or “International GAAS” (see note 4).
6
See note 4.

146

to the orderly development of global capital markets.
7.6
While it is a simple concept, transparency is hindered in some areas of the world by a
lack of requisite accounting and auditing standards, corporate governance practices, regulation
and local business culture, and other issues.

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND REGULATION
Accounting Standards
7.7
Critical to the reliability and comparability of financial information (and therefore its
“transparency”) is the establishment of a set of accounting principles and practices that can be
accepted internationally. National GAAP varies significantly from country to country and in
some jurisdictions the standards or rules comprising National GAAP are not oriented to the
needs of investors. 7 For example, tax or other laws may determine National GAAP in some
countries. On the other hand, International GAAP (or IASs) promulgated by IASC endeavor to
serve the needs of investors. 8
Regulation
7.8
In the U.S. the SEC permits foreign registrants to present financial statements prepared in
accordance with their home country GAAP (National GAAP) or in accordance with standards
issued by the IASC.9 In either case, they are required to quantify and reconcile material
differences between National GAAP or IASs and US GAAP and disclose such differences in
financial statements filed with the SEC. The SEC requires that these disclosures be audited.
7.9
In a major effort to seek acceptance of IASs as the benchmark “international” accounting
standards, IASC and IOSCO (including the SEC) have been working to develop accounting
standards for cross-border offerings and listings. In 1995 the IASC announced a program to
complete a core set of standards identified by IOSCO as being a reasonably complete set of
accounting standards. IOSCO recognized that the initial core set of standards would not address
all issues, such as those related to specialized industries or areas where improvements could be
made but were nevertheless not critical to the core standards. IOSCO also recognized that
individual jurisdictions might specify accounting treatments that they would require if those
issues were not addressed satisfactorily.
7.10 By the end of 1999, the IASC had completed the last major component of its core
standards project, and both IOSCO and the SEC were engaged in a detailed assessment of the
standards. In May 2000, IOSCO recommended that its members permit the use of IAS to prepare
7

See note 4.
See note 3.
9
In February 2000 the SEC issued for public comment a concept release regarding the use of IAS (Release Nos. 337801, 34-42430; International Series No. 1215). The release seeks to identify what important concerns would be
raised by acceptance of IAS and asks for comment on whether the SEC should modify its requirement for all
financial statements to be reconciled to US GAAP. The release also questions whether the approach of having the
host country specify treatment for topics not addressed by the core standards is a workable approach.
8
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financial statements for cross-border filings and listings. However, IOSCO recognized that some
of its members may require reconciliations for certain items.
7.11 Because many of the standards deal with complex issues in considerable detail, they will
represent a significant change for some companies. Transnational harmonization (or complete
convergence) of accounting standards is still evolving and likely will continue to do so for some
time.
7.12 In 1998 IOSCO endorsed a core set of disclosure standards for the non-financial
statement portions of a disclosure document. The standards cover fundamental disclosure topics
such as the description of the securities issuer’s business. The SEC recently revised its foreign
private issuer integrated disclosure system to incorporate fully those international disclosure
standards, effective September 30, 2000. Thus, except for financial statements, in the near future
disclosures in offering documents should be substantially equivalent, regardless of the
jurisdiction involved.
International Accounting Standards Committee
Structure
7.13 In December 1999 the current IASC Board10 adopted a proposal to make several
significant structural changes so that it can better meet the need for standards that can be
accepted in most areas of the world. A key change is that the current part-time Board is to be
replaced by a new autonomous Board of fourteen individuals, twelve of whom will be full-time.
The most important Board membership qualification is technical expertise. The new Board is
expected to commence its activities in 2001.
7.14 In applying IASs, questions may arise regarding the appropriate accounting for
transactions that are not specifically covered by the standards. The IASC has (and will continue
under its revised structure) a Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC), which is a vehicle for
issuing timely guidance on International GAAP issues, similar to the EITF11 . If not addressed by
the SIC, preparers may look to their National GAAP for analogous guidance, or regulators12 may
impose other alternatives. This has the effect of permitting a variety of alternatives in the absence
of specific guidance. Thus, SIC has a significant challenge in identifying and establishing the
priorities with which it will deal with the issues that are not addressed by the core set of
standards.
10

The new structure adopted by the current Board of the IASC provides for a group of nineteen trustees having
diverse geographical and functional backgrounds. The trustees will appoint members of the Board, the Standing
Interpretations Committee, and a new Standards Advisory Council. In May 2000, the IASC Nominating Committee
made up of seven members headed by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. announced the selection of the initial
trustees, including as their Chairman, Mr. Paul A. Volcker, former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board.
11
EITF refers to the Emerging Issues Task Force of the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
12
Where the measurement principles of US GAAP and IAS are the same, but US GAAP has interpretive guidance,
the SEC staff may expect registrants to use that additional guidance in implementing IAS. For example, in
determining when the equity method of accounting should be applied under IAS 28, Accounting for Investments in
Associates, the SEC staff has stated that indications of significant influence should include those cited in US GAAP
in FASB Interpretation No. 35, Criteria for Applying the Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common
Stock.
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Convergence of Accounting Standards
7.15 Many factors may influence how and to what extent sovereign authorities are willing to
converge on a single set of global accounting standards. However, regardless of whether
countries adopt IASC’s standards, retain their own standards or select other standards, market
pressures likely will encourage convergence over time. Countries that elect to participate in the
convergence of accounting standards may do so in different ways. For example, some countries
may:

• Adopt IASs nationally
• permit, but not require, compliance with IASs as an alternative to national standards
• not allow certain options permitted by IASs or require additional disclosures
• adopt IASs piecemeal
7.16 The IASC realizes that identifying and dealing with departures by preparers from its
standards (i.e., enforcement) will be an important element of the ultimate acceptance of its
standards. The leadership efforts of the major accounting firms and IFAD may prove helpful in
this regard.

AUDITING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
International Auditing Standards
7.17 Since the late 1970s, IFAC has led the effort to establish global auditing standards. IFAC
formed the International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC) to establish international auditing
standards (International GAAS). IFAC determines membership on IAPC based on candidates’
qualifications and with an eye on geographic representation, among other factors. The AICPA
has been represented on IAPC since its inception, and the U.S. representative has chaired IAPC
several times. Its present chair is the AICPA’s representative.
7.18 Historically, IAPC has been constrained by limited staff and research resources and the
wide geographical dispersion of its members. However, the member bodies of IFAC approved a
significant dues increase in 1999 allocated to the IAPC’s activities. Since then, a new technical
director and additional technical managers have been hired.
7.19 The IAPC reviews its agenda and discusses important projects with a consultative
advisory group of public interest organizations. This process has been in effect since 1994. The
consultative group members include IOSCO, the European Commission and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision.
7.20

IFAC’s member organizations endeavor to implement IAPC standards in their own
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environments, albeit country-specific auditing standards generally govern the work of auditors in
their own country. For example, in the U. S. the generally accepted auditing standards (US
GAAS) established by the Auditing Standards Board govern the work of auditors
notwithstanding the AICPA’s membership in IFAC.
7.21 IAPC has endeavored to establish a comprehensive set of core auditing standards. It has
made significant progress toward that end when it issued a codified core set of international
auditing standards in 1994. Since that time 25 countries have formally adopted IAPC’s
international auditing standards, and another 32 countries have based their national standards on
them with no significant differences between their national standards and IAPC’s standards. In
addition, the European Commission is studying whether to implement these standards in the
European Union.
7.22 Similar to efforts to gain regulatory acceptance of international accounting standards,
IOSCO and the IAPC are in discussions with respect to IOSCO’s endorsing IAPC’s standards.
The process for endorsing the international auditing standards is expected to proceed once
IOSCO has completed all of its work on international accounting standards.
7.23 The staff of the SEC accepts an auditor’s report prepared in accordance with the
requirements of the auditor’s home country GAAS or international auditing standards issued by
IAPC13 provided that the report includes a statement that the audit also was conducted in
accordance with US GAAS. The SEC recently indicated that qualifying language in auditor’s
reports such as “substantially similar” or “similar in all material respects” to US GAAS is no
longer acceptable.
7.24 The breadth and quality of auditing standards vary from country to country. Regulators’
requirements also vary from one jurisdiction to the next. Consequently, one set of “international”
standards that could serve as minimum benchmarks for auditors regardless of domicile would be
especially useful when an entity’s financial statements are used by investors outside of the
country where the entity is domiciled. Consistency in the quality of assurances provided by
audits would enhance the efficiency of cross-border financing and help promote a global
marketplace for capital.
Other Aspects of Audit Effectiveness Internationally
7.25 As in the U. S., other elements of the “system” play a major role in assuring the reliability
of information. Aside from government regulation, the accountancy profession’s efforts at selfgovernance are an essential part of that system. IFAC endeavors to be a catalyst in promoting
practice monitoring and appropriate professional standards, such as quality control standards and
ethics standards (including auditor independence). Similarly, IFAC endeavors to promote higher
educational standards for the accountancy profession, since the educational systems and
13

The ISAs (see note 5) are similar in concept to U.S. Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The staff of the
AICPA periodically publishes a non-authoritative analysis of the ISAs, identifying portions of the ISAs that require
procedures and documentation beyond those required by US GAAS or that may be in conflict with U.S. auditing
standards. The AICPA also is making a similar analysis to identify the provisions in US GAAS that are incremental
to the ISAs.
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consequently the level of technical skills and competencies differ among countries. IFAC has
made substantial progress over the years in these endeavors. However, it has been constrained in
many ways by jurisdictional issues, the stage of development of the profession in specific
countries, and its limited financial and other resources.
Recent Changes to SECPS Membership Requirements
7.26 In recognition of the increase in the number of foreign registrants that file audited
financial statements with the SEC, in November 1999 the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
amended its membership requirements for member firms associated with foreign firms that audit
financial statements of foreign registrants. The changes apply to the foreign offices of
international firms as well as any firm outside the U.S. that is a member of, correspondent with,
or similarly associated with an international firm or international association of firms with which
the SECPS member is associated.
7.27 The first change, sometimes referred to as the “gatekeeper” provision, requires a limited
review of most foreign registrants’ filings by a filing reviewer, i.e., a person or persons
knowledgeable about US GAAP and US GAAS, as well as about the independence rules and
SEC regulations. The required procedures include discussions with the engagement partner and
documenting the results of the procedures performed. Prior to this change, many of the large
firms already had such a process, but may have limited it primarily to initial public offerings and
certain other registration statements.
7.28 The second change calls for enhanced inspection procedures, i.e., a review of a sample of
foreign registrants’ audit engagements performed by foreign associated firms. The qualifications
of an inspection reviewer are similar to those for a filing reviewer. Prior to this change, many of
the large firms already performed internal inspections of foreign offices, but not necessarily on a
recurring basis or specifically directed at foreign registrants.
7.29 The “gatekeeper” provisions are aimed at the audits of foreign registrants. The inspection
procedures are broader, however, and embrace audits of foreign affiliates of U.S. registrants.
Thus, a firm’s global audit practice of all SEC registrants will now be subject to internal
inspection.
7.30 The Panel believes that these changes are appropriate and will serve to improve both
financial reporting by foreign registrants and audit quality.

IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
7.31 Setting accounting standards internationally appears to the Panel to be progressing at a
reasonable pace. But, lagging behind standard setting is the proper application of the standards
by the financial reporting community. In its concept release on the use of IAS, the SEC noted
that:
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“…while the accounting standards used must be high quality, they also must be
supported by an infrastructure that ensures that the standards are rigorously
interpreted and applied, and that the issues and problematic practices are
identified and resolved in a timely fashion. Elements of this infrastructure include:
•

effective, independent and high quality accounting and auditing standard
setters;

•

high quality auditing standards;

•

audit firms with effective quality controls worldwide;

•

profession-wide quality assurance; and

•

active regulatory oversight.” 14

7.32 An official of the World Bank observed: “(IASC and IFAC) are all excellent standard
setters but without an effective compliance mechanism, commitment or responsibility. On the
one hand they can be seen as useful debating clubs, setting state of the art standards, which, if
complied with, could dramatically change the face of the economic earth through transparency;
but again, having no teeth to make it happen, other than by benevolently agreed regulatory
osmosis. When you keep issuing top class standards, but 80% of your membership does not
comply with your own club rules and know full well that nothing in the world can make them do
it when they sit in judgment on the next one, you have a problem: tremendous professional
satisfaction in a pool of missed opportunities….”15
7.33 Of course, achieving transparency requires an enormous effort by all the participants in
the capital-raising and financial-reporting processes, including national governments, regulators,
the international business community, international lenders and other financial institutions, as
well as standard setters and accounting firms. This means more than mere moral support: in
some cases, national governments may have actually hindered transparent reporting, and lenders
may not have insisted on appropriate disclosures.

LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE MAJOR AUDIT FIRMS
7.34 The major international audit firms have a unique role and franchise in the promotion of
uniform financial statement transparency and consistent audit quality around the world. Through
their international affiliations and organizational infrastructure, they can promote consistent
levels of practice. A widely held view is that their active leadership is critical to accomplish the
goals of consistent, high quality financial reporting and auditing throughout the world.
7.35

For example, when the IASs are silent regarding the accounting for particular

14

See note 9.
Jules W. Muis, Vice President and Controller of The World Bank, Governance, Institutions, Disclosure and
Transparency, in an address to the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, September 1999.
15
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transactions, preparers and regulators may default to their National GAAP or other practices for
guidance. Given their international networks, the major international audit firms should be able
to put into place policies that will help identify such transactions and promote consistent
treatment of like items under like circumstances. Furthermore, the firms’ active support of SIC
should aid this process by helping SIC identify areas of uncertain or differing practice and
helping SIC to resolve conflicts.
7.36 The major firms have increased their cooperative efforts to effect change in the
international arena. For example, the Big 5 recently decided to identify in audit reports the basis
of GAAP and GAAS employed (i.e., the national or international standards used). The Panel
understands that the ASB is considering whether this identification should be required in audit
reports.

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR ACCOUNTANCY DEVELOPMENT
7.37
to:

IFAD was formed in 1999 as an initiative of the World Bank and IFAC. Its objectives are

• Promote a strong accounting profession throughout the world, especially in
developing countries

• Enhance the understanding by developing countries’ governments of the value to
them of transparent financial reporting

• Help harness funds and expertise to build accounting capacity in developing and
transitional countries

• Assist in defining expectations about how the accounting profession should carry out
its responsibilities to support the public interest in these countries

• Promote the use of IASs as the minimum benchmark for national accounting
standards
7.38 The Panel has been apprised that IFAD held its first two meetings in 1999 and has held
one meeting in 2000 to date. As a result of concerns regarding varying reporting and auditing
practices, the seven largest international accounting firms proposed an approach to raising and
enforcing standards across the world. IFAD adopted the approach. Implementation will require
significant long-term efforts, and the firms have committed to provide a leadership role.
7.39 The approach includes joint efforts by all participants to develop country-by-country
action plans to achieve a rational framework of financial reporting. This framework
encompasses not only accounting and auditing standards, but also a generally accepted
framework for corporate governance, for the accounting and auditing profession, for regulation
and for education. Pilot projects related to the action plans may be initiated in several countries
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in 2000. Where any actions are solely or primarily within the control of the major firms, they
have agreed to adopt interim measures until long-term solutions can be implemented.
7.40 The Panel applauds IFAD and the major audit firms for this undertaking. IFAD’s mission
is daunting and will require extraordinary patience, perseverance and statesmanship. The Panel
encourages the major audit firms and IFAD’s other members to continue their leadership efforts.

STRENGTHENING SYSTEMIC ASSURANCES GLOBALLY
7.41 The Panel is aware of recent proposals to strengthen the influence of IFAC that include a
number of ideas for enhancing global self-regulation of the auditing profession. The Panel
understands that the goal of the proposals is to involve the large audit firms as catalysts for
improving audit quality, further increase the resources available to the IAPC, and establish the
supporting mechanisms for quality review and monitoring.
7.42 These initiatives would include IFAC’s sponsoring a new group of audit firms with
transnational clients to work closely with IFAC in developing and encouraging implementation
of international accounting and auditing standards. Membership would require, among other
things, intrafirm practice reviews and periodic peer reviews. Furthermore, the proposals include
creating an oversight body to oversee all of IFAC’s audit-related activities, embracing not only
auditing standards, quality review and monitoring but also ethics (including independence) and
education.
7.43 At the time of this report, the Panel has not seen the final proposals that are under
consideration by IFAC. However, given its extensive deliberations on the self-regulatory aspects
of the auditing profession in the U. S., the Panel believes that its views concerning the global
aspects of self-regulation of the auditing profession may be useful to IFAC and other
constituencies with an interest in auditing globally. In making its recommendations to IFAC, the
Panel is cognizant of the difficulties involved in timely implementation, but believes those
difficulties can be overcome if a commitment to do so is made by key interested parties,
including accounting firms, IFAC, and regulators.

RECOMMENDATIONS
To the International Federation of Accountants:
7.44 The Panel recommends to IFAC that the global self-regulatory structure of the
international auditing profession meet the following criteria:
Public Interest Oversight

• The global self-regulatory structure should have as its centerpiece a global oversight
body to monitor and report on the activities of individual country self-regulatory
organizations (or the member organizations of IFAC that expressly serve that
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purpose). The charter of this oversight body should clearly establish that its primary
goal is to serve the public interest. Membership in this body should be established
through a mechanism that ensures its independence and viability. (The Panel’s
recommendations to the Public Oversight Board in the U. S., included in Chapter 6,
may be helpful to IFAC in this regard.)
This body should impose clear and unequivocal minimum guidelines for selfregulation of the auditing profession in each country subscribing to its oversight.
Timetables for achieving goals should be established on a by-country basis.
International Auditing Practices Committee

• The oversight body should approve the membership appointments and agenda of the
IAPC and evaluate the efficacy of the ISAs. It should ensure that IAPC’s standards
are comprehensive and sufficiently specific and rigorous that they serve as
appropriate benchmarks to judge the work of auditors. (See the section on
Establishing Auditing Standards in Chapter 2 for recommendations to the ASB.)

• IAPC’s deliberations should be open to the public and the basis for and outcome of its
actions (including dissenting views) published.
Quality Assurance over Auditing

• A key element of quality assurance by individual self-regulatory organizations should
be external reviews of the quality controls of accounting firms over their accounting
and auditing practices. Minimum global standards for quality control over the audit
function should serve as the benchmark for these reviews. (See the section on Recent
Changes to SECPS Membership Requirements above.) IAPC (or an equivalent
technical body) should establish these quality controls standards with due process.
The global oversight body should evaluate these standards and the progress of the
individual self-regulatory organizations in promoting external reviews and reporting
on their results.
Ethics and Independence

• The oversight body should evaluate the adequacy of IFAC’s ethics standards,
including independence standards (for firms and individual auditors), in serving the
interests of public investors, creditors and other users of financial statements.
Education

• The oversight body should assess IFAC’s process for evaluating the education and
training of auditors on a by-country basis and its initiatives for establishing highlevel, minimum educational standards for the auditing profession. This process should
include monitoring the progress of the profession in each country toward achieving
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established goals.
By-Country Monitoring, Investigations and Discipline

• The global oversight body should establish a framework for monitoring the
accountancy profession to guide the individual country self-regulatory organizations
(or equivalent bodies, if not formally designated as self-regulatory organizations).
Key elements that should be addressed by each country include: (1) accounting
standards adopted and in use and status of efforts toward convergence with IASC
standards, (2) auditing standards adopted and in use and status of efforts to apply
IAPC standards, (3) ethics (including independence) standards adopted and in use and
status of efforts to adopt international standards as minimums, (4) educational levels
and skills and competencies and status of efforts to achieve goals, (5) quality reviews
(including peer reviews) and status of efforts to achieve goals, (6) monitoring of
practice quality through investigations of allegations of audit deficiencies or failures
and status of efforts to achieve goals, (7) disciplinary activities and status of efforts to
achieve goals, and (8) the regulatory environment over global financing and changes
occurring in that environment.
Participation by IFAC-sponsored Group of Audit Firms

• Membership requirements in the proposed group of audit firms that will work with
IFAC to raise international standards should include periodic reports by those firms
about their structure and operations.16
Monitoring of the Global Auditing Profession

• A system for monitoring the global auditing profession should be established that
includes reporting directly to the oversight body by the individual self-regulatory
organizations. This monitoring activity should address the key elements described
above for individual countries.
Reporting to the Public

• There should be comprehensive annual reporting to the public by the oversight body
on its activities, including the results of its monitoring of the quality assurance
functions over the auditing profession on a by-country17 basis. Such reporting should
describe the nature of the self-regulatory processes followed in each country and the
16

For example, World Bank officials have suggested disclosure statements by the various institutions involved in
capital flows, including countries, international standards setters, and international accounting firms. One official of
the World Bank has described possible elements of disclosures for firms as, among other things, the international
structure of the firm; what the global use of the firm’s name means to clients and others, when associated with
financial statements; minimum standards followed; their financial strength; their risk profile; their effective control;
and their independence rules. (Muis, see note 15)
17
If some or all of these processes are delegated to regional organizations, the results nonetheless should be reported
on a by-country basis.
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results of reporting by each country’s individual self-regulatory organization. These
reports should address the progress being made by each country toward achieving
goals in the areas of standards, quality assurance, ethics and independence, education,
monitoring and investigations and discipline. The global oversight body’s goal should
be to bring “transparency” to how the global auditing profession functions and serves
the interests of investors and the public.
To audit firms:
7.45 While the changes in the SECPS membership rules described earlier in this chapter are
important first steps, the Panel believes that much more is required to effect significant
improvements in worldwide accounting and auditing quality. The Panel believes that the firms
share this view, and that they are in varying stages of upgrading their international quality for the
benefit of all users of audited financial statements, not just those who invest in companies whose
securities are registered with the SEC. 18
Accordingly, the Panel recommends that audit firms:19

• Implement uniform audit methodologies throughout the world that use international
auditing standards as the base minimum.20

• Subject all audit practice units to periodic inspection procedures covering all audits,
not just foreign registrants or affiliates of U.S. SEC registrants.

• Assign personnel throughout the world to function as technical consultants in the
application of international accounting and auditing standards. The firms should
consider establishing in-firm international “clearinghouses” to resolve differences in
the application of international accounting and auditing standards and promote
consistency of practice.

18

Users in this context are those who use financial statements for financing and other needs on a transnational basis.
The Panel understands that some audit firms already have made significant progress toward implementing these
recommendations.
20
The Panel understands that audits of the financial statements of foreign registrants are required to comply with US
GAAS. Nonetheless, it believes that it is in the best interests of the audit firms that, regardless of jurisdiction, a
uniform global “standard” for what constitutes “audit assurance” serves the public interest.
19
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CHAPTER 8 – LOOKING AHEAD
8.1
The last decade has seen unprecedented changes in the global economy and capital markets. In
making its recommendations, the Panel recognizes that many of these changes have profoundly affected
the auditing profession, and they will continue to do so at an accelerating pace. The Panel’s
recommendations throughout this report seek not only to make today’s audits more effective, but also to
help the profession make continuous improvements in the years ahead. The Panel recognizes that
implementing its recommendations requires a major effort by many constituencies. It believes that its
recommendations can have a significant effect on the conduct of audits, the governance of the
profession, and the public’s perceptions about the value of audits.
8.2
However, many issues pose a challenge to the profession’s future development. Principal among
these are the technology explosion, the demand for new or more timely information, finding and retaining
the best people for the profession, and the globalization of business. The Panel’s vision about each of
these issues is briefly discussed in the balance of this chapter.

TECHNOLOGY
8.3
Not a day goes by without more news about the revolutionary effects of technology on the
world economy. Technological developments are changing business and financial reporting, and
consequently how audits are conducted also is changing. And more changes are forthcoming.
8.4
Increasingly, auditors will find it necessary to understand fully the risks associated with new and
advanced business information systems, and the controls that are needed to respond to those risks.
Auditors also will find that they must expand their technological knowledge and skills, devise more
effective audit approaches by taking advantage of technology, and design different types of audit tests to
respond to new business processes. Highly skilled technology specialists will become even more
essential members of audit engagement teams.
8.5
Attracting and retaining qualified technology specialists in the numbers required for audit support
has long been a challenge to the profession, one that will become even more critical in the high
technology environment of the future. Technology specialists will need to work with auditors as a team.
However, auditors cannot cede addressing all technology matters to technology specialists, and in turn
technology specialists will require a better understanding of auditing.

THE INFORMATION DEMAND
8.6

The demand for new or timelier information is on the rise. Technology driven information
159

systems are capable of capturing, organizing and disseminating information in “real-time.” Investors can
quickly access information and consequently have expanded their demands for both financial and nonfinancial information. Some of that information is comprised of “traditional” historical financial data, and
some of it is new. Information provided on a real-time basis to investors inevitably will raise the question
of its reliability. And, at this point, the auditors likely will be expected to enter the picture and to provide
some assurances about the reliability of the expanded array of information. But, because of its virtually
real-time nature, these assurances will involve both the reliability of the systems or processes that
produce the information and the ultimate output of those systems or processes, the information itself.
8.7
The challenge for the auditing profession will be to develop new approaches to auditing,
including some form of continuous auditing, with greater emphasis on the use of technology-driven
analytical and diagnostic procedures.

THE BEST PEOPLE
8.8
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the auditing profession today is the apparent decline in the
attractiveness of auditing, particularly to college and university students. That decline has been influenced
by increased educational requirements, issues of compensation, heavy workloads and issues of family or
lifestyle. It also has been influenced by the perception that alternative career opportunities are more
exciting, challenging, and rewarding than auditing. Some of the same issues affect the ability of audit
firms to retain professional personnel for the long term.
8.9
The profession will need to restore the historic attractiveness of auditing as a profession and
convince the “best” people that it offers excellent long-term career opportunities. To do so it will have
to lift the public perception of the profession to a higher plane, and convincingly demonstrate the worth
of the profession. This is an effort that will require a partnership among the audit firms, the professional
societies, and the academic community.

GLOBALIZATION
8.10 Economic globalization is expected to continue at an accelerating rate. For the auditing
profession, this means greater attention to the development of fully integrated international organizations
with uniform audit policies and methodologies premised on high quality standards. The challenges of
globalization will require extraordinary leadership efforts by the audit firms, especially the large firms, to
overcome the many impediments to progress, such as weak country-specific regulations and corporate
governance practices. The firms will need to be the first line of enforcement of uniform worldwide
accounting and auditing standards.
8.11

An infrastructure for global self-regulation that provides for strong governance and oversight of
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the profession needs to be put in place. Importantly, this infrastructure will have to be sufficiently
transparent that it is responsive to the public interest in both fact and perception. Audit firms will need to
work closely and cooperatively with regulators, the key organizations involved in establishing
international accounting and auditing standards, and those involved in overseeing the international
auditing profession to achieve these goals.

FINAL THOUGHTS
8.12 Responding to change promises to be an ongoing challenge for audit firms, for those who
establish standards, and for those who oversee the profession and monitor auditors’ performance –
essentially, the bodies and organizations to whom the Panel’s recommendations are addressed. The
Public Oversight Board (POB), in particular, will face major challenges in meeting its expanded
responsibilities – challenges that the Panel believes present a unique opportunity not only to improve
audit effectiveness but also to elevate the image of the auditing profession. A fully cooperative effort by
the profession, the POB and the SEC is essential to ensure both successful implementation of the
Panel’s recommendations and continuous improvement in audit quality.
8.13 In even a short five years from now, it is likely that the auditing profession will have undergone
dramatic change. The Panel is hopeful that its recommendations will serve to promote some of that
change in positive ways. The Panel is confident that a newly empowered POB will monitor the progress
towards implementing the recommendations in this report and use its expanded influence to see that the
profession addresses the challenges of the future. The POB also will act as the catalyst for a renewed
spirit of cooperation between the profession and the SEC.
8.14 POB-sponsored special reviews of issues of audit efficacy or other matters affecting the
profession are clearly within the scope of the POB’s new charter. While another broad review of audit
effectiveness of the nature of the Panel’s project is not foreseeable, the POB should not hesitate to
exercise its discretion in calling for further reviews if circumstances demonstrate the need to do so. At
the end of the day, the public interest is paramount.
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APPENDIX A – THE AUDIT RISK MODEL
INDEPENDENT AUDITS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
1 Publicly held companies and other entities (referred to in this report as public
companies) are required by securities laws to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) financial statements audited by independent auditors. Most users of
financial statements are aware that such audits are being performed and that auditors
issue reports that conclude with an opinion on whether the financial statements are in
conformity with “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP).1 GAAP is a
technical accounting term that encompasses the conventions, rules, and procedures
necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time. In general, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board is the body that promulgates GAAP.
2 All auditors are required to perform audits in accordance with “generally accepted
auditing standards” (GAAS).2 The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA
promulgates GAAS. The SEC historically has accepted GAAS as necessary and
sufficient to comply with the requirements of the securities laws that call for independent
audits of financial statements.
3 Audit firms are engaged by their clients (i.e., the preparers of financial statements) to
perform the audit. The management of a publicly held company is responsible for the
preparation of the company’s financial statements. Auditors are responsible for carrying
out their audits of those financial statements in accordance with GAAS, which state that
auditors are responsible for planning and performing their audits to obtain reasonable,
though not absolute, assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. The purpose of independent
audits therefore is not to produce financial statements but rather to enhance their
reliability.

THE AUDIT RISK MODEL
Overview of the Model
4 GAAS establish a “model” for carrying out audits that requires auditors to use their
judgment in assessing risks and then in deciding what procedures to carry out. This
model often is referred to as the “Audit Risk Model.” The model allows auditors to take a
variety of circumstances into account in selecting an audit approach. For example, the
model calls for auditors to have an understanding of the client’s business and industry,
1

To distinguish GAAP or GAAS in the United States from accounting or auditing standards outside of the
United States, these terms are sometimes modified as US GAAP and US GAAS. See Chapter 7,
“International.”
2
See note 1.
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the systems employed to process transactions, the quality of personnel involved in
accounting functions, the client’s policies and procedures related to the preparation of
financial statements, and much more. The model requires auditors to gain an
understanding of a company’s internal controls, and to test their effectiveness if the
auditor intends to rely on them when considering the nature, timing and extent of the
substantive tests to be carried out. For example, if internal controls over sales and
accounts receivable are strong, the auditor might send a limited number of accounts
receivable confirmation requests at an interim date and rely on the controls and certain
other tests for updating the accounts to year end. Conversely, if controls are not strong,
the auditor might send a larger number of accounts receivable confirmations at year end.
The model requires an assessment of the risk of fraud (intentional misstatements of
financial statements) in every audit.
5 Based on the auditor’s assessment of various risks and any tests of internal controls,
the auditor makes judgments about the kinds of evidence (from sources that are internal
or external to the client’s organization) needed to achieve “reasonable assurance.” On the
one hand, GAAS set forth numerous requirements or matters that auditors should
consider; on the other hand, the need to exercise audit judgment is embedded throughout
GAAS.
Technical Briefing about the Model
6 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting
an Audit (SAS No. 47), essentially provides the “high-level” conceptual underpinning for
the Audit Risk Model, but the concepts in the model permeate GAAS. For example, the
model directly influences audit sampling, which is the application of an audit procedure
to less than 100 percent of the items in a given population.
7 Audit risk (AR) is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately
modify his or her opinion on financial statements that are materially misstated. Audit risk
is the product of the following three interrelated factors:
IR = Inherent risk (the risk that an assertion is susceptible to a material
misstatement, assuming there are no related controls)
CR = Control risk (the risk that a material misstatement that could occur in an
assertion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity’s
internal control)
DR = Detection risk (the risk that the auditor will not detect a material
misstatement that exists in an assertion)
8 Thus, the “mathematical” depiction of the Audit Risk Model in simple terms is AR=
IR X CR X DR. Despite the precision implied by rendering the model in mathematical
terms, in reality it is highly judgmental. The objective in an audit is to limit audit risk
(AR) to a low level, as judged by the auditor.
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9 Essentially this objective is accomplished as follows. Auditors are required to assess
inherent risk (IR) and control risk (CR) along a spectrum. Often in practice this
assessment is reduced to three levels: maximum risk, moderate risk or low risk (or similar
terms, such as high, medium or low risk). These assessments are complex matters to
carry out and GAAS set forth a number of requirements on how to accomplish them at
both the financial statements level and at the individual account-balance or class-oftransactions level. GAAS also contain a specific requirement that, if control risk is to be
assessed at less than the maximum level, the auditor must test the effectiveness of
controls to support that assessment. A maximum risk assessment (i.e., 100%) means that
the auditor believes controls are unlikely to pertain to an assertion or are unlikely to be
effective, or the evaluation of their effectiveness would be inefficient. In all cases, the
auditor is permitted to “default” to a maximum risk assessment for inherent or control
risk.
10 The importance of the assessments of inherent and control risk is highlighted by their
effects on detection risk (DR). The effects can be depicted in mathematical form by the
equation DR = AR / IR X CR. The auditor mitigates or compensates for the assessed
levels of risk by designing and performing procedures to detect material misstatements.
The greater the inherent and control risks, the lower the detection risk needs to be,
resulting in “more” procedures (“more” includes their nature and timing as well as their
extent) that the auditor would need to carry out. At the end of the day, the objective is to
limit audit risk (AR) to an appropriately low level, thus enabling the auditor to achieve
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement.
11 Some added observations about what the Audit Risk Model contains and does not
contain are worthy of discussion. First, the model subsumes the concept of “materiality.”
Auditors do not have to concern themselves with every possible misstatement of a
financial statement that might occur. Consequently, the concept of “materiality” enters
into the risk assessment process, and the selection of the nature, timing and extent of the
audit procedures is an integral part of the model. Furthermore, the model calls for
auditors to make “fraud risk” assessments that encompass attributes of both inherent and
control risk.
12 Lastly, the auditor also is exposed to risks that are not embraced in the Audit Risk
Model. For example, auditors may be exposed to loss or injury to their professional
practice from litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with
financial statements they audited and reported on. This exposure is present even though
the auditor has performed the audit in accordance with GAAS and has reported
appropriately on the financial statements. Even if the auditor assesses this exposure as
low, the auditor is not permitted to perform less extensive procedures than would
otherwise be appropriate under GAAS. The “risks” that fall outside of the Audit Risk
Model generally are referred to as “engagement risk,” “client risk,” or “client continuance
(or acceptance) risk.”
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Historical Perspective of the Model in GAAS
13 The Audit Risk Model is codified in GAAS (though not by name), primarily in SAS
No. 47. The ASB issued SAS No. 47 in 1983, and it was amended in 1997 by Statement
on Auditing Standards No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(SAS No. 82). Prior to SAS No. 47 many auditors employed some of the model’s
concepts in practice, albeit they were not explicitly codified and embedded in GAAS.
There is, however, no clear record of exactly what practice was in this area prior to SAS
No. 47. Generally, it is believed that, while auditor judgments entered into the audit
process, many auditors employed “procedural” approaches that were not fully supported
by strict conceptual underpinnings. In other words, audits tended to be conducted using a
variety of substantive testing approaches with less reliance on judgments about risk.
Testing of internal controls, primarily by testing individual transactions, was common
and sometimes extensive.
14 Since 1984, auditors have been required to follow SAS No. 47; in other words they
have been required to employ the Audit Risk Model. Notwithstanding this requirement,
anecdotal and other evidence indicates that many (but by no means all) audits continued
to be performed using substantive testing approaches with little or no attention paid to the
results of the risk-assessment judgments called for by the model. This phenomenon
perhaps is facilitated by the fact that the model permits “defaulting” to an assumption that
risks are at a maximum level.
15 Over time, however, audit firms began to evaluate both the effectiveness and
efficiency of their audits. The sheer volume of transactions processed by client
organizations, the fast pace of technological developments affecting client organizations
and audit firms alike, and economic constraints on the ability of audit firms to recover
rising costs were influential drivers in these evaluations. They led some firms to conclude
that many audits were being conducted without sufficient consideration being given to
the risk assessment process and that they consequently lacked in both effectiveness and
efficiency. Some firms responded by making important changes to their audit
methodologies. Furthermore, changes to audit methodologies continue to be made by
firms and some of those changes are highly significant.

FIRM AUDIT METHODOLOGIES
16 While all audits of financial statements of publicly held companies are required to
comply with GAAS, audit firms are at liberty to design their audit processes or
methodologies in whatever manner best suits their needs so long as the processes or
methodologies result in audits that comply with GAAS. Historically, audit firms have
adapted their processes or methodologies in response to such matters as changes in
business or industry conditions, changes in clients’ systems or use of technology, and
new or changed requirements of GAAS or GAAP.
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17 Auditors are guided in many ways by their firms’ processes or methodologies - for
example, how personnel are assigned to engagements, how they are supervised and their
work reviewed, the way audit working papers are prepared (for example, by electronic
means or otherwise), and the nature and extent of documentation retained in the working
papers. For multi-location audits, including work to be performed outside of the United
States, the processes or methodologies guide how that work is carried out and by whom,
and how it is reviewed. Included in the processes and methodologies are policies and
guidance on matters for which consultation within the audit firm is required or advisable,
and on other quality control matters.
18 Audit firms also take into consideration their clients’ expectations, such as
expectations to inform them of matters that might benefit their businesses. Clients’
expectations often go well beyond GAAS requirements for performing financial
statement audits. Auditors respond to those expectations by providing information or
services beyond the financial statement audit, either separately or as an integral part of
their audit processes and methodologies.
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APPENDIX B – ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND CURRENT
TRENDS
OVERVIEW
1 There are approximately 15,0001 entities, including about 1,2002 international
companies, that file financial statements with the SEC. The financial statements included
in those filings are audited by a variety of international, national, regional and local
accounting firms. Substantially all U.S. registrants are audited by member firms of the
SEC Practice Section (SECPS).
2 Not all members of the SECPS audit public companies. According to recent AICPA
data, the SECPS membership profile by number of SEC clients is as follows:
Number of SEC clients

Number of member firms

0
1
2–4
5 –10
11-15
16-20
21-30
Over 30

478
352
298
104
19
9
11
14

Totals

1,285

3 Thus, 65% of the SECPS member firms have only one or no SEC clients; almost 90%
have four or less.
4 Approximately 503 U.S. firms that are not SECPS members audit U.S. registrants;
however, some of those firms are not eligible for membership due to past actions.
5 Foreign registrants ordinarily are audited by foreign firms that are not members of the
SECPS. (See Chapter 7 for a description of recent changes to SECPS membership
requirements for member firms with foreign associated firms that perform these audits.
Each SECPS member firm is required to seek the adoption of the changes by any firm
outside the U.S. that is a member of, correspondent with, or similarly associated with an
international firm or international association of firms with which the SECPS member is
associated.)

1

Internal SEC staff estimates as of March 2000.
SEC staff estimates, above.
3
SEC Practice Section, Annual Report – Year Ended June 30, 1997.
2
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6 The auditors of U.S. registrants generally are stratified into two groups, the eight
largest firms and other firms, due to the differences between the firms in terms of
structure and service offerings, client demographics, and size of practice.
7 Other information about the firms is included in Chapter 5 of this report (comparative
mix of revenue data and independence issues) and in Appendix D (prior considerations of
non-audit services).

EIGHT LARGEST FIRMS
The Big 5
8 The largest accounting firms are (in alphabetical order) Arthur Andersen LLP,
Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP and are commonly referred to as the “Big 5.” Since their founding over 100 years
ago, these firms have become highly regarded as established leaders in the accounting
and auditing profession. In 1999, these firms collectively audited approximately 76%4 of
the public registrants in the U.S and had U.S. revenues in 19995 of approximately $26
billion, including approximately $9.5 billion for accounting and auditing.
International Presence
9 The Big 5 are international accounting and consulting firms whose U.S. practices are
organized as limited liability partnerships. The average size of a Big 5 firm in the U.S. is
90 offices, 1,500 partners and 15,500 professionals. Globally, these firms average
100,000 professionals serving clients across 130 countries.6
10 These firms are organized in varying degrees as global firms. A firm’s globalization
may range from an array of affiliated firms joined by international marketing and costsharing agreements, without central management, to one unified firm that is managed
internationally. Globalization efforts have focused primarily on common branding,
marketing, consistent service delivery, common infrastructure and access to additional
capital resources. The majority of these firms have established their international
presence through international affiliations. Historically, the affiliate structure has
presented obstacles in delivering seamless global service to clients and achieving uniform
management policies due to the amount of autonomy that may remain with the individual
affiliates’ management and business operations.
11 Increasingly, there is market demand to be organized as an integrated global firm that
can act as one unified firm, deliver uniform worldwide services, and implement
consistent business policies. Recently, certain of the firms have begun initiatives to move
4

Provided by SECPS staff.
Revenue data compiled from information in Public Accounting Report’s “Annual Survey of National
Accounting Firms – 2000.”
6
Compiled from data on firm web sites as of February 2000.
5
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closer toward true globalization by combining member firms in certain regional areas.
These moves toward globalization are strengthening the delivery of global services to
clients, assisting in the creation and implementation of uniform international accounting
and auditing standards worldwide, and continuing the Big 5 firms’ leadership position in
the accounting profession.
Service Offerings and Structure of Practice
12 The Big 5 firms offer a wide array of services, encompassing:

• Assurance services, including traditional audit, information systems security,
internal audit outsourcing, and risk assurance services
• Tax services, including corporate and individual planning and compliance and
global strategic tax planning
• Consulting services, including strategic change management, process
improvement, systems design and implementation, and human resources
13 There have been increasing demand for and competitive pressures to expand these
service offerings, differentiate them and identify new markets. For example, in recent
years, changes have included:

• Adopting the term “assurance” services as an umbrella for:
•
•

audit activities and other services historically provided by the audit staff,
such as assistance in mergers and acquisitions
newly developed services that are audit related, such as internal audit
outsourcing and risk assurance

• Assigning the delivery of specialized assurance services, such as transactionbased services (e.g., due diligence, financing advice), to teams of experts
• Developing new service offerings to address emerging market needs such as
e-business
• Expanding the breadth of consulting services to compete with traditional
consulting firms
• Expanding tax services to include legal services
The expansion of these services has contributed significantly to the Big 5 firms’ annual
double-digit revenue growth over the last decade.
Other Three Largest Firms
14 The next three largest firms are BDO Seidman, LLP, Grant Thornton LLP and
McGladrey & Pullen, LLP. In 1999, these firms collectively audited approximately 6%7
7

All size data compiled from firm annual reports to the SEC Practice Section for the year ended June 30,
1999.
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of the registrants in the U.S. The average size of these firms is 47 U.S. offices, 330
partners, and 2,200 professionals. Globally, these firms average 480 offices across 80
countries.
15 BDO Seidman, LLP and Grant Thornton LLP are international accounting and
consulting firms organized in the U.S. as limited liability partnerships with their global
reach achieved through various international affiliations. In addition, BDO has formed
The BDO Seidman Alliance, which is an alliance of more than 30 independent U.S.
firms.
16 McGladrey & Pullen, LLP (McGladrey) is a national accounting firm and is
represented internationally through its affiliation with RSM International. McGladrey
provides audit and accounting services and certain income tax services to its clients.
McGladrey is related to RSM McGladrey, Inc. which offers clients nonattest professional
services. McGladrey and RSM McGladrey, Inc. are separate legal entities. McGladrey is
wholly owned by its partners, and RSM McGladrey, Inc. is an indirect wholly-owned
subsidiary of H&R Block, Inc. In August 1999, H&R Block, Inc. acquired the nonattest
assets and business of McGladrey and consolidated these nonattest functions with the
nonattest functions of other smaller accounting firms in a “roll-up” transaction.
17 Similar to the Big 5 firms, these firms provide accounting, tax and consulting services
to their clients. However, these firms primarily serve middle market, entrepreneurial
clients. Accordingly, these firms’ service offerings are tailored to meet the needs of the
middle market sector. The competitive pressures for firm growth, needs for capital
resources and regulators’ concerns for auditor independence have led these firms to focus
on many of the same growth strategies that the Big 5 firms are considering.

OTHER FIRMS
Overview
18 There are more than 7,2008 local and regional accounting firms within the U.S.
organized generally as partnerships or proprietorships. There are approximately 8009
local and regional firms that audit SEC registrants and that are members of the SECPS.
Collectively, these members audit approximately 17%10 of the registrants in the U.S.
Many smaller firms are members of Partnering for CPA Practice Success (PCPS), which
is a subset of the AICPA. PCPS was founded in 1977 and acts as an advocate for smaller
firms within the AICPA and to improve the quality of services and operating success of
smaller firms.
19 These firms play a significant role in contributing to the leadership of the profession.
They have participated in AICPA boards, committees and initiatives, such as the CPA
8

AICPA web site, February 2000.
SECPS 1997 Annual Report; note 3 above.
10
SECPS 1997 Annual Report; note 3 above.
9
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Vision Project and CPA Web Trust. The purpose of the CPA Vision Project is to define
the comprehensive and integrated vision of the entire profession’s future. CPA Web Trust
is an example of expanding assurance services beyond their traditional boundaries.
International Presence
20 These firms generally have not had a significant international presence as their
practices have been focused regionally or locally. However, that is changing as these
firms increasingly form networks of independently-owned firms within the U.S. and
internationally. These domestic and international associations seek to leverage the firms’
collective knowledge, obtain client referrals, establish strategic alliances, expand their
geographic reach and increase their service offerings. One or a few anchor firms may
initiate the formation of an association to extend their market reach beyond their local
markets. Evidence of this increasing trend is the existence of more than 130 associations
of accounting firms, including 30 international associations, which collectively include
approximately 1,000 U.S. regional and local firms within their membership.11
21 Generally, association membership requires annual dues to fund the activities of the
association and may require correspondent fees for certain referrals and labor sharing.
There is no profit sharing or common name among the association members. Common
branding is limited generally to references by a firm to its membership in the association
on its letterhead or web site.
Practice and Structure
22 Alternative structures for small firms have begun to emerge due to corporate
purchases of the non-attest businesses of traditional audit firms and roll-up transactions.
In roll-up transactions, the purchasing entity (frequently referred to as a “consolidator”)
acquires the non-attest assets and employees of small firms. Due to the state laws
requiring that CPAs own a majority (or more) of audit firms, the audit practices of these
firms are retained in partnerships controlled by the former partners of these firms. In
these structures, several audit firms may be affiliated with, but not owned by, the
consolidator, or these firms may be merged into a single audit firm. As a result of these
transactions, an operational link is formed between the audit partnership and the new
corporate entity performing the non-attest services. Various business transactions, such as
cost sharing and employee leasing, may occur between the two entities.
23 Many industry leaders believe that consolidators are the business model of the future
for small firms because this model provides for expanded services, improved name
recognition, higher staff retention, and expanded capital resources. Some view the
consolidators and other associations as a means of leveling the playing field between the
small firms and the large firms in the middle market arena.

11

David Albrecht, professor of accounting, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, as
quoted in the January 2000 Journal of Accountancy.
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APPENDIX C – CURRENT GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
OVERVIEW
1 Professions often are granted the right by society to self-regulate and do so in order to
protect the public interest and the interests of their members. Professions, through selfregulation, attempt to balance the need to protect the public interest with the desire for financial
reward.
2 The accounting profession in the United States has long maintained a voluntary selfregulatory system of governance through the activities of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) and also, in more recent years, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), Independence
Standards Board (ISB), SEC Practice Section (the SECPS or the Section) and Public
Oversight Board (POB). This system, much like public regulation by the government, has been
continually improved and modified as political, social and economic conditions and needs have
changed. However, there are differences, both in perception and nuances, between a voluntary
self-regulatory model and public regulation. These differences are clearly described by Robert
K. Mautz (a former member of the POB) in his article, Self-Regulation: Perils and
Problems.1 He states:
However similar their goals, public regulation and self-regulation have important
differences, not all of which are immediately apparent. Public regulation is
conducted with the full power of the state in support of established
requirements. Self-regulation has no equivalent authority. At most, it can
exclude noncomplying members from whatever benefits group membership
confers or impose whatever sanctions members have voluntarily agreed to
accept. Such powers as the ability to subpoena records and witnesses are not
available in self-regulation.
3 It is imperative not to equate voluntary self-regulation with public regulation, nor is selfregulation to be perceived as a substitute for public regulation. The two mechanisms must be
viewed in concert with one another, not equal and yet not different in their purposes and goals.
Such misperceptions could lead to significant impairments of the integrity of self-regulation.
4 The activities of both the profession’s voluntary self-regulatory system and the public
regulators have a common objective, which is the protection of the public interest. Our nation’s
economic system, which is founded on capitalism, requires an efficient and trusted capital
marketplace. It is well known and accepted that the United States capital marketplace is the
1

Initially presented as Mr. Mautz’s views in a talk prepared for the AICPA’s tenth national conference on
current SEC developments (January 1983) and published in the Journal of Accountancy, May 1983.
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most attractive and successful in the world. The desire of many large foreign corporations to
offer their securities on our stock exchanges bears the strongest evidence of this.
5 In the mid-1970s, reports of U.S. companies paying bribes to foreign officials and a few
well-publicized corporate bankruptcies resulted in the U. S. Congress looking into the
accounting profession. Hearings were commenced in both the House of Representatives
(chaired by John E. Moss) and the Senate (chaired by Lee Metcalf) to investigate these matters
and the role of independent auditors. The response of the public accounting profession was,
perhaps, its most dramatic declaration of its responsibility to protect the public interest.
6 In 1977, the public accounting profession created the SEC Practice Section as part of the
Division for CPA Firms of the AICPA, which gave rise to unprecedented voluntary selfregulatory initiatives:

•
•
•
•

Independent oversight by the Public Oversight Board
Mandatory peer review
Mandatory continuing professional education
Establishment of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (initially titled “Special
Investigations Committee”)

7 These initiatives require member firms to open their professional practice to competitors and
independent overseers, in addition to scrutiny by public regulators.
8 Initially, membership in the SECPS was voluntary and membership grew rapidly in the initial
three years, encompassing CPA firms that audited approximately 75% of all SEC registrants.
The criticism of the profession continued due to the voluntary nature of participation and the fact
that non-participating CPA firms that audited SEC registrants numbered in the hundreds of
firms. To answer this criticism and reflect its commitment to the public interest, in 1988, the
AICPA membership adopted a change to its by-laws that mandated that each individual
member of the AICPA who provides attest services to an SEC client 2 shall be employed by or
affiliated with a CPA firm that is an SECPS member firm. Non-compliance by the individual
AICPA member would result in his or her expulsion from the AICPA. Additionally, SECPS
member firms are obligated to abide by numerous membership requirements.
9 Presently, there are approximately 1,300 member firms in the SECPS, and collectively, they
audit more than 99% of all U.S.-based SEC registrants.
10 The SECPS was chartered to create an organizational structure and requirements for its
member firms with one end in mind – to honor and protect the public interest by improving the
quality of practice by CPA firms before the SEC. The membership requirements have a central
theme – each member firm must design and place in operation a system of quality control that
2

SEC client is defined in the SECPS membership requirements.
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will provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming with professional standards in the
conduct of its accounting and auditing practice. The requirements are broad in nature, thus
allowing firms of all sizes (from sole practitioners to international firms) to design and operate
systems that are appropriate for their practice. The system of quality control must include
elements related to independence, integrity and objectivity; personnel management; acceptance
and continuance of clients and engagements; engagement performance; and monitoring.

COMPONENTS OF THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM
11 The profession’s voluntary self-regulatory system supplements public (government)
regulation—in some areas, for example discipline, self-regulation extends beyond the realm of
the law and public regulation, while in other areas, such as standards-setting, it largely takes the
place of public regulation. The accounting profession’s voluntary self-regulatory structure
includes the bodies that set the standards for the profession as well as those bodies that conduct
the related compliance and disciplinary procedures that apply to CPAs and CPA firms as a
result of their voluntary memberships in professional organizations, primarily the AICPA and its
components. The standards include technical, ethical and quality control standards as well as
requirements for continuing professional education.
Public Oversight Board
12 At the time of its formation, the SECPS sought to quiet those who might question the
effectiveness of a voluntary self-regulatory model whose cornerstone would be a review by, and
among, peers. Although a public regulatory system was already in place, the SECPS wanted an
independent component that would represent the public interest. This led to the Public Oversight
Board.
13 The POB is comprised of five public members, primarily non-accountants with a broad
spectrum of business, professional, regulatory and legislative experience. The members
nominate and elect their replacements. Currently, the members are:

• Charles A. Bowsher, Chairman, Comptroller General of the United States and head
of the General Accounting Office (1981-1996), Partner of Arthur Andersen & Co.
(1971-1981), Assistant Secretary of the Navy—Financial Management (19671971) and corporate director
• Donald J. Kirk, Vice Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards Board, member
(1973-1977), Chairman (1978-1986), Partner of Price Waterhouse & Co. (19671973), Columbia Business School, Professor (1987-1994), Executive-inResidence (1995-present) and corporate director
• Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense (1969-1973), Counsellor to the President
(1973-1974), nine-term U. S. Congressman (1953-1969)
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• Robert F. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army (1971-1973), Chairman of the Board
of Equitable Life Assurance Society (1982-1987), President and CEO of IDS
Mutual Fund Group (1987-1993)
• Paul H. O’Neill, Chairman and CEO of Alcoa (1987-1999) and corporate director
14 The POB has sole discretion in the hiring and replacement of its Executive Director, who is
responsible for hiring and supervising the technical and administrative staffs.
15 Dues paid by SECPS member firms support the POB; however, the POB is responsible for
determining its budget, compensation levels, and other disbursements.
16 The primary function of the POB is to monitor and report on the activities of the SECPS. Its
objective is to safeguard, and act as an advocate of, the public interest. The POB discharges its
responsibilities by meeting regularly with standard-setting bodies, public regulators, and those
responsible for the various SECPS activities.
17 Over the years the POB has expanded its role by identifying issues regarding the quality of
auditing and financial reporting in the U.S. As a result, the POB has issued a number of highly
respected reports, some of which are:
•

Scope of Services by CPA Firms (1979), an analysis of and recommendations
regarding non-audit services provided by CPA firms to their SEC audit clients.

•

Public Perceptions of Management Advisory Services Performed by CPA Firms
for Audit Clients (1986), a research report prepared by the Survey Division, Audits &
Surveys, Inc., which reports the survey results of nine key publics’ perceptions of the
management advisory services (MAS) issue. The survey results suggest that members of
the key publics think that performing certain MAS can impair objectivity and
independence and that caution needs to be exercised when CPAs perform any MAS
for their audit clients.

•

In the Public Interest (1993), a special report dealing with issues confronting the
accounting profession.

•

Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor (1994), by the
Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, chaired by Donald J. Kirk and often referred
to as the “Kirk Panel Report.” The Panel was formed in response to concerns
expressed by the Chief Accountant of the SEC in January 1994 regarding his
perceptions of auditors’ acquiescence to clients’ accounting policies. The
recommendations in the Report called for auditors to look to the audit committee and
the board of directors, the shareholders’ representatives, as the audit client, not
corporate management.
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•

Allies in Protecting Shareholder Interests (1994), a report to directors, management,
and auditors, which discusses the corporate governance recommendations contained in
the Kirk Panel Report.

The SEC Practice Section
The Executive Committee
18 The Executive Committee governs the activities of the SEC Practice Section. The Executive
Committee has senior status within the AICPA and the authority to carry out the activities of the
Section, which are subject to oversight and public reporting by the POB.
19 The responsibilities of the Executive Committee include:

• Establishing the Section’s membership requirements
• Establishing budgets and dues requirements to fund the Section’s activities
• Determining sanctions to be imposed on member firms for failing to comply with the
Section’s membership requirements
• Appointing persons to serve on such committees and task forces as are necessary
to carry out the Executive Committee’s functions
• Consulting from time-to-time with the POB
20 Well-defined membership requirements are critical to the Section’s overall success. The
SECPS adopted numerous membership requirements at its outset, and has continued to amend
and add to them as times and circumstances have changed. The principal membership
requirements that member firms must meet include:

• Adhering to quality control standards established by the AICPA
• Submitting to a peer review of the firm’s accounting and auditing practice every
•
•
•
•

three years
Ensuring that all professionals within the firm participate in specified amounts of
continuing professional education
Assigning an audit partner to be in charge of each SEC engagement up to a
maximum of seven years
Assigning a second partner to perform a concurring review of the auditors’ report
and financial statements of an SEC client before issuance of the auditors’ report on
the financial statements
Establishing independence policies covering relationships between (a) the member
firm, its benefit plans, and its professionals (and the close relatives of such
professionals) and (b) “restricted entities” of the firm (i.e., all audit clients that are
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•
•
•

•
•
•
•

SEC registrants and certain entities related to such clients)
Maintaining a database that includes, at a minimum, (a) all restricted entities, and (b)
for firms with at least 7,500 professionals, partners’ and managers’ investment
holdings so the two can be matched on a timely basis
Designating a senior-level partner who is responsible for timely updates to the
database and for overseeing the adequate functioning of the independence policies
and consultation process
Seeking adoption of policies and procedures by their international organizations or
individual foreign associated firms whereby (a) a “filing reviewer” (a person or
persons knowledgeable in accounting, auditing, and independence standards
generally accepted in the U.S.) would perform certain limited review procedures
prior to the submission of certain SEC filings that include or incorporate the foreign
associated firm’s audit report; and (b) a sample of SEC audit engagements would
be reviewed as part of the annual inspection program of the international
organization or the individual foreign associated firms
Reporting annually the names and countries of the foreign associated firms that have
represented that they have established such policies and procedures
Filing with the Section each year an annual report containing certain demographical
and statistical data related to the firm’s attest, tax and MAS services to SEC clients
Reporting annually to the audit committee or board of directors of each SEC client
on the total fees received from the client for MAS and a description of the services
Reporting to the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC) within 30 days of
being served with any litigation or regulatory proceeding relating to alleged audit
deficiencies in the audit of an SEC client

Peer Review Committee
21 The peer review process was established to evaluate whether:

• A firm’s quality control system for its accounting and auditing practice appropriately
addresses the five elements of quality control
• The quality control policies and procedures are adequately documented and
communicated to professional personnel
• Personnel are complying with the policies and procedures
• The firm is complying with the Section’s membership requirements
22 CPA firms are required to create a system of quality control, in accordance with
promulgated standards, that is appropriate for their size, the nature and complexity of their
practice, and other factors.

180

23 Independent peers, that is, competitors, examine this quality control system, on a triennial
basis. The peer reviewers examine both the design of the system and compliance with it, which
includes a review of internal firm documents and selected audit reports and working papers. At
the completion of the peer review, the peer reviewers issue a report on the effectiveness of the
design of and compliance with the system. The report, similar to that rendered at the completion
of an audit, may be unmodified, modified or adverse. The report also may refer to a separate
letter of comments that enumerates deficiencies in the system of quality control that were noted
during the peer review. (When the report is unmodified, it states that none of the deficiencies are
of such significance to result in a modified report.) The reviewed firm is required to submit a
letter of response to the Peer Review Committee (PRC) describing the actions taken, or to be
taken, by the firm to correct the deficiencies.
24 The peer review report, and if applicable, the letter of comments and letter of response
(collectively, the “peer review reports”), together with the peer review working papers, are
submitted to the POB staff or the SECPS staff for review. The POB staff performs an in-depth
review of the peer review working papers and related peer review reports for those firms,
including all the largest firms, that meet its risk-based criteria. The POB staff provides oversight
on all other peer reviews. The SECPS staff reviews the peer review working papers and related
reports for those peer reviews that the POB staff does not review. Collectively, the SECPS
staff and POB staff then present the reports to the PRC (comprising representatives from 18
member firms) for acceptance. Upon acceptance, the peer review reports are placed in a public
file at the AICPA.
25 Periodically, the PRC imposes corrective measures on member firms to make certain that
quality control deficiencies are corrected. Those corrective measures and the number of times
they were imposed during the SECPS’ fiscal year ended June 30, 1999 and since the inception
of the peer review process are as follows3:

Action
Accelerated peer review
Employment of an outside consultant to perform
preissuance reviews of financial statements or
other specified procedures
Oversight by the peer reviewers or a PRC
member to monitor progress made by the firm
in implementing corrective actions
Oversight of the firm’s internal monitoring
program
Changes made to the firm’s quality control
3

Public Oversight Board, Annual Report 1999.
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Year Ended
June 30, 1999
1

Since
Inception
54

11

110

11

220

32

402

document or other guidance materials
Continuing professional education in specified areas

1

44
4

62*

* Since July 1, 1988, as data for prior years is no longer available.
26 The POB oversees the entire peer review process, including reviewing the qualifications of
peer reviewers. Further, under the provisions of an access agreement between the POB and the
Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) of the SEC, the peer review working papers and related
reports (masked to protect the confidentiality of individual registrants) are made available for
review and oversight by the OCA staff.
Quality Control Inquiry Committee
27 Shortly after the SECPS instituted the peer review process, its member firms and the public
regulators sought a means to address issues of alleged audit failures that occurred during the
three-year period between a firm’s peer reviews. The result was the Special Investigations
Committee, later named the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC), which consists of
approximately 12 representatives of member firms, most of whom are retired.
28 Member firms are required to report to QCIC, within thirty days of being served, all matters
of alleged audit failures involving SEC clients arising from litigation or regulatory investigations,
including criminal indictments. The QCIC process begins almost immediately after a matter is
reported; it is not deferred while the litigation or regulatory proceeding is in process. The
allegations are investigated by QCIC members and staff to determine if there are any
deficiencies in the reporting firm’s system of quality control, its compliance with the system, or
the professional standards relevant to the matters in the case. The QCIC does not make any
determinations concerning the guilt, innocence or liability of the reporting firm.
29 The activities of the QCIC take place in four distinct phases. Each case added to the
QCIC’s agenda might require the QCIC to employ the procedures in any or all of the four
phases, which are:
Phase No. 1 – Analysis of allegations
30 Read the complaint, relevant financial statements and any other publicly available relevant
materials. Upon evaluation of such information, the QCIC will proceed to Phase No. 2 unless
the case file can be closed because the complaint against the firm is considered, after QCIC
analysis, to be frivolous. A frivolous complaint is characterized by, among other things:

• Allegations that do not relate to a period in which the auditor was associated with
the entity’s financial statements
• Allegations that are so general in nature that they do not raise serious implications
concerning the adequacy of a firm’s system of quality control, or its compliance with
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that system
• Allegations that ignore relevant and adequate disclosures made in the financial
statements or information contained in the auditor’s report
• Allegations that do not relate to matters that are encompassed by existing generally
accepted accounting principles or generally accepted auditing standards or that
clearly misstate the requirements of such professional standards
Phase No. 2 – General inquiries
31 Discuss the issues addressed by the allegations that have quality control implications with
representatives of the firm. Based upon such discussions, the QCIC will proceed to Phase No.
3 unless the case file can be closed because one or more of the following conditions exist:

• The relevant aspects of the firm’s system of quality control are considered adequate
based upon QCIC’s review of the firm’s relevant guidance materials and
established firm auditing or quality control policies and procedures
• The complaint stems from a business failure, not an audit failure
• Nothing more than minor changes in quality control were necessary, and the firm
has taken appropriate corrective measures and has satisfied the QCIC that those
changes are effective
Phase No. 3 – In-depth inquiries
32 Discuss with firm personnel who are familiar with the subject engagement the quality control
policies and procedures and compliance with them; review firm technical manuals, guidance
materials, and inspection reports; or read certain audit documentation having a bearing on the
issues addressed by the allegations. Based upon such procedures, the QCIC will proceed to
Phase No. 4 unless the case file can be closed because the responses to QCIC’s inquiries
provide a reasonable basis to conclude that the firm’s quality control policies and procedures
are adequate and were complied with.
Phase No. 4 – Special review
33 A special review is ordered whenever the QCIC, based upon its evaluation of responses to
in-depth inquiries, is not satisfied that the firm’s quality control system provides the firm with
reasonable assurance of performing audit engagements in compliance with professional
standards, whether for the firm as a whole, an office, or a specific industry. The scope of a
special review is directly related to the extent of the possible quality control deficiencies and any
corrective actions that may be needed.
34 Since its inception and through June 30, 1999, QCIC has opened 809 cases. (See Table
1.)
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35 Prior to 1998, the AICPA Ethics Division would open a case file concurrent with QCIC
opening a case. The Ethics Division, as a matter of fairness to the AICPA member, allows the
member to request a deferral of the ethics investigation until the litigation or regulatory
proceeding has been completed, which often is many years later.
36 Even when the QCIC investigation resulted in a determination that the allegations were
frivolous, the Ethics Committee members and staff would expend considerable time and
resources (albeit many years later) to reach a similar conclusion. In 1998, in an attempt to
eliminate this waste of time and resources, the SECPS Executive Committee and the
Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) whereby QCIC would assign a rating to each case at the conclusion of
its investigation, ranging from a “1” to a “4.” The ratings are:
1. The QCIC deems the case to be frivolous and recommends that no actions be taken by
the PEEC with respect to the engagement personnel.
2. The QCIC determines that no engagement personnel issues of significance were
involved in the case and recommends that no actions be taken by the PEEC with
respect to the engagement personnel.
3. The QCIC believes that there may be engagement personnel issues of significance, and
recommends that the PEEC determine whether or not to open an investigation of certain
engagement personnel.
4. The QCIC recommends that the PEEC open an investigation of certain engagement
personnel.
37 Since the inception of the MOU, which was made retroactive to those cases closed by
QCIC at its December 1997 meeting, a total of 125 cases have been rated, the results of which
are:
Rating
1
2
3
4

No. of cases
12
64
38
11

38 As of May 2000, PEEC has reviewed 33 of the cases rated as “3” and opened a case file
on 25 of those matters. Noteworthy is the fact that PEEC did not open a case file on 84 of the
125 cases, which will allow PEEC to devote additional time and resources to those cases that
merit its scrutiny. In addition, QCIC has referred 15 current or former client personnel who are
members of the AICPA to Ethics.
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39 The following table presents QCIC’s actions related to member firms, professional
standards, and individuals for the SECPS’ fiscal year ended June 30, 1999 and since the
inception of QCIC 4:
Year Ended
June 30, 1999
Actions related to firms
Either a special review was made, the firm’s regularly
scheduled peer review was expanded, or other
relevant work was inspected
The firm took appropriate corrective measures that
were responsive to the implications of the specific case
Actions related to standards 5
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked to
consider the need for changes in, or guidance on,
professional standards
The Professional Issues Task Force was asked to
consider the issuance of a practice alert
Actions related to individuals
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional
Ethics Division with a recommendation for
investigation into the work of specific individuals

Since
Inception

2

72

6

133

3

49
2

23

14

46

40 The POB oversees the QCIC process through its participation in all aspects of QCIC’s
analysis, investigation and closing of each matter. Further, the SEC conducts oversight of the
QCIC’s activities whereby the SEC staff reviews the Closed Case Summary prepared by the
QCIC staff, together with the POB’s oversight files, for each matter.
Firm Policies And Procedures
41 CPA firms establish, maintain and enforce firm-wide quality control policies and
procedures. These measures are designed to provide each firm with reasonable assurance that it
4

See Note 3.
During its analysis of cases, QCIC is cognizent of the need to identify matters for which it believes the
profession would benefit from additional or more specific standards or guidance. It refers these matters to
the appropriate standards setters and/or the Professional Issues Task Force (PITF) for inclusion in a
Practice Alert. These are available on the AICPA’s web site and are included as supplements to the version
of The CPA Letter that is distributed to AICPA members in public accounting firms.
5
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complies with professional standards, maintains its technical capabilities, applies the appropriate
expertise on all audits, and meets the SECPS’ membership requirements. Although invisible to
the public, internal monitoring of audit quality is considered by many to be the most pervasive
and productive of all types of regulation. The principal components of internal monitoring (often
referred to as “safeguards”) include periodic inspection procedures, determination of any
corrective actions to be taken and improvements to be made in the quality control system,
vigorous internal challenges regarding client acceptance and continuance decisions, independent
preissuance reviews of audit engagements, and continuous updating of guidance and training
materials and their dissemination to professional personnel. Enlightened self-interest has led firms
to emphasize the importance of quality control and to discipline professionals who depart
significantly from firm and professional standards.
Standard-Setting Bodies
42 Although the concept of self-regulation is often thought of as an evaluative and disciplinary
function, it also encompasses the establishment of professional standards. Such standards form
the basis for measuring the performance of professionals. Within the public accounting
profession, the standard-setting bodies include:
Financial Accounting Standards Board
43 The federal securities laws place statutory authority with the SEC for the issuance of
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Shortly after its creation, the SEC delegated
this responsibility to the AICPA. In 1973, the AICPA, with the concurrence of the SEC,
transferred the responsibility for establishing GAAP to the FASB.
44 The FASB, as part of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), is an autonomous
organization that is supported by contributions from accounting firms, corporations and other
entities that are interested in accounting issues. The FASB consists of seven full-time members
who are selected and approved by the FAF; the FASB establishes its agenda through
discussions with parties interested in financial accounting.6 The FASB’s deliberations are held
“in the sunshine” and all promulgated standards are subject to public exposure and comments
prior to issuance. The FASB maintains a dialogue with the SEC regarding its deliberations and
activities.
45 In order to provide timely guidance to financial statement preparers, auditors and users on
emerging issues that affect financial reporting, the FASB established the Emerging Issues Task
Force (EITF). The EITF identifies emerging issues and promulgates its "consensus” in
authoritative releases; however, due to the limited time frame in which the EITF is expected to
respond to the need for guidance, its pronouncements are not subject to public exposure for
6

The FAF established the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council to advise the FASB on issues
related to projects on the FASB’s agenda, possible new agenda items, project priorities, procedural matters
that may require the attention of the FASB, and other matters as requested by the FASB Chairman.
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comments. The Chief Accountant of the SEC, who has the right to the floor, attends the EITF
meetings as “the SEC Observer.”
46 The Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) of the AICPA, which operates
under the oversight of the FASB, promulgates GAAP on certain industry issues and certain
other matters that it places on its agenda (e.g., revenue recognition for software). Most AcSEC
pronouncements are exposed for comment prior to issuance.
Auditing Standards Board
47 Subsequent to the highly publicized McKesson-Robbins audit failure in 1939, the AICPA
established the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) to promulgate generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS). The ASB is funded by the AICPA through its members’ dues. Its
pronouncements, which include quality control standards as well as GAAS, are subject to
public exposure and comment, and similar to the FASB, the ASB maintains a dialogue with the
SEC regarding its activities and deliberations. GAAS pronouncements are applicable to audits
of all entities, not just to audits of public companies; however, certain Statements on Auditing
Standards (SASs) are applicable primarily to public-company engagements (e.g., SAS No. 71,
Interim Financial Information).
48 The ASB is comprised of 15 members, representing CPA firms, academia and government
(either state or federal government entities). The AICPA Board of Directors approves
prospective new members of the ASB.
Independence Standards Board
49 The ISB was established in 1997 by the SEC and the AICPA for the purpose of assuming
responsibility from the SEC for establishing rules relating to auditor independence with respect
to audits of public companies. (The PEEC retains responsibility for all other matters contained in
the Code of Professional Conduct, including the rules relating to independence for audits of all
other entities.)
50 The ISB is comprised of eight members, four of whom are public members and four are
from the accounting profession (the “CPA members”). Three of the CPA members, who are
nominated by the SECPS Executive Committee, are representatives of SECPS member firms,
and the fourth CPA member is the President of the AICPA or his or her designee. The public
members are responsible for the nomination of their successors. The SECPS-nominated ISB
members must be approved by the AICPA Board of Directors.
51 Although the ISB is funded by the SECPS, it is an autonomous body with responsibility for
hiring and supervising its technical and administrative staffs, establishing its budget, and with
input from the SEC, determining its agenda.
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52 In accordance with SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 50 issued in December 1997,
standards issued by the ISB will be deemed by the SEC to have “substantial authority” with
respect to matters of auditor independence; however, ISB standards that are less restrictive
than existing SEC and/or AICPA rules shall not be effective until the SEC and/or AICPA
amends or revokes its/their rules.
The AICPA Ethics Division
53 After the creation of the SEC, the AICPA adopted certain rules relating to auditor
independence, which were necessitated by the SEC’s requirement for audits by independent
auditors. Subsequently, the AICPA formed its Ethics Division that, through the PEEC, is
responsible for changes to and determining compliance with the profession’s Code of
Professional Conduct. Unlike the SEC, the Ethics Division does not have subpoena power and
its disciplinary authority extends only to a CPA’s membership rights in the AICPA. The
disciplinary process is deferred while litigation or regulatory proceedings are in process.
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TABLE 1

Quality Control Inquiry Committee
Number of Cases Reported by Year
Year Ended
June 30,
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total

189

Number
of Cases
20
34
27
47
44
44
42
53
56
44
55
59
61
51
33
37
53
49
809
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APPENDIX D – PRIOR CONSIDERATIONS OF NONAUDIT SERVICES
1 In its 1957 annual report, the SEC voiced one of the earliest concerns about the
breadth of services of auditors and whether an auditor could become so closely identified
with the client that the auditor makes decisions that should be made by management. In
1959 the SEC’s chief accountant commented on the possibility of an auditor’s becoming
so deeply involved in performing managerial services for a client that the auditor would
lose the objectivity needed for an audit.1
2 In 1961 two distinguished educators studied non-audit services and concluded that
management and tax services tended to cloud the appearance of independence.2 They
recommended that the audit function be sharply separated from other services provided
by a firm. The AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics issued Opinion No.12 in
1963, reasserting that independence is an attitude of mind and that there is no ethical
prohibition against a CPA’s performing management advisory services for an audit client,
“…so long as he does not make management decisions or take positions which might
impair objectivity.” Thus, the committee recognized the need to avoid relationships that
might have the appearance of a conflict of interest.
3 Opinion No. 12 was followed by a spate of articles and studies addressing the
question of whether auditors can appropriately perform management advisory services
for audit clients.3 Most expressed renewed concerns about the appearance of a conflict. In
an address to the AICPA at its 1966 annual meeting, the chairman of the SEC chided the
profession over certain types of non-audit services -- such as executive recruitment -- that
he believed raised independence questions.4 (Following the Metcalf Subcommittee report
in 19775 , the SECPS adopted a rule prohibiting members from providing these services to
SEC clients.) At the same time the chairman sought to distinguish “management
services” related to financial processes or to information and control systems, which he
felt raised no serious threat to independence.
4 Beginning in 1966 an AICPA committee began a study of auditors’ scope of services
and issued a Final Report in December 1969.6 The committee found no evidence that

1

Andrew Barr, “Accounting – Changing Patterns; The Impact of Regulatory Agencies,” address at the Art
Institute of Chicago, November 11, 1959.
2
R. Mautz and H. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association (1961).
3
For example, A. Schulte, “Compatibility of Management Consulting and Auditing,” Accounting Review
(July 1965); A. Briloff, “Old Myths and New Realities in Accountancy,” Accounting Review (July 1966);
and J. Carey and W. Doherty, “The Concept of Independence -- Review and Restatement,” Journal of
Accountancy (January 1966).
4
Manuel F. Cohen, address before AICPA annual meeting, October 5, 1966.
5
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, Committee on Government Affairs, United
States Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Improving the Accountability of Publicly Owned Corporations
and Their Auditors (Committee Print 1977) (“Senate Report”).
6
AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence, “Final Report,” Journal of Accountancy (December 1969).
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management services impair independence in fact, but once again found that some users
believed that such services created an appearance of lack of independence.
5 There have been a variety of studies and investigations since then. In 1974 the
AICPA formed an independent commission (the Cohen Commission) to study several
aspects of the accounting profession and published its findings in 1978.7 That
commission recommended, among other things, that the board of directors (or its audit
committee) consider all services provided to the company by the auditor, and that the
auditor fully inform the board of all such services and their relationship, or lack thereof,
to the audit function. That same year the SECPS adopted that disclosure recommendation
as a requirement of membership.
6 Shortly after the Cohen Commission was formed, the United States Senate, through
its Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and
Management (“Metcalf Subcommittee”), launched a broad-scale inquiry of the
accounting profession, including a review of the nature of services furnished by the
firms.8 The resulting staff report (The Accounting Establishment), published in 1977,
generally concluded that management advisory services furnished to audit clients created
a conflict of interest. After holding hearings on the staff report, the Metcalf
Subcommittee concluded that the only management advisory services it believed
appropriate to provide to public audit clients were “certain computer and systems
analyses…necessary for improving internal control procedures of corporations.”9 The
Metcalf Subcommittee also concluded that certain types of services, such as executive
recruitment, marketing analysis, plant layout, product analysis, and actuarial services
should not be provided to audit clients.
7 The profession reacted promptly to the Metcalf and Moss Subcommittee reports by
undertaking a new program of self-regulation, including forming the SECPS, introducing
required peer reviews, and establishing the Public Oversight Board to conduct oversight
of the SECPS and peer reviews. The SECPS adopted criteria for scope of services,
including that an auditor may not provide to a public audit client psychological testing,
public opinion polls, merger and acquisition assistance for a finder’s fee, executive
recruitment, and actuarial services to insurance companies.
8 Since the formation of the SECPS there have been several disclosure requirements
related to non-audit services. As mentioned above, SECPS members must report annually
to the audit committee of each SEC client the amounts and nature of management
advisory services (MAS) rendered. Also, each member’s annual report to the SECPS
must include MAS fee data for SEC clients, indicating the number of clients by ranges of
such fees as a percentage of audit fees (i.e., the number of clients for which MAS fees
were 0% of audit fees, 1-25% of audit fees, 26-50%, 51-100%, and over 100%).
7

The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations (New York
1978).
8
Although not focused on non-audit services, in 1978 a House subcommittee (the “Moss Subcommittee”)
also looked into the role of the SEC in establishing accounting principles and overseeing the profession.
9
Senate Report, see note 5.
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9 Further, Standard No. 1 of the Independence Standards Board (ISB), issued in
January 1999, requires auditors (1) to disclose, annually in writing, all relationships
between the auditor and the audit client that may reasonably be thought to bear on
independence and (2) to confirm independence. The auditor must also meet with the audit
committee to discuss the auditor’s independence.10
10 The SEC issued a complementary rule in December 1999 that, among other things,
requires that proxy statements include reports by audit committees that state whether the
committee has received the disclosures required by Standard No. 1 and discussed the
auditors’ independence with them.11
11 In 1978 the SEC adopted requirements that certain disclosures related to non-audit
services be made in the annual proxy statements of public companies.12 The disclosures
included the percentage relationship of fees for all non-audit services to the audit fee, the
percentage relationship for each non-audit service to the audit fee (describing the service
if more than 3%), and whether the audit committee or board had approved the services
and considered the possible effects on independence. The SEC described the disclosure
requirements as an interim step and stated it would not propose any rules limiting scope
of services but would await the conclusions of a study by the POB.
12 The POB concluded its extensive study in 1979.13 The POB studied the history of
concerns over scope of services and held public hearings, noting that with one exception
there were few uniform views. The exception was that almost all agreed that providing
management advisory services is perceived by some persons as creating a situation in
which an auditor’s independence is impaired. In its report the POB reviewed the concerns
but also balanced that with the many benefits that appeared to accrue from MAS, even
citing a comment letter to the Board from a former Chief Accountant of the SEC.14 The
former Chief Accountant related some of his own positive experiences, including those as
a staff accountant, to illustrate the benefits that he believed MAS brought to the audit
process.
13 The Board found it difficult to assess the effects of MAS on independence:
From the voluminous record before the Board, it is apparent that
documented MAS abuses or impairment of independence through the use
of MAS is virtually nonexistent. Many concerned persons point to feeling
that “it doesn’t look right” or a speculation that some services “might” or
“could” impair independence, but no one can counter the demonstrated
10

In Practice Alert 99-1, Guidance for Independence Discussions with Audit Committees, the SECPS
issued guidance designed to assist firms in evaluating and enhancing their policies and procedures for
identifying and communicating with audit committees those judgmental matters that may reasonably be
thought to bear on the auditor’s independence.
11
Release No. 34-42266, Audit Committee Disclosure, December 22, 1999.
12
Accounting Series Release No. 250 (June 29, 1978) (“ASR 250”).
13
Public Oversight Board Report – Scope of Services by CPA Firms (AICPA, 1979).
14
Letter from John C. Burton, p. 17 of POB scope of services report.
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benefits of MAS with some proof that specific practices lead to actual
impairment.…Specific evidence of loss of independence through MAS, a
so-called smoking gun, is not likely to be available even if there is such a
loss.…the absence of any known cases, while comforting, does not serve
to prove conclusively that independence has not been, or will not be,
impaired due to the furnishing of MAS to audit clients.…the problem … is
not so much lack of independence in fact as the appearance of lack of
independence.15
14 The Board concluded that no rules should be imposed to prohibit specific services. In
light of the disclosure requirements of ASR 250 and the SECPS membership rules, the
Board believed it better to rely on public disclosure, supplemented by the admonition to
auditors to exercise restraint and judgment before venturing into new MAS areas. The
Board also concluded that:
There are many potential benefits to be realized by permitting auditors to
perform MAS for audit clients that should not be denied to such clients
without a strong showing of actual or potential detriment.…mandatory
limitations on scope of services should be predicated only on the
determination that certain services, or the role of the firm performing
certain services, will impair a member’s independence in rendering an
opinion on the fairness of a client’s financial statements or present a strong
likelihood of doing so.16
15 In ASR 264 the SEC responded to the POB’s report, stating that the report “did not
adequately sensitize the profession and its clients to the potential effects on the
independence of accountants of performance of non-audit services for audit clients,” and
invited comments on factors the Commission identified as important to an evaluation of
whether non-audit services could impair independence.17 In 1981 the SEC rescinded ASR
264,18 followed almost immediately by the SECPS’ adopting the aforementioned
requirement for member firms to disclose the extent of MAS fees and activity in their
annual reports to the SECPS. The SEC repealed ASR 250 in 1982, citing the new SECPS
disclosure requirements and having concluded that the disclosure required by ASR 250
“was not generally of sufficient utility to investors to justify continuation.”19
16 In 1986 the POB, having noticed that non-audit services had continued to proliferate
despite its admonition that the firms exercise self-restraint and judgment before venturing
into new areas of MAS,20 commissioned a survey of attitudes of various groups toward
non-audit services and independence.21 The POB issued the survey without comment, but
15

Note 13, p. 33 of POB scope of services report.
Note 13, p. 4 of POB scope of services report.
17
Accounting Series Release 264 (June 14, 1979).
18
Accounting Series Release 296 (August 20, 1981).
19
Accounting Series Release 304 ((January 28, 1982).
20
Note 13, POB scope of services report.
21
Public Perceptions of Management Advisory Services Performed by CPA Firms for Audit Clients, a
research report prepared for the POB by Survey Division, Audits & Surveys, Inc. (November 1986).
16

194

reaffirmed that it knew of no instance in which it could be demonstrated that MAS
services had interfered with auditor independence. The survey results indicated continued
concerns that MAS services could impair auditor objectivity and independence.
17 Shortly thereafter, the Treadway Commission concluded that the audit committee
should oversee management’s judgments relating to the independence of accountants by
reviewing management’s plans for engaging its auditors to perform MAS, considering
both the types of services that might be rendered and the projected fees.22
18 In March 1994, in response to a Congressional request, the Office of the Chief
Accountant (OCA) of the SEC reexamined the current independence rules and considered
whether any changes were needed. The OCA acknowledged the continuing increase of
non-audit-service offerings by the firms and undertook to continue to be alert to the
development of problems of auditor independence, but concluded that:
…the extensive systems of independence requirements issued by the
Commission and the AICPA, coupled with the Commission’s active
enforcement program, provide to investors reasonable safeguards against
loss due to the conduct of audits by accountants that lack independence
from their audit clients. The enactment of detailed legislation or the
promulgation of additional rules is not necessary.23
19 The POB continued to analyze “extended audit services” such as internal audit
outsourcing and to monitor the firms’ expansion of non-audit services. The Board had
concluded that extended audit services need not impair independence if properly and
carefully structured. The POB suggested that the profession consider whether the Code of
Professional Conduct provides an adequate framework and guidance for addressing in a
timely manner the implications of new service lines, and organizational structures to
provide them, on the traditional concepts of independence.24
20 Since then the AICPA has issued or revised several relevant ethics interpretations and
ethics rulings, including:

• Interpretation 101-3, Performance of other services – lists many activities that
would be considered to impair independence

• Interpretation 101-13, Extended audit services – discusses circumstances
under which internal audit outsourcing and similar services would or would
not impair independence

• Interpretation 101-14, The effect of alternative practice structures on the
22

Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting -- October 1987.
Staff Report on Auditor Independence, SEC (March 1994).
24
Annual Report 1994-1995, POB. A task force of the SECPS Executive Committee studied the issue of
non-audit services. Although no report was issued, its findings were submitted to the then newly-formed
Independence Standards Board.
23
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applicability of independence rules – discusses the extent to which
independence rules apply to certain persons outside the “traditional” auditing
firm

• Interpretation 102-2, Conflicts of interest – offers guidance when a conflict
occurs and on activities that should cause a CPA to consider whether others
could view the relationship as impairing objectivity

• Interpretation 102-6, Professional services involving client advocacy –
discusses tax, consulting or other engagements that involve acting as an
advocate for the client
21 In a 1996 report to Congress,25 the GAO stated that it believed that measures that
would limit auditor services are outweighed by the value of traditional consulting
services, but added that concerns over independence would grow as firms move to
provide new services that go beyond traditional services. The GAO also urged the
profession to be attentive to independence concerns in considering new services.
22 Since then the shifting mix of practice has been a continuing source of concern and
has been noted frequently by the SEC. The Chief Accountant recently asserted that,
“These firms no longer advertise themselves as auditing firms, but as one-stop financial
services firms that offer a full range of services.”26
23 Recently, the success of the firms’ consulting practices, the explosive growth in
technology, and regulators’ concerns over auditor independence have converged and
resulted in the Big 5 firms exploring new business strategies for the future. These
strategies have attracted attention from the regulators with respect to the issue of auditor
independence and include:

• Restructuring and separating consulting practices from accounting and tax
services

• Fully or partially divesting the restructured practices
• Planning public offerings of the consulting practices for access to needed
capital
24 Some other firms have sold their non-attest practices to other financial services firms
and have a variety of alliances with those firms (see Appendix B, “Accounting Firms and
Current Trends”).
25

The Accounting Profession -- Major Issues: Progress and Concerns, United States General Accounting
Office Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives
(September 1996).
26
Lynn E. Turner, “Shifting Paradigms in Self-Regulation,” address at the 27th Anniversary Securities
Regulation Institute, January 27, 2000.
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25 The agenda of the Independence Standards Board includes alternative practice
structures, as well as appraisal and valuation services, outsourcing engagements, and
legal services for public audit clients. (Currently, auditors may not provide legal services
to audit clients.) The Panel understands that the SEC is assessing the effects on auditor
independence of certain of the large firms’ proposed practice restructurings.
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APPENDIX E – QUASI PEER REVIEW PROCESS
OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE
1 The Panel’s primary purpose was to examine whether the audit processes of the large
firm members of the SECPS adequately serve and protect the interests of investors. The
major element in this examination was the Quasi Peer Review (QPR) process. The QPR
process was designed to make a comprehensive review of public company audits
performed by the eight largest firms, to evaluate the way independent audits are
performed, and to assess the effects of recent trends in auditing on the public interest. The
QPR process, which occurred during the summer and fall of 1999, gathered empirical
data on the quality of a selected sample of SEC audit engagements with 1998 and 1999
year ends. In considering the effectiveness of the audits, the QPR:

• Evaluated the quality of work performed in specific key areas, including risk
assessments, reviews of controls, and documentation
• Assessed whether the individuals who performed and reviewed the work had
the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience
• Determined whether the work was performed and reviewed on a timely basis
• Considered the adequacy of existing professional standards
2 Recommendations for improving audit effectiveness were developed from the Panel’s
QPR findings.

QPR REVIEW COMPARED TO A SECPS PEER REVIEW
3 While there were numerous similarities between the QPRs and SECPS peer reviews,
there also were numerous differences. The differences included:

• In-depth interviews in the QPRs of engagement personnel at all levels
• Focusing the QPRs on specific identified areas, such as the risk assessments,

•
•
•
•

the linkage of the risk assessments to tests of controls and substantive tests,
and whether the people who performed the work had the necessary knowledge
and skills, rather than on an overall assessment of the engagement (i.e., an
overall assessment of compliance with GAAP and GAAS)
More in-depth, subjective examinations in the QPRs of the areas reviewed
Having a member of the Panel Staff conduct an extensive debriefing session
with the QPR reviewer at the conclusion of each engagement review
Holding focus group meetings in the QPRs of managers and seniors in each
office reviewed
Not preparing matter sheets in the QPRs
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• Not preparing reports or letters of comments on individual offices or firms in
the QPRs
4 During the Panel’s development of the QPR, various constituencies, including the
SEC, the POB, practitioners, the Panel and the Panel Staff, identified specific areas that
directly affect the overall effectiveness of an audit. The Panel determined that the QPR
should focus on these specific areas. The QPRs examined these areas in more depth than
the SECPS peer reviews typically do. These areas included:

• risk assessments, including engagement risk, fraud risk, inherent risk, and
•
•
•
•
•
•

control risk
controls, especially those related to information technology
linkage of risk assessments to tests of controls and substantive tests
substantive procedures, including substantive analytical procedures, in
selected areas
completion of the audit, including the resolution of issues, non-standard
entries, final analytical review and waived adjustments
communications with audit committees
revenue recognition, asset impairments, and merger-related and restructuring
reserves

5 The QPR reviewers sought to obtain an in-depth understanding of the engagement
teams’ thought processes in the areas reviewed. The QPR reviewers used in-depth
interviews and reviews of working papers to obtain this understanding. All matters where
the QPR reviewers disagreed with the quality or sufficiency of the engagement teams’
work were referred to the firms for appropriate follow-up.
6 Matter sheets, reports, and letters of comments were not prepared during the QPRs to
increase openness and candor and reduce the reviewees’ defensiveness. The goal of the
QPR was not to assess and report on specific offices or firms; rather, the purpose was to
assess and report on the overall effectiveness of public company audits performed by the
large firms. Accordingly, the results of the QPR have been summarized on an overall
basis combining the results of all offices and firms. In order to elicit frank responses and
full cooperation from those reviewed, the Panel agreed to hold the specific engagement
results in confidence.

QPR SCOPE
7 All the companies whose audits were reviewed were SEC registrants. The reviews
covered the eight largest accounting firms in the U.S.; i.e., the Big 5 firms of Arthur
Andersen LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, as well as BDO Seidman, LLP, Grant Thornton LLP and
McGladrey & Pullen, LLP.
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8 To facilitate the selection of the individual offices to be reviewed, the Panel Staff
requested these firms to provide detailed demographic information by office.1 The Panel
Staff selected the offices to be reviewed to achieve diversity in their size, geographic
location, clients and risk characteristics. For each of the Big 5 firms, the Panel Staff
selected four offices. Due to the smaller size of the other three firms, the Panel Staff
selected two or three offices per firm.
9 The selected offices then were requested to provide detailed demographic information
by SEC registrant, as well as information regarding certain office-wide quality control
and risk matters.2 The Panel Staff used this data, as well as other information,3 to
determine the specific engagements to be reviewed. The engagements were chosen to
achieve a diverse sample of engagements in terms of size, industry, and engagement
characteristics.4 For the Big 5 firms, the Panel Staff generally selected five engagements
per office resulting in approximately 20 engagements reviewed for each firm. For the
other three firms, the Panel Staff selected approximately ten engagements per firm to
review. Overall, the Panel selected 130 engagements for which the results were tabulated
for 126 engagements representing 320,790 audit hours. The other four engagements were
used to pilot test the QPR process. Based on these pilot tests, the Panel Staff made certain
modifications to the QPR questionnaire to improve the effectiveness of the QPR process.

QPR REVIEW PROCESS
Training
10 Prior to the performance of the QPRs, the Panel Staff conducted a training session for
the eight firms’ QPR coordinators and the review team captains from the reviewing firms.
One member of the POB, a Panel member, and members of the staffs of the AICPA,
SEC, POB, and SECPS also attended the one-day session.
11 At the beginning of the review in each office, the reviewers and reviewees attended
an orientation session conducted by the Panel Staff. The purpose of these training and
orientation sessions was to explain the purpose and objectives of the QPR reviews, how
they differed from the SECPS peer reviews, and how the Panel would use the results of
these reviews.

1

See Table 1, Demographics Considered in Office Selection.
See Table 2, Demographics Considered in Engagement Selection.
3
Other information included the Top 50 restructuring charges, in-process research and development
charges, merger charges, and write-downs in 1998; information regarding the fastest growing companies;
and the SEC’s hot topics.
4
See Table 3, Industries of Reviewed Engagements, Table 4, Audit Hours of Reviewed Engagements, and
Table 5, Engagement Characteristics of Reviewed Engagements.
2
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Office Reviews
12 The firms’ regular peer reviewers conducted the 28 office reviews under the close
supervision of the Panel Staff, including at least one senior member of the Panel Staff.
Each office review was approximately one-week long and consisted of:

• an interview of the partner-in-charge of the office’s audit practice
• discussions with groups of managers and seniors (referred to as “the focus
groups”)
• engagement reviews comprised of interviews of engagement personnel,
reviews of selected working papers, and completion of the QPR questionnaire
• interviews of the consulting partners responsible for the delivery of non-audit
services, if any, on the engagements reviewed
• an exit conference with office management
13 Panel members attended most of the office reviews and participated in the focus
groups and interviews and observed the QPR engagement reviews.
Interview of the Partner-in-charge
14 The interview of the partner-in-charge of the office’s audit practice focused on the
adequacy of the professional development of auditors, the overall “tone at the top” in the
office, and the performance measures used by the office in evaluating, compensating and
promoting audit personnel. The partner’s views on audit effectiveness and governance of
the profession also were obtained. The partner-in-charge of the office QPR conducted the
interview, which was attended by a member of the Panel Staff, and in many instances,
one or more Panel members.
Focus Groups
15 The objective of the focus group discussions was to provide the Panel with added
insight from audit seniors and managers about positive matters and issues for future
change. There were two focus group meetings in most offices, one comprising five to
eight senior managers and managers and another comprising a similar number of seniors.
At some of the smaller offices, one combined focus group of managers and seniors was
held. The focus group participants generally were not assigned to the engagements being
reviewed. The sessions, which were conducted by the Panel Staff, addressed such topics
as the environment, auditors’ knowledge and skills, and audit methodology. In many
instances, one or more Panel members attended the session.
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Engagement Reviews
Overview
16 The engagement reviewers began the review process by reviewing information from
the prior year’s audit and making their own preliminary risk assessments before
interviewing the engagement partner, concurring partner, manager, senior and selected
staff. Then they reviewed selected working papers as a result of the information they
obtained. The reviewers documented their observations and findings by completing a
detailed questionnaire, which included basic and supplemental sections. Virtually all the
reviewers were partners with relevant industry and SEC experience. Panel members and
staff participated in some of the interviews.
The Basic Questionnaire
17 The basic questionnaire included 426 data gathering, evaluative, best practice, and
improvement questions, as well as areas for the reviewer’s comments. The Panel Staff
designed the questionnaire to elicit narrative responses from the reviewers to help
identify best practices and areas for improvement and to eliminate the “check the box”
mentality that can occur when questionnaires are used to gather information. The data
gathering and evaluative questions were organized in a manner that is consistent with the
audit risk model. Panel members reviewed and commented on the questionnaire before it
was issued.
18 The questionnaire covered the following areas at the financial statement level:

• engagement risk assessment and linkage to the inherent risk and control
environment assessments
• inherent risk and control environment assessments
• fraud risk assessment
19 The reviewers generally selected three high risk areas for review as well as one
material area that the engagement team had assessed as having “low” or “moderate” (i.e.,
not high) risk. For these areas, the reviewers evaluated the:

• inherent risk assessment
• internal control risk assessment and evaluation
• linkage of risk assessments (inherent, control and fraud risks) to substantive
tests
• design and performance of substantive tests
20 In order to obtain data regarding other important areas that affect audit effectiveness,
the questionnaire required the reviewers to consider:

• Completing the audit
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• Resolution of issues
• Non-standard entries
• Final analytical review
• Relations with the audit committee
• Personnel assigned to the engagement and changes in the engagement in
recent years
21 The reviewers had to make numerous subjective evaluations when completing the
questionnaire. These judgments related to the quality of the audit work performed, the
knowledge and skills of those who performed the work, and whether the reviewer agreed
with the engagement team’s decisions. The reviewer’s judgments on these matters were
not limited to the engagement team’s compliance with firm policies or professional
standards since the purpose of the QPRs was to address change and identify potential
improvements.
The Supplemental Sections
22 The reviewers completed the following supplements to the basic questionnaire when
they were applicable:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

fraud risk assessment – misappropriation of assets
use of internal audit
revenue recognition
merger-related and restructuring reserves
impairment of long-lived assets and long-lived assets to be disposed of
going concern/severe liquidity
multi-location audits
non-audit services
former firm personnel in client management

23 Also, the reviewers described the audit approach in each of the four key areas and
completed a supplemental questionnaire on the use of analytical procedures as
substantive procedures in five additional areas that the reviewers selected with guidance
from the Panel Staff.
Debrief
24 At the end of each engagement review, the reviewer met with a Panel Staff member
to debrief the staff member on the reviewer’s findings and evaluation of the engagement,
with emphasis on the:
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• appropriateness of the risk assessments
• level, general business and industry experience/expertise, knowledge, and
skills of those who performed and reviewed the work
• nature, timing and extent of the partner’s involvement in the engagement
• nature and extent of the control testing and substantive procedures performed,
including the use of analytical procedures as substantive procedures
• adequacy of documentation in the areas reviewed
25 Panel members attended some of the “debrief” sessions.
QPR Exit Conferences
26 An office exit conference was held at the completion of the QPR process in most
offices to summarize the results of the review. These exit conferences were conducted by
the peer review team captain and generally were attended by the office’s accounting and
auditing leaders and a Panel Staff member, and in some offices, a Panel member.
27 An overall exit conference was conducted with most of the firms to summarize and
discuss the firm’s overall QPR results. The firm’s accounting and auditing leaders
generally attended the meeting, which focused on the scope of the QPR review and the
best practices and areas for improvement noted during the review.
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TABLE 1
Demographics Considered in Office Selection
To facilitate the selection of the individual offices to be reviewed, the Panel Staff
requested the eight firms to provide the following information by office:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Audit engagement hours for the most recent twelve-month period
Number of audit partners
Number of other audit personnel
Average hours per audit partner
Ratio of other audit personnel to audit partners
Number of SEC engagements
Number of IPOs effective since December 31, 1997
Number of new SEC clients for which the firm’s first report covered a period
ending after November 30, 1997, with separate identification of the number of
clients for which the predecessor auditors had resigned or reported a
disagreement
Number of SEC engagements with management consulting fees that exceeded
the audit fees
Number of SEC engagements considered “high risk”
Number of cases reported to the Quality Control Inquiry Committee since
January 1, 1997
Number of restatements issued since December 31, 1997 (both SEC and nonSEC clients)
Number of withdrawals of opinion since December 31, 1997 (both SEC and
non-SEC clients)
“Top five” industries
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TABLE 2
Demographics Considered in Engagement Selection
The selected offices were requested to provide detailed information by SEC registrant
including:

• engagement hours, industry, revenues, percentage of assets used in foreign
operations and percentage of revenues from foreign operations
• whether the following characteristics were present including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

significant derivative financial instruments
going concern issues
revenue recognition issues
in-process research and development (IPR&D) charges
restructuring charges
significant use of electronic data interchange (EDI)
internal audit outsourcing services provided by the firm
IPO effective since December 31, 1997
the firm’s first report covered a period ending after November 30, 1997
the firm’s first report covered a period ending after November 30, 1997
and the predecessor auditors had resigned or reported a disagreement
The management consulting fees exceeded the audit fees
the client is considered “high risk”
a reproposal within the past three years
a partner or manager had left the firm to become the client’s chairperson,
CEO, COO, CFO or controller within the past three years

In addition, the selected offices were asked to list any:

• cases reported to the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC) since
January 1, 1997
• restatements issued since December 31, 1997 (both SEC and non-SEC clients)
• withdrawals of opinion since December 31, 1997 (both SEC and non-SEC
clients)
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TABLE 3
Industries of Reviewed Engagements
Number of
Engagements
28
25
17
14
12
8
8
8
2
2
1
1
126

Industry
Manufacturing
High technology
Financial services
Telecommunications
Consumer business
Health care
Real estate
Utilities
Gaming
Transportation
Aerospace & defense
Travel
Total engagements
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TABLE 4
Audit Hours of Reviewed Engagements

Audit Hours
0 – 500
501 – 1000
1001 – 2000
2001 – 3000
3001 – 4000
4001 – 5000
More than 5000
Total engagements

Number of
Engagements
18
27
38
15
10
4
14
126
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% of Total
Engagements
14%
21%
31%
12%
8%
3%
11%

TABLE 5
Engagement Characteristics of Reviewed Engagements
Engagement Characteristics
Initial audits
IPO within the past 3 years
Predecessor auditors resigned or declined
to stand for re-election
Client classified as “high risk”
Reproposal within the last 3 years
Restated financial statements in the past 3
years
Significant use of EDI
Foreign operations
Work of a specialist used
Significant work referred to an affiliated
firm
Significant
work
referred
to
an
unaffiliated firm
Significant work referred to other U.S.
offices
Internal audit was given significant audit
consideration
Restructuring charges or reserves
Impairment of long-lived assets
Going concern issues
Revenue recognition issues
Merger-related charges or reserves
IPR&D write-offs
Derivatives
Significant audit adjustments
Significant disagreements with
management
Services other than audit or tax provided
Former partner or manager of the firm in
position of client chairperson, CEO,
CFO, COO or Controller
Communications about fraud or illegal
acts
Communications about reportable
conditions

% of Total Engagements
15%
25%
6%
44%
6%
11%
13%
44%
33%
24%
4%
12%
16%
29%
28%
39%
27%
20%
6%
7%
29%
0%
29%

13%
8%

12%
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APPENDIX F – ANALYSIS OF SEC ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING ENFORCEMENT RELEASES
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
Purpose
1 The Panel studied recent Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) to
supplement the Quasi Peer Reviews and held discussions with the SEC staff regarding the
apparent causes of actual or alleged fraudulent financial reporting and/or audit failures. The
Panel’s objective was to obtain additional insights regarding the characteristics that frequently
were present in these matters as well as insights regarding the auditors’ work that either resulted
in detecting or not detecting material misstatements. The Panel used those insights to identify
lessons that might be useful in improving audit effectiveness and in helping to develop some of
the recommendations in this report, especially in Chapters 2 through 4.
Scope
2 The study, which was conducted by Professor Thomas Weirich of Central Michigan
University, covered the AAERs issued from approximately July 1, 1997, through January 1,
2000, involving the Big 5 firms and/or their clients. The Panel limited the study to the Big 5 firms
and their clients because the Big 5 firms audit the most SEC registrants and because most of the
Panel’s efforts have focused on the effectiveness of their audits. The study included 96 AAERs
involving 38 different matters.
Methodology
3 After reading the AAERs, Professor Weirich met with members of the staff of the Office of
the Chief Accountant (OCA) of the SEC to discuss each case. The discussions focused on:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The root causes of or contributing factors to an effective or ineffective audit
The auditors’ actions, including what they did right and what they did wrong
Any implications for the audit risk model
The steps that could/should have been taken to prevent or detect the alleged
financial reporting/audit failure
The systemic/quality control implications
The penalties (if any) the SEC assessed against the auditors
The client personnel involved
The client personnel’s apparent motivations for materially misstating the financial
statements
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• The methods the client personnel apparently used to misstate the financial
statements
4 The SEC staff members answered questions using the information contained in the SEC’s
non-public enforcement files. Professor Weirich did not have access to those files. To help
structure his discussions with the SEC staff, Professor Weirich developed a questionnaire that
members of the Panel and its staff reviewed. After his meetings with the SEC staff, Professor
Weirich prepared a written summary of the key elements of each case, including the auditors’
actions during the audit, if known.
5 Subsequently, the Panel’s staff director met for a total of five full days with Professor
Weirich and members of the SEC staff to review and discuss each of the cases for over an hour
on average.
6

Two significant limitations of this study were:

• While the SEC staff routinely examines the auditors’ involvement in each case, the
SEC’s files generally did not contain much or any information about the auditors’
work unless the auditors were named in the AAER (seven of the 38 cases).
• Professor Weirich did not have direct personal access to the SEC’s files because
they contain non-public information. Instead he had to rely on the SEC staff’s
responses to his questions.

FINDINGS
Overview
7 The SEC named the auditors in seven of the 38 cases, and may name the auditors in others
where the SEC has not completed its investigations. In those cases where no actions were
brought against the auditors, the reasons included: there was insufficient evidence to support an
action against the auditors, only unaudited interim financial statements were misstated, and the
auditors discovered the misstatements. For instance, in 12 of the 38 situations, the auditors
discovered the fraudulent activities, reported them to the audit committee and resigned, and/or
required restatements.
8 There appeared to be substantial variations in the quality of the audits. At one extreme, the
auditors appeared to have performed extremely thorough audits under the leadership of heavily
involved, highly skeptical partners and managers who were able to ferret out well concealed,
massive collusive frauds. At the other extreme, inexperienced auditors appeared to have been
virtually unsupervised, overlooked seemingly obvious “red flags,” and failed to follow up
adequately on exceptions noted during their audit tests.
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Accounts Frequently Misstated
9 Most of the misstatements involved relatively routine transactions and accounts rather than
complex judgmental areas and more esoteric transactions and accounts, such as derivatives or
other complex financial instruments, restructuring reserves, business combinations, or in-process
research and development charges.
10 The most frequently misstated transactions and accounts were:
Revenue and accounts receivable
Expenses
Cost of sales and inventory
Sales discounts/returns and allowances
Property, plant, and equipment
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities
Securities valuations

26 cases (out of 38)
13
9
8
7
5
3

11 These findings are consistent with those of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission (COSO) in its research study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting:
1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies.
Common Techniques for Overstating Revenue
12 As noted above, approximately 70% of the cases in the study involved the overstatement of
revenue—either premature revenue recognition or fictitious revenue. The most frequent
techniques for overstating revenue were:

• Recognizing revenue contrary to agreements with customers, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Recognizing revenue on consignment sales
Recognizing revenue despite having entered into side agreements
Recognizing revenue on conditional sales to related parties
Recognizing revenue on bill and hold transactions
Inflating invoices in kickback schemes
Recognizing revenue when the risks/rewards of ownership had not passed
Recognizing revenue on shipments not ordered by customers
Recognizing revenue on non-qualifying barter transactions

• Manipulating cutoff, including:
•

Recording revenue on shipments after year end by backdating shipping
documents
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•

Delaying the recognition of returns

• Generating fictitious transactions, including:
•
•
•

Recognizing fictitious revenue with false journal entries
Recognizing fictitious revenue on shipments of mock products and/or obsolete
inventory
Recognizing fictitious revenue on shipments to public or company warehouses

13 In many instances the entity used more than one of the preceding techniques to overstate
revenue. Many of these techniques are similar to those identified in the COSO report.
Other Factors Associated with Materially Misstated Financial Statements
14 During the study, Professor Weirich noted:

• Numerous instances where entities used information technology to facilitate material

•
•
•

•

•

•

frauds, such as by making inappropriate modifications to computer programs,
recording hundreds of small non-standard entries rather than a few large ones, and
“freezing the date” in the computer system.
Numerous instances where non-standard entries were used to conceal
misstatements.
A few instances of materially misstated financial statements due to the
misappropriation of assets.
Several instances where the entity’s inherent risk apparently increased due to
significant changes in the entity’s business (e.g., the loss of one or more major
customers or the existence of a new competitor with a better, cheaper product),
and the auditors apparently were not aware of these changes and/or did not
accurately assess how they increased inherent risk.
Numerous instances where management had overridden controls, including controls
over aging accounts receivable, recording shipments, changing computer programs,
and classifying disbursements. Because the auditors apparently were unaware that
management was overriding controls, they apparently assessed control risk and
fraud risk as considerably lower than they actually were.
Several instances of material fraud, either fraudulent financial reporting or
misappropriation of assets, at relatively small divisions or subsidiaries. In some of
these instances, the auditors apparently had not visited the locations in several years
even though the entities did not have any internal auditors, controls at the locations
were weak, or competition for the locations’ products had increased substantially,
thereby increasing the risk at the locations.
Numerous instances where the auditors’ substantive procedures apparently were
not adequate to detect material misstatements. Examples included:
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•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Inadequate (small) sample sizes.1
Not adequately following up on exceptions noted or fax responses to
confirmations.
Not adequately testing the approval process for sales, the sales or inventory
cutoffs,2 charges to asset accounts, or the valuation of securities or property,
plant, and equipment.
Not controlling the confirmation process or not confirming the terms of large or
unusual sales transactions, especially those at year end.
Not ascertaining whether the financial statements agreed or reconciled with the
accounting records.
Over-relying on management’s representations (i.e., not obtaining sufficient
evidence to corroborate or refute management’s representations, such as
management’s explanations for unusual fluctuations noted when performing
analytical procedures).
Not testing the accuracy of computer-prepared schedules.

• Various instances where the auditors apparently were not aware of, or did not pay
sufficient attention to, such factors as negative cash flows, extended sales terms,
customers taking longer than usual to pay, increased product returns, or very large
percentages of sales being recorded at period ends.
• A very limited number of situations where the external auditors may not have tested,
supervised, and reviewed the internal auditors’ work as thoroughly as would have
been desirable.
• Some instances where the personnel assigned to audit certain areas, such as
receivables and inventories, did not appear to have sufficient training and experience
or to be adequately supervised.
15 In many of these situations, the auditors appeared to have demonstrated a lack of sufficient
professional skepticism.
16 Professor Weirich also noted that the entities with the most sophisticated frauds often were
very concerned about concealing the fraud from the auditors and ensuring that “the numbers and
the relationships among them would ‘look right’ to the auditors when they performed their
analytical procedures.” A favorite technique for accomplishing this was to “play around” with
the numbers, often through the use of non-standard entries, until they “looked right.” In these
circumstances, such ratios as the accounts receivable and inventory turnover ratios and the
gross margin percentages presumably met the auditors’ expectations rather than raising
questions that might have revealed the fraud.
1

In several situations, cutoff tests were limited to examining the documentation for a very small number of
transactions.
2
See note 1.
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17 In a limited number of instances, succumbing to time pressures may have contributed to the
auditors’ failure to detect material misstatements, while in others, the auditors’ resistance to time
pressures may have facilitated their detection of the misstatements.
Fraud Participants and Incentives for Committing Fraud
18 In most of the 38 cases, one or more members of top management were involved in (or
aware of) the activities that resulted in the materially misstated financial statements. For example,
the CFO apparently was involved in almost two-thirds of the cases, the CEO in almost one-half
and the Controller in almost one-half. In some situations, numerous lower-level personnel also
were involved in (or at least aware of) the activities, such as accounting clerks, district sales
managers or personnel in the IT department who reprogrammed the computer to conceal the
fraud.
19 In still other situations, top management apparently was unaware that the overall financial
statements were materially misstated since the fraud was perpetrated at a subsidiary or division
where the personnel apparently either were trying to “make the numbers” or cover up their
misappropriations of assets. Finally, in a few situations, third parties were involved in attempting
to conceal the fraud, such as by sending false confirmations to the auditors.
20 In five situations, one or more of the members of management involved in the misstatements
had been with the audit firm, in three situations as partners, prior to joining the company.
21 The personnel involved in making the misstatements are reported to have cited various
incentives for participating, including:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Meeting analysts’ expectations
Meeting corporate earnings targets
Raising additional capital
Complying with financial covenants for loans/lines of credit
Reporting favorable results for an IPO
Earning bonus awards/stock options
Satisfying NASDAQ listing requirements
Funding personal expenses
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APPENDIX G – FOCUS GROUPS
1 Focus group sessions, led by an independent professional facilitator and a Panel staff
member, were conducted to obtain information on topics relevant to financial reporting
and audit effectiveness. Most of the sessions, which were in addition to the focus group
sessions held in conjunction with the Quasi Peer Reviews, lasted approximately three
hours. Almost all were attended by at least one Panel member. The groups included:

• Practicing professionals from the eight large firms – A total of eight sessions
were held in New York, Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco. Each included
one individual from each of the eight large firms that participated in the
Panel’s project. All of the participants at a session were at the same level of
experience. The eight sessions covered a cross section of experience levels as
follows:

Staff
In-charge
Managers/Supervisors
Experienced managers
Partners

Years of
Experience
1-2
3-5
5-11
11-14
12+

Number of
Meetings
1
3
2
1
1

Number of
Participants
8
24
16
8
8

• Chief financial officers – One session of financial executives of SEC
registrants. All are members of the Financial Executives Institute. The
companies represented were:
•
•
•
•
•

Bethlehem Steel Corporation
General Electric Company
ITT Corporation
Tenneco Inc.
Union Carbide Corporation

• Internal audit executives – One session of executives, mostly from SEC
registrants. All are members of the Institute of Internal Auditors. The
companies represented were:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Asea Brown Boveri Inc.
Bell Atlantic Corporation
International Business Machines Corporation
Lucent Technologies Inc.
Proxair, Inc.
Readers Digest Association Inc.
Texaco Inc.
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•

Pitney Bowes Inc.

• Partners from smaller firms – one session of eight partners experienced in
leading peer reviews of smaller firms.1 The firms represented were:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Barnes, Dennig & Co.
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, LLP
Hanson, Barnett & Maxwell
Hevia, Beagles & Company, P.A.
Larson, Allen, Weishair & Co. LLP
Urbach Kahn & Werlin P.C.
Virchow, Krause & Company, LLP
Weaver and Tidwell LLP

2 Different topics were emphasized depending upon the experience and background of
the participants. The topics were identified by the Panel and included the following:

• The value of an audit – as seen by management, audit committees, investors,
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1

other users, and auditors
The audit environment – governance of firms and the profession, messages
about audit quality, personnel issues (recruiting, turnover, salaries), personnel
performance measures, fee competition, and earnings management
Audit methodology – understanding the client's business, business and
financial-statement risk assessments, internal controls, detailed audit tests, and
the effects of technology on audits and audit effectiveness
Fraud – auditors’ responsibilities and abilities to detect material financial
statement frauds
Knowledge and skills of audit professionals – self development, technology
skills, technical and industry knowledge, and on-the-job learning
Professional standards – individual accounting and auditing standards,
standards-setting
Audit committees – roles, responsibilities, and relationships with auditors
Practice economics – practice development and growth, profitability, fee
competition, and time pressures on engagement teams
Auditor independence – the effects on auditor independence of non-audit
services
The SEC – its role and responsibilities, relationships with it

See Appendix K, “Smaller Firms,” for additional information.
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APPENDIX H – SURVEY
1 The Panel’s project contemplated gathering information from key audiences using a
variety of means. Early in the project the Panel decided to seek information about a wide
range of issues from a number of sources through a mail survey, “Request for Opinions
on Issues of Audit Effectiveness Addressed to Thought Leaders and Key Stakeholders.”
The survey was issued on September 1, 1999.
2 The survey was not intended to be an opinion poll. Rather, the Panel encouraged each
respondent to give free-form responses to as many of the questions as possible from that
person’s unique perspective. The Panel also informed all potential respondents that their
responses would be held in confidence and would not be available for public inspection.

CONSTITUENCIES RESPONDING
3 The intent of the Panel was to seek the views of many constituencies. Toward that
end, the Panel addressed the survey to a number of selected individuals and
organizations. Among the constituencies surveyed were preparers and users of financial
statements, auditors, regulators, academicians, lawyers and analysts. While the list of
those initially selected was broad, the Panel did not limit responses to those on the list.
Rather the views of everyone interested in the Panel’s project were welcomed. The
survey questionnaire was included on the websites of the AICPA and the SEC for anyone
to obtain and answer.
4 An analysis of the constituencies included in the Panel’s original mailing and the
constituencies responding follows:
Original
Mailing*
46
157
36
80
16
15
88
56
43
537

Constituency
Accounting firm personnel
CPA organizations or personnel
Legal firm personnel
Governmental organizations
Management organizations
Corporate management
Investment management or analysts
Public interest organizations
Academia
Totals

Responses*
15
18
2
9
4
7
7
9
19
90

* Some individuals or organizations could fit into more than one category.
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
5 The survey was designed to provoke thought by setting forth points of view in a
number of areas, with related questions for respondents to address as they saw fit. The
areas explored in the survey were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The Business Environment
Responsibilities for Detecting Financial Statement Fraud
The Audit Risk Model
Breadth of Auditors’ Involvement
Audit Committees and Auditors’ Communications
The Auditing Profession
The Business of Auditing
i)
The effects of competition
ii)
Scope of services offered by audit firms
iii)
Organizational structures
iv)
Litigation
8. Regulation and Self-Regulation
i)
Roles and responsibilities
ii)
Auditing standards
iii)
The AICPA and audit firms
9. Costs, Benefits and Other Issues
A copy of the survey questionnaire is included at the end of this appendix.

ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESPONSES
6 The Panel reviewed all of the survey responses. The details of each response were
related to the applicable question or questions in the survey. Matters appearing to be of
common interest and common themes were identified and discussed. In general, the Panel
addressed:

• Key substantive observations made in response to each of the survey’s
•
•
•
•
•

questions
Specific recommendations for Panel action or non-action
Comments about the Panel’s project, process and scope
Specific ideas for enhancing audit effectiveness, including incentives and
disincentives
Other ideas for enhancing investor protection, not necessarily directly
involving auditing or auditors
Cost–benefit considerations and recommendations
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7 The information that the Panel received from the survey was valuable in its
deliberations and in formulating many of its recommendations. The Panel expresses its
appreciation to all respondents for their efforts and the quality of their responses.

COPY OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
8

C.

A copy of the survey questionnaire is reproduced below.

The Questionnaire

Each section of the questionnaire begins with an introductory paragraph, setting out some
points of view that you may or may not agree with, and that are not necessarily
representative of the views of the Panel. Please feel free to consider these points of view
in forming your responses to the questions that follow, or set them aside, as you see fit.
They are merely meant to provoke thought.

1.

The Business Environment

Auditors operate in an environment of increasing complexity, accelerating change and
intense business competition. There is significant merger and acquisition activity, newer
and more complex financial transactions and instruments to hedge or mitigate risks, and
more intangible or “soft” assets on corporate balance sheets than ever before. Businesses
often change strategic directions giving rise to restructuring activities with corresponding
reserves set aside to cover the anticipated costs of those activities. Accounting standards
address many of these areas, but they often are subject to varying interpretation. In
preparing financial reports, management must rely far more on making informed
judgments and estimates about the effects of future events and transactions.
Core Questions

§

Are auditors devoting sufficient attention to the areas where management discretion
and judgment are required in financial reporting? If not, please explain why you
believe this.

§

To what extent do analysts’ earnings estimates influence management’s judgments in
preparing financial statements, and what are the effects on the auditor? If you see any
effects, please elaborate on their importance.

§

Do accounting standards issued in recent years help or hinder auditors in meeting the
needs of users of financial statements? If they hinder auditors, how do they do so and
what should be done?
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Extended Question

§

2.

Analysts’ earnings per share estimates establish expectations (sometimes to the
penny) in the marketplace for companies to achieve. Can audits ever be expected to
be this exact? If not, what should be done, if anything, to deal with this situation?

Responsibilities for Detecting Financial Statement Fraud

Under current auditing standards, auditors have the responsibility to assess fraud risks
and obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. This is not the same as saying that
audited financial statements are a “guarantee” that fraud has not taken place. Investors
clearly place some responsibility for the detection of fraud in the hands of auditors, but
the extent of these responsibilities often is unclear to many of those involved in the
financial reporting process.
Core Questions

§

Are auditors’ responsibilities with respect to the detection of deliberate misstatements
of earnings appropriate? Please explain your view.

§

What are users’ views of those responsibilities and are they realistic? Please feel free
to elaborate on differing views of various types of users, such as individual investors
and institutional investors.

§

What, if anything, should be done to change these views, or to change auditors’
responsibilities for detecting fraud?

3.

The Audit Risk Model

Audits are conducted using an “Audit Risk Model” that requires auditors to use their
judgment in assessing risks and then in deciding what procedures to apply. The model
allows auditors to take the client’s business, financial and other circumstances into
account in selecting their audit approach. This model can be applied differently by
different audit firms, so long as they comply with “generally accepted auditing
standards.”
Core Questions

§

Is this model, where auditors are encouraged to use their judgment in selecting their
audit approach based on the individual company’s nature and circumstances,
appropriate? Please elaborate on your point of view.

§

What are the best safeguards to make sure that auditors exercise this judgment in
ways that protect shareholders and other investors?
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Extended Questions

§

Does this model allow too much chance that errors in auditors’ judgments will result
in problems for investors?

§

Does the model require auditors to explore in sufficient detail the accounting policies
and procedures that individual companies use?

§

Does the model meet the expectations of the investment community in constraining
inappropriate management behavior, especially in judgmental areas?

§

Is this model equally appropriate in all industries, or are there some where a different
approach might be needed?

§

Are auditors sufficiently equipped to deal with the growing role of information
technology? What incremental skills are needed?

§

Do auditors exert the right balance between efficiency and timeliness on the one hand
and thoroughness on the other? Do you have any observations about the level of
experience of auditors assigned to engagements, how they are supervised and their
work reviewed, or the nature and extent of the audit documentation that they retain in
their working papers?

4.

Breadth of Auditors’ Involvement

Some argue that, in light of increased business complexity, technology, new financial
instruments, and other developments, auditors do not pay enough attention to business
systems, management processes, unique industry factors and operational matters.
According to these observers, auditors place too much emphasis on historical financial
information and not enough on the current and future risks of managing the business and
on the entity’s communications with investors. Others believe that it would be
impractical or inappropriate for auditors to focus more attention on these matters.
Core Question

§

Do you believe auditors should be more involved in and familiar with their clients’
business and operational matters and ongoing communications with the investment
community? Please explain why you feel the way that you do.

Extended Questions

§

Should auditors be more or less involved with:
§

internal controls
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§

interim financial statements

§

forecasts

§

management’s discussion and analysis

§

non-financial data

§

Should auditors be required to report on such matters? If so, which matters and why?

§

Would greater involvement in these areas improve the value of the independent audit?

§

Would the costs of greater involvement outweigh the benefits?

5.

Audit Committees and Auditors’ Communications

A significant part of the debate about audit effectiveness has focused on the current and
future roles of audit committees, including their roles in enhancing communications
among themselves, the board, management, shareholders, and the auditors. Some believe
that a stronger role for audit committees may be a necessary and helpful way of
improving the effectiveness of audits. (The Panel does not intend to duplicate the work of
the Blue Ribbon Committee on the Effectiveness of Audit Committees.)
Core Questions

§

Do you believe auditors currently communicate effectively with:
§

management

§

audit committees

§

boards of directors

§

stockholders (feel free to elaborate on institutional versus individual investors)

Extended Questions

§

Do you have any suggestions for improving the effectiveness of auditors’
communications?

§

Should auditors do more to assist audit or other committees of a board of directors?

§

Are audit committees effective in promoting quality audits? How can audit
committees be more effective in that regard? Do audit committees do enough to seek
out auditors’ opinions and input?
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6.

The Auditing Profession

Some have sensed that it is becoming more difficult to attract and retain young people in
auditing as a career. Others believe that this has long been a challenge and that things are
not so different today.
Core Questions

§

Do you believe that the quality of new recruits into auditing has been declining in
recent years, and if so, is this having an effect on the quality of audits?

§

Are the opportunities and rewards in the auditing profession sufficient to attract and
retain high quality entrants? (Please separate the question of attracting versus
retaining as you see fit.) If not, what more should be done to attract and retain more
high quality individuals over the long term?

§

What are your views on audit personnel taking jobs with clients?

7.

The Business of Auditing
i)

The effects of competition

Audit firms operate in a highly competitive environment, and there is a debate about the
effects of that competition on the quality of audits. While the largest five firms audit the
preponderance of publicly held companies, changes in audit firms by publicly held
companies are relatively infrequent. Some believe that competition improves the quality
of audits while others argue that emphasis on competition weakens their quality.
Core Questions

§

What are your views about the effects of competition and pricing on the quality of
audits?

•

How do you see time and budget pressures affecting the quality of audits?

ii)

Scope of services offered by audit firms

Some believe that audit firms are placing less emphasis on audit work and more emphasis
on other services they provide, thus weakening the quality of audits. Others assert that
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non-audit work either has no effect, or actually helps audit firms perform better audits by
keeping their skills and understanding of business more up to date.
Core Questions

§

What are your impressions of the importance (stature, compensation, advancement,
investments, etc.) audit firms place on audit work relative to the other services they
offer, and how, if at all, does this affect the quality of audits?

§

Do you believe non-audit services offered to audit clients affect the independence or
perceived independence of auditors? If so, how do they do so and what should be
done about this?

§

Do firms properly balance the importance of high quality, independent audits with
§
§
§

§

The goal of practice growth and firm success?
The goal of client retention?
The goal of enhancing relationships with clients?

Do firms place sufficient importance on professional qualifications, accounting and
auditing training, specialized skills, experience and integrity of auditors?

iii)

Organizational structures

Over the past decade, audit firms have diversified into a variety of services either by
internal expansion or by acquisition. Furthermore, some non-audit organizations have
acquired audit firms or parts of them.
Core Questions

§

§

What are the effects of the following on the quality of audits:
§

non-audit organizations acquiring audit firms or parts of them?

§

audit firms broadening their range of non-audit services through acquisition or by
internal expansion?

Are current organizational structures appropriate to promote quality audits?
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iv)

Litigation

Some believe that litigation or the threat of litigation has a salutary effect on the quality
of audits. Others assert that litigation has unreasonably driven up costs for audit firms,
and combined with downward pressures on prices, may have weakened audit quality.
Core Questions

§

What are your thoughts on the effects of litigation on the quality of audits?

§

Will recent changes in federal or state laws affect the quality of audits? In what way?

§

Are more changes to securities or other laws needed? If so, what changes?

8.

Regulation and Self-Regulation
i)

Roles and responsibilities

Currently, there is a wide array of practices in place to enhance audit quality, including
oversight by regulatory bodies, self-regulation by professional associations, and policies
and practices within each audit firm.
Core Questions

§

Do you think that there is the right balance between regulation and self-regulation,
insofar as enhancing audit quality is concerned?

§

What changes, if any, would you suggest in the approaches taken by regulatory
bodies, self-regulatory bodies, and individual firms to enhance audit quality?

ii)

Auditing standards

Auditing standards are established by the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA, a 15member board comprising representatives from each of the five largest audit firms, eight
other audit firms, a member of the academic community and a member from government.
The SEC oversees the activities of the ASB.
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Core Question

§

Do “generally accepted auditing standards” and the way they are formulated meet the
needs of the investment community? If not, what changes would be useful?

iii)

The AICPA and audit firms

The AICPA exists to serve the accounting profession’s interests in a variety of ways,
including speaking on behalf of the profession on topical issues. Audit firms, of course,
speak on their own behalf and promote their own individual capabilities.
Core Question

§

9.

What would you like to see the AICPA and individual firms do to enhance the
public’s trust and confidence in the auditing profession?

Costs, Benefits and Other Issues

Actions to improve the effectiveness of audits in protecting investors’ interests need to be
justified in terms of their costs versus the benefits to be derived from them.
Core Question

§

What recommendations would you like to see the Panel make, and how do you assess
their costs and benefits?

************

The foregoing questions are intended to cover key issues relating to audit effectiveness.
The Panel invites respondents to provide comments on issues that may not be addressed
or adequately covered by this questionnaire. You may draw on personal experiences or
observations, as you deem appropriate.
________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX I – OCTOBER 1999 PUBLIC HEARINGS
BACKGROUND
1 To gather additional information, the Panel conducted public hearings in October
1999 to hear directly from leaders of all constituencies of the financial reporting process.
Leaders of almost thirty organizations were invited to testify at the hearings, and most
agreed to participate. Participants were asked to express their views on the current
effectiveness of audits in protecting investors’ interests. Each participant made a
presentation of 15-20 minutes, followed by questions from Panel members.

PARTICIPANTS AT THE OCTOBER 1999 HEARINGS
2

The following organizations were represented at the hearings1 :
American Accounting Association
American Bar Association, Committee on Law and Accounting
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Arthur Andersen LLP
BDO Seidman, LLP
Bear Stearns & Co.
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Ernst & Young LLP
Financial Accounting Standards Board
Financial Executives Institute
Grant Thornton LLP
KPMG LLP
McGladrey & Pullen, LLP
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
National Association of State Boards of Accountancy
New York Society of Security Analysts
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Public Oversight Board
Securities and Exchange Commission
SEC Practice Section
Ten Eyck Associates
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
Willkie Farr & Gallagher

3 Thus, the Panel heard from and was able to question representatives of investors,
regulators, auditors, preparers, analysts, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bars, standards-setters
and educators.
1

See Exhibit 3 to this report for a timetable of the presentations at the October 1999 hearings.
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PARTICIPANTS’ COMMENTS
4 The speakers were forceful and straightforward in their remarks, and responded
candidly to Panel members’ questions. The Panel considered the information it received
to have been very valuable in its deliberations and is grateful to the speakers for their
outstanding participation.
5 The views expressed by the speakers are referred to in the “Findings” sections of this
report. Some of the areas of recurring comments by the speakers were:
Governance of the profession
Financial statement and reporting models
Non-audit services
Recruiting new people to the profession
Auditing revenue recognition
Auditing reserves
Auditors’ involvement in interim periods
The “rate” of audit failures
Encouraging employees to disclose fraud
Earnings management
Audit myths, including audits as loss leaders
Alternative practice structures
Risk-based audit model
Effects of globalization
The relationship between the SEC and the firms
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APPENDIX J – FIRM MATERIALS/MEETINGS WITH
FIRMS
1 At the outset of the project, representatives of the Panel met with some of the leaders
of the accounting and auditing practices of the eight largest firms. These meetings
generally included the partners responsible for the firms' United States accounting and
auditing practice and for activities related to professional education; risk management,
including client acceptance and retention; professional standards; internal consultation;
and methodology development and implementation. The objective of these several-hour
meetings was to obtain the firms’ views on the accounting and auditing environment and
the issues the Panel should consider, including such topics as:

• Expectations of auditors, including by management, audit committees, boards
•
•
•
•
•

of directors, shareholders, other users, and auditors
Personnel, including recruiting and the availability of quality people,
knowledge and skills, performance measures, employee turnover
Audit methodologies, including the risk-based model, the effects of
technology, and auditors’ responsibilities for detecting fraud
Accounting and auditing standards, including the processes for developing
and implementing them, and ideas about necessary changes
Governance issues, including, in particular, the roles of the SEC, AICPA and
POB
Independence matters, including the effects, if any, of non-audit services
performed by auditors

2 The partners also provided the Panel with in-depth information and explanations
about changes in their audit methodologies and tools and related firm policies.
3 Separately, the firms provided additional information and statistics on a variety of
topics for the Panel’s use in developing its findings and recommendations. The topics
included:

• Audit policies, procedures, guidance materials, and practice aids
• Risk management – client acceptance and retention
• Professional development activities, including instructor-led and self-study
course catalogs and selected course content, coaching and mentoring
programs, and average training hours per auditor by experience level
• Programs relating to performance measures and evaluations and measurement
tools
• Reward and incentive compensation programs for employees at each
experience level
• Marketing publications designed to attract new audit clients or promote new
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services to existing audit clients
• Internal messages to staff, particularly relating to the importance of
performing quality audit work, and external messages to clients and potential
clients concerning audit quality
• Statistical data covering five-year trends in hiring personnel, employee
retention, and employee workload and scheduling
• Success stories – examples of situations where audits uncovered material
errors or fraud before the issuance of financial statements or where the auditor
took a strong stand against overly aggressive accounting or client-imposed
time pressures
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APPENDIX K – SMALLER FIRMS
BACKGROUND
1 In excess of 80%1 of the audits of domestic SEC registrants are performed by the
eight largest U.S.-based accounting and auditing firms. As a result, the Panel
concentrated primarily on those firms and their audit methodologies. However, the Panel
recognizes the important role that smaller firms that audit the remaining public entities
play in our capital markets. (See also “Other Firms” in Appendix B of this report.)
Accordingly, the Panel Staff reviewed and analyzed Practitioners Publishing Company’s
“Guide to Risk-Based Audits” and “Guide to Audits of Small Businesses.” These
represent the core methodologies that a large number of smaller firms use.
2 In addition, the Panel Staff met with a group of eight professionals experienced in
leading peer reviews of smaller firms. These individuals are partners in firms ranging
from less than 10 to over 600 professionals, and in the aggregate, they conducted nearly
100 peer reviews in 1999.
3 The discussions with these peer reviewers included a broad range of topics similar to
the topics covered with the larger firms and in other focus groups, but from the
perspective of the smaller firms. Substantial time was devoted to client acceptance and
retention policies and procedures, technical industry and specialist (information
technology, etc.) support for engagement teams, and the unique challenges these firms
face as a result of changing technology and audit methodologies.

1

Provided by SECPS staff.
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APPENDIX L – MEETINGS WITH REGULATORS AND
PROFESSIONAL BODIES
1 The Panel Chairman, the Staff Director, and other members of the Panel and its staff had
numerous meetings with regulators, primarily the SEC, and various private-sector professional
bodies involved in the governance of the profession or their representatives. During these
meetings, the Panel representatives reported on the Panel’s activities and progress and
discussed various issues and other matters of mutual interest to assist the Panel in gathering
information and formulating its recommendations.
2

The groups the Panel or its staff met with and the number of meetings are:

Organization
Securities and Exchange Commission and its
staff
SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee
Public Oversight Board
Independence Standards Board and its staff
SECPS Peer Review Committee
Auditing Standards Board and its staff
SECPS Executive Committee
SECPS Peer Review Process Task Force
SECPS Planning Subcommittee
CEOs of the Big 5 firms
Committee on Corporate Reporting of the
Financial Executives Institute
International Organization of Securities
Commissions
Audit Issues Task Force
Professional Ethics Executive Committee staff

Number of Meetings
18
7
71
5
5
5
5
4
3
2
1
1
1
1

3 The preceding statistics do not include numerous letters, phone conversations or informal
discussions between one member of the Panel or its staff and a member or representative of one
of the preceding groups.

1

In addition, the Panel staff had many informal meetings with the staff of the POB.
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APPENDIX M – PANEL MEETINGS
1 As of May 31, 2000, the Panel had met 11 times for a total of 17 days. Portions of five
meetings were open to the public, including representatives of the SEC, the press, the AICPA
and the SEC Practice Section, and the eight firms that participated in the Panel’s project.
2 During the meetings, the Panel met with representatives of the AICPA and/or the SEC
Practice Section (four times), the Public Oversight Board (three times), the SEC (twice), and
the Independence Standards Board (once). The Panel heard presentations by some of these
representatives on such topics as governance of the profession, including the feasibility of a SelfDisciplinary Organization (SDO); the supply and demand for entry-level accountants; and the
results of the Independence Standard Board’s research project that surveyed various
constituencies on their perceptions of auditor independence and objectivity. 1
3 Substantial portions of the meetings were devoted to discussing the issues on the Panel’s
agenda; to formulating the Panel’s recommendations; and to discussing reports from the Panel
Staff on the nature, scope, and results of the Panel’s activities and on the audit risk model and
other facets of audits and the auditing profession.

1

Report to the United States Independence Standards Board: Research into Perceptions of Auditor
Independence and Objectivity, 1999.

237

(This page is intentionally blank)

238

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

Exhibit 3

Panel on Audit Effectiveness
Public Hearings October 7/8, 1999
Timetable
9:00 – 9:15
9:15 – 9:45
9:45 – 10:15
10:15 – 10:30
10:30 – 11:00

11:00 – 11:30
11:30 – Noon
Noon – 1:00
1:00 – 1:30
1:30 – 2:00
2:00 – 2:30
2:30 – 3:00
3:00 – 3:15
3:15 – 3:45

3:45 – 4:15
4:15 – 4:45
4:45 – 5:00

Thursday, October 7

Friday, October 8

Opening Remarks, Shaun
O’Malley
Arthur Levitt, Harvey
Goldschmid, Lynn Turner, SEC
SEC, continued
Break
Richard Rowe, Dan Goldwasser,
Samuel Gunther, ABA
Committee on Law and
Accounting
Ed Jenkins, FASB
Barry Melancon, AICPA
Lunch Break
Mike Conway, SECPS
David Bershad, Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach
Phil Livingston, FEI
Peter Knutson, The Wharton
School
Break
Dom Esposito, Grant Thornton
(on behalf of Grant Thornton,
BDO Seidman, and McGladrey
& Pullen)
Ernest Ten Eyck, Ten Eyck
Associates
Bob Elliott, KPMG
Closing Remarks, Shaun
O’Malley

Opening Remarks, Shaun O’Malley
Michael Young, Willkie Farr &
Gallagher
Karen Pincus, AAA
Break
Steve Samek, Joe Berardino, Greg
Jonas, Arthur Andersen

David Costello, NASBA
Jim Copeland, Deloitte & Touche
Lunch Break
Patricia McConnell, Bear Stearns
Dennis Nally, Bob Herz,
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Steve Percoco, Lark Research Inc.
Bob Herdman, Ernst & Young
Break
Don Kirk, POB

Closing Remarks, Shaun O’Malley

Exhibit 4
Report of the
Peer Review Process Task Force
Executive Committee
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
January 25, 2000
Purpose
The Peer Review Process Task Force (Task Force) was formed by the Executive Committee of the
SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of CPAs (SECPS) in March 1999 for the purpose of
determining ways of improving the effectiveness of peer reviews conducted under the SECPS peer
review program. The formation of the Task Force and the need to reexamine the peer review program
was encouraged by the SECPS Peer Review Committee (PRC), the Public Oversight Board (POB),
and the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These groups seek:
•

enhancements in the reporting of the results of peer reviews;

•

improvements in the effectiveness of peer reviews, for example by emphasizing the
timely identification and testing of emerging issues and higher-risk areas during peer
reviews;

•

comprehensive governance and oversight of the peer review process; and

•

peer reviews performed by appropriately qualified and trained reviewers.

Task Force Deliberations
A list of the Task Force members is attached. The members have the following affiliations:
•

SECPS Executive Committee

•

SECPS Peer Review Committee

•

SECPS SEC Regulations Committee

•

AICPA Peer Review Board

•

AICPA Auditing Standards Board

•

Nasdaq

Also participating in the deliberations of the Task Force was a member of the POB, staff of the POB,
and staff of the POB’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness. Additionally, members of the Task Force met
individually with several groups who are users of peer review reports, but were not directly represented
in the deliberations of the Task Force, to obtain feedback from them regarding the peer review
program. These meetings included representatives from the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee,
the U.S. Department of Labor, several State boards of accountancy, and several State CPA societies
who administer the AICPA’s Peer Review Program applicable to non-SECPS member firms.
Background and Objectives of the SECPS Peer Review Program
The origins of the profession’s programs for voluntary self-regulation date back to 1977. Since then
these programs have been continuously reviewed and enhanced with the changing practice environment
and market conditions. Currently, SECPS member firms must have their quality control systems
reviewed by independent peers once every three years. These reviews are system and compliance
oriented with the objectives of evaluating whether:
•

The reviewed firm’s system of quality control for its accounting and auditing practice has
been designed to meet the requirements of the quality control standards established by
the AICPA.

•

The reviewed firm’s quality control policies and procedures were being complied with
to provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming with professional
standards.

•

The reviewed firm was complying with the membership requirements of the SECPS in
all material respects.

In a peer review, an independent team of CPAs, typically a firm-on-firm review, reviews the firm’s
stated quality control policies and procedures to determine whether they meet the elements of quality
control set forth in professional standards. Then the review team tests whether the firm’s personnel have
consistently applied these policies and procedures by looking at specific engagements and compliance
with firm-wide quality control systems, for example systems pertaining to independence, client
acceptance, and professional development. The review team’s conclusions are documented in a written
report—which may be unmodified, modified or adverse—and, when appropriate, a letter of comments
addressing matters that require action by the reviewed firm. The reviewed firm then responds to the
letter of comments in writing, stating what corrective actions it intends to take.
The PRC establishes and maintains review standards. At regular meetings and through report evaluation
task forces, the PRC considers each peer review, evaluates the reviewer’s competence and
performance, and examines every report, letter of comments, and accompanying response from the
reviewed firm that states its corrective action plan before it is finalized. In its deliberations, the PRC may
also question the peer review team or require the team to revisit the reviewed firm to perform additional
procedures. The POB staff plays a key role in overseeing the performance of peer reviews working

closely with peer review teams and the PRC. The working papers prepared on all peer reviews
performed under the SECPS program are reviewed by the SECPS staff or POB staff.
Based on the nature of the peer review results, the PRC may require remedial measures beyond those
contemplated in the reviewed firm’s letter of response and require active monitoring of the firm’s followup to assure that corrections are made. On some occasions, the PRC requires an accelerated follow-up
peer review.
Once the PRC accepts them, peer review reports, letters of comments, and reviewed firms’ responses
are maintained in a file available to the public.
The SEC also oversees the SECPS peer review program and makes its own evaluation of the adequacy
of the program and the POB’s oversight of it. After the PRC accepts reports on the peer reviews of
member firms with one or more SEC clients, the POB arranges with the SEC staff to review the POB’s
oversight files and the peer reviewer’s working papers for a sample of the reviews based on the SEC
access to working papers protocol set forth in the peer review standards. The SEC reports on its
evaluation of the peer review program in its annual report to Congress.
Comments and Recommendations
After evaluating the current peer review program and obtaining feedback from various user groups, the
Task Force reaffirmed the previously stated objectives of the peer review program. The structure for
administering, conducting, and overseeing peer reviews should continue to strive for improvements in the
performance of member firms’ accounting and auditing practices and provide a means for fostering
remedial actions when necessary. The Task Force also concluded that it is in the public’s, and the
profession’s, interest to continue to have peer reviewers express opinions on the design of quality
control systems and a firm’s compliance with those quality control systems.
However, the Task Force identified four areas of the current peer review program that it believes should
be improved. The four areas are: Reporting, Process, Governance and Oversight, and Qualifications
and Training of Reviewers. The Task Force believes improvements in these areas will enhance the
effectiveness of future peer reviews.
Reporting
Overview
Currently, individuals can request (either orally or in writing) the contents of the SECPS’s public file
which includes a member firm’s three most recent annual reports, their most recent peer review report
and, if applicable, the letter of comments and letter of response issued pursuant to their most recent peer
review report, and the PRC’s acceptance letter of such peer review. In addition, any actions required to
be taken by the reviewed firm as a condition of acceptance of its peer review report are included in the
firm’s acceptance letter. Peer review reports and letters of comments are prepared based on the
Standards for Performing and Reporting on Peer Reviews established by the PRC. Other
communications regarding the results of peer reviews that are not available to the public are made orally

at exit conferences with firm management and in Summary Review Memoranda1 presented to the PRC 2
(and available to the POB and SEC).
The Task Force believes that in order to best serve the public interest, the future peer review reporting
model must be more transparent and better facilitate the communication of matters identified during peer
reviews that should be addressed by reviewed firms and the profession. More transparent reporting
would inform users of peer review reports and letters of comments about the conduct of peer reviews
and expand the disclosure about the findings pertaining to the reviewed firms’ quality control systems
and compliance with those systems. The reporting model also should provide for the communication of
best practices, constructive suggestions that go beyond professional standards, and matters for the
attention of standards setters. To accomplish this, peer reviewers and reviewed firms should consider
the PRC as the “audit committee” so that they have appropriate information to perform their functions
effectively. Additionally, the future reporting model should provide appropriate access to information for
the SEC staff to assess the effectiveness of the peer review program.
Recommendations
1.

2.

The SECPS should:
a.

Continue to maintain a file that provides for public access to peer review reports, letters
of comments, and the firms’ responses to the letters of comments. We understand the
SECPS is in the process of developing a system for including the documents contained
in the public file on the Internet. The Task Force supports efforts to make the public file
more accessible.

b.

Study whether there are key quantitative and qualitative performance indicators that
would be useful to users of SECPS member firms’ annual reports or peer review
reports. Such information might include, for example, the number of audits performed
during the year compared to key qualitative indicators that are relevant, objective, and
measurable.

The PRC should make changes to the Standards for Performing and Reporting on Peer
Reviews for the following:
a.

1

2

Revise the standard peer review report to more fully describe the peer review process
and matters relevant to the specific peer review.

The Standards for Performing and Reporting on Peer Reviews require that a Summary Review Memorandum be
prepared on each peer review. The memorandum describes the planning of the review, the scope of the work
performed, the findings and conclusions supporting the report and letter of comments issued, and the comments
communicated to firm management during the exit conference that were not deemed of sufficient significance to
include in the letter of comments.
The Summary Review Memorandum is presented to the PRC for firms with 30 or more SEC clients or in instances
where it is necessary for consideration by the PRC in accepting the applicable peer review report.

b.

Peer review reports should be addressed to the reviewed firm and the PRC to
emphasize that peer reviewers and reviewed firms should consider the PRC as the
“audit committee.”

c.

Require a Summary Observations Memorandum be prepared on all peer reviews that
describes the peer reviewer’s observations regarding best practices, constructive
suggestions that go beyond professional standards, and matters for the attention of
standards setters. The Summary Observations Memorandum should be submitted to the
PRC along with the other documents that are required to be submitted (all of which are
available to the POB). To encourage candid communications, the Summary
Observations Memoranda prepared on peer reviews each year should not be made
available for public distribution, but should be used as a basis for preparing the PRC
annual report described in Recommendation 4 c. The SEC staff should have access to
the PRC annual report and, in its oversight role, should have access to the Summary
Observations Memoranda on a no-name basis.

Process
Overview
As previously indicated, the PRC establishes and maintains the Standards for Performing and Reporting
on Peer Reviews. Although there are approximately 1,300 SECPS member firms of various sizes and
types of practices, the peer review standards are common to all member firms and do not provide for
these differences. The Task Force believes the peer review process needs to recognize that not all firms
are the same and adapt the peer review procedures accordingly. The peer reviews of larger, more
complex firms with extensive quality control systems and internal inspection programs3 should have
more frequent peer review involvement and eliminate redundancies with internal inspection programs.
Further, the Task Force believes the peer review process needs to place greater emphasis on
ascertaining auditor performance versus evaluating documentation to determine compliance with quality
control systems and professional standards.
Recommendations
3.

The PRC should make changes to the Standards for Performing and Reporting on Peer
Reviews for the following:
a. There should be a prescribed differentiation of the SECPS member firms, based on the
effectiveness and objectivity of the firms’ internal inspection programs. Tier A firms should
be those that do not have an internal inspection program that meets specifically defined

3

The larger, more complex firms have established extensive internal inspection programs. These programs are
designed to annually evaluate the adequacy of the firm’s quality control policies and procedures, its personnel’s
understanding of those policies and procedures, and the extent of its personnel’s compliance with them. The
inspection procedures performed are similar to those performed during tri-annual peer reviews. Such procedures
place significant emphasis on reviewing engagements performed by a cross section of the firm’s accounting and
auditing personnel.

criteria for a Tier B firm. Tier B firms should be those firms that have an effective internal
inspection program that meets specifically defined criteria. The effectiveness of a reviewed
firm’s internal inspection program should be determined by the peer reviewer. The PRC,
with the POB’s oversight, should concur with the classification of firms.
b. The peer reviews of Tier A firms should be systems and compliance oriented but place
greater emphasis on the reviews of engagements, while the peer reviews of Tier B firms
should involve reviews of engagements but place greater emphasis on systems and
compliance.
c. Tier B firms should be required to engage their peer reviewers to annually perform certain
limited review procedures, in addition to the peer review performed on a tri-annual basis.
The procedures performed by the peer reviewer on an annual basis should include: (1)
follow-up on actions taken by the reviewed firm in response to the letter of comments, if
any, and Summary Observations Memorandum from the most recent peer review, the
Recommendations Letter (described below), if any, from the most recent annual limited
procedures engagement, and the findings of the prior year internal inspection program; (2)
review the design of any significant changes in the reviewed firm’s system of quality control
for its accounting and auditing practice; (3) review changes to the firm’s policies and
procedures designed to implement significant new professional standards; (4) review the
plan for and results of the reviewed firm’s internal inspection program, including determining
whether it included consideration of emerging issues and higher-risk areas, and determine
whether the reviewed firm has taken appropriate actions with respect to any engagements
with material findings noted in the inspection program; and (5) if considered appropriate,
prepare a Recommendations Letter communicating to the reviewed firm any observations
and recommendations resulting from the limited procedures engagement. The
Recommendations Letter would be sent to the PRC for informational purposes. However, if
the peer reviewer determines that the firm has not taken appropriate actions with respect to
material findings, the peer reviewer should refer such circumstances to the PRC for further
consideration. Additionally, the POB should conduct oversight of the annual limited
procedures engagement.
d. The tri-annual peer review for Tier B firms should be integrated with the reviewed firm’s
internal inspection program in that year and focus on emerging issues and higher-risk areas,
while relying on the internal inspection program (with some testing by the peer reviewer) to
review routine and compliance areas. The reviewed firm’s internal inspection program
should become an integral part of the peer review in that the peer reviewer should review
and approve inspection review procedures, review materials and questionnaires, and office
and engagement selections made for the inspection program, and form joint teams of internal
inspectors and peer reviewers for certain reviewed offices. The objectives of this more
integrated involvement are to provide the peer reviewer with more direct, ongoing
knowledge of the effectiveness of the firm’s quality control systems and inspection program.
Also, if the internal inspection program is determined to be effective, this approach allows

the peer reviewer to perform less routine and compliance review procedures and focus
primary attention on the areas of higher-risk and emerging issues. For example, in some
instances, peer reviewers might review on a surprise basis only those portions of
engagements pertaining to emerging issues and higher-risk areas.
e. The review materials and questionnaires should be revised to generate more qualitative,
subjective, and judgmental considerations and findings by peer reviewers. The qualitative
considerations by the peer reviewer should include in-depth interviews of the engagement
team at all experience levels with respect to the approach taken in areas of higher-risk and
emerging issues to provide a basis for judgmentally evaluating whether the engagement team
possessed the necessary experience and appropriate information to adequately and timely
plan and perform the audit procedures. Peer reviewers also should conduct focus group
sessions with professional personnel at various levels in the organization in order to obtain
candid feedback regarding critical matters pertaining to the accounting and auditing practice.
The qualitative, subjective, and judgmental findings from these procedures should result in
observations and recommendations regarding best practices, constructive suggestions that
go beyond professional standards, and matters for the attention of standards setters to be
included in the Summary Observations Memorandum in addition to potential findings for the
letter of comments.
Governance and Oversight
Overview
The PRC is responsible for administering the SECPS peer review program by establishing standards for
conducting and reporting on the results of peer reviews. The PRC also works closely with the POB in
its oversight role. Although the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct does not specifically consider
relationships between reviewers, reviewed firms, and clients of reviewed firms, the concepts concerning
independence, integrity, and objectivity embodied in the Code are critically important to the peer review
program. Likewise, oversight of the peer review program by the POB, and the SEC, makes the process
both more effective and more credible.
The Task Force concluded that the overall structure for administering and overseeing the peer review
program is primarily sound. However, the Task Force believes the effectiveness of future peer reviews
would be improved with additional measures to promote peer reviewer independence and objectivity;
changes to current protocols among the PRC, POB, SEC, and peer reviewers; and with greater depth
in the POB’s oversight of the performance of peer reviews.
The Statements on Quality Control Standards (SQCS) issued by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB)
provide that firms have a system of quality control for their accounting and auditing practice and broadly
describes elements of quality control and other matters essential to the effective design, implementation,
and maintenance of the system. These standards, as well as generally accepted accounting, auditing, and
independence standards and SEC rules and regulations in areas where such rules and regulations are
pertinent, form the foundation of the systems oriented approach to conducting peer reviews. The Task

Force believes that one of the root causes of some recent criticisms of the peer review process relates
to the lack of specificity of the SQCS.
Recommendations
4.

The PRC should:
a.

4

Make changes to the Standards for Performing and Reporting on Peer Reviews for the
following:
i.

Limit the peer review team captains for the reviews of Tier B firms to two
consecutive reviews of the same firm and a total of three consecutive reviews as
an engagement team member4. The primary purpose for limiting the team
captain’s total years of service is to enhance the benefit of the fresh-look
obtained by rotating the peer review team captain.

ii.

Require that peer review team captains for the reviews of Tier B firms
participate in a meeting (exit conference) with the SEC staff and POB staff
when the SEC staff reviews the firm’s peer review working papers. The
purpose of such a meeting is to timely discuss significant matters considered by
the SEC staff during their oversight.

b.

Prepare an annual report for the profession, standard setters (such as the ASB and
FASB), regulators (such as the SEC), and others (such as the Professional Issues Task
Force and SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee) that describes significant matters
noted during peer reviews conducted during the year. Such report should highlight
matters noted in letters of comments, Summary Review Memoranda, and Summary
Observations Memoranda. The primary purpose of the annual report would be to
facilitate the timely identification of matters that require the attention of the profession,
standard setters, regulators, and others.

c.

Determine a more formal means of identifying emerging issues and higher-risk areas in a
timely manner, and providing frequent updates or supplements to the review materials
and questionnaires used to perform peer reviews. The PRC should regularly seek
formal input from the ASB, Professional Issues Task Force, SECPS Quality Control
Inquiry Committee, POB, SEC staff, and others as to emerging issues and higher-risk
areas that should receive focused attention by peer reviewers. The PRC, through a
standing committee, task force, SECPS staff or otherwise, should prepare revisions or
supplements to its review materials and questionnaires and timely distribute them to peer
reviewers. We understand the SECPS is in the process of developing a system for
including the review materials and questionnaires on the Internet. The Task Force

Team captains are currently limited to three consecutive reviews of the same firm with no limit on the total years of
service on the engagement team.

supports efforts to make these materials easier to keep current and more accessible to
peer reviewers.

5.

d.

Study the cost versus benefit of more frequent peer reviewer involvement for Tier A
firms in order to improve the effectiveness of the peer review process for these firms.
More frequent peer reviewer involvement might include limited review procedures
similar to those described in Recommendation 3 c for Tier B firms.

e.

Establish a more formal means for continuously pursuing better approaches to
performing peer reviews. Such means might include, for example, periodically
conducting focus group sessions with experienced peer reviewers and users of peer
review reports or having a limited number of experienced peer reviewers experiment
with different review techniques on some peer reviews.

The POB should:
a.

b.

Perform an in-depth review of its current approaches to overseeing the performance of
peer reviews with the goal of identifying ways of gaining more timely and deeper
involvement by the staff and Board. Guidelines for enhancing such approaches should
include the following:
i.

The nature, timing, and extent of the POB staff’s oversight role should vary
based on an assessment of such factors as size, complexity, and risk profile of
the firm’s accounting and auditing practice.

ii.

The POB staff’s oversight of the performance of peer reviews should be timely
and include the scope of the review, evaluation and resolution of issues
identified during the review, and communications of the results of the review.
The scope of the review includes consideration of the number of and specific
engagements and offices to be reviewed; the significant accounting, auditing, and
independence areas to be emphasized during the review; and the approach to
integrating the firm’s internal inspection program.

iii.

The POB staff’s oversight of the performance of peer reviews should be more
timely and extensive for Tier B firms. More timely involvement would include,
for example, increasing beyond its current level the oversight of the work of
peer reviewers as it is being performed rather than reviewing the work once it is
completed. More extensive involvement would include, for example,
participation with a peer reviewer in some interviews of audit engagement team
members and in focus group sessions with office personnel.

Consider establishing a process for obtaining additional expertise to assist the POB
staff, when necessary, in formulating the staff’s views on significant matters that

occasionally arise during the performance of peer reviews. The purpose of establishing
such a process would be to provide a means of drawing on experienced professionals
and subject matter experts to assist in evaluating matters where significant differences of
professional judgment exist between the peer reviewers, reviewed firm, and/or POB
staff.
6.

The Task Force understands the ASB is planning a project to improve the SQCS. The Task
Force believes that an expansion of the standards to include more specific guidance is an
important element to achieving continuous improvement and strongly supports the ASB’s
efforts.

Qualifications and Training of Reviewers
Overview
The Standards for Performing and Reporting on Peer Reviews describes the qualifications and training
requirements for peer reviewers. The Task Force believes the standards appropriately address the
essential requirements of the peer review team such as confidentiality; independence, integrity and
objectivity; competence; organization of the review team; and qualifications for individuals who serve as
reviewers and of the reviewing firm. However, the Task Force also believes that the current training
courses and approach to training peer review team captains and reviewers needs to be enhanced. There
are currently two courses offered by the AICPA to peer reviewers, How to Conduct a Peer Review
Under the AICPA Practice-Monitoring Programs (“How to Course”) and the Advanced Training
Course for Reviewers: Current Issues in Practice Monitoring (“Advanced Course”). Individuals who
want to participate as a team captain on a peer review are required to attend a training course at least
once every five years. The courses are developed by authors contracted with by the AICPA and are
offered through various State CPA societies.
Almost all peer reviews are firm-on-firm peer reviews. However, in a few instances, Committee
Appointed Review Teams (CARTs) are formed to perform the review. CARTs are typically formed for
reviews of small firms so that the review team has appropriate specialized skills. For example, a CART
may have a team captain from one firm and a reviewer from another firm in order to have a review team
member who is knowledgeable in a particular specialized industry. Currently, the PRC establishes the
fee schedule for CARTs. The Task Force believes a market driven fee arrangement between the CART
and the firm being reviewed would result in more qualified reviewers willing to participate on a CART.
Recommendations
7.

The PRC should:
a.

Establish a standing task force that will oversee the peer review training programs to
ensure that the training programs and methods of delivering them meet the needs of the
peer review program. The task force should address the following:

i.

The content and method of delivering peer review training courses to ensure that
the training is relevant and timely. To determine the content of training programs,
considerations should be given to the competencies required to perform
effective peer reviews. Such competencies would include interviewing skills,
diagnostic skills, knowledge of the peer review process, as well as, knowledge
of generally accepted accounting, auditing, and independence standards and
SEC rules and regulations in areas where such rules and regulations are
pertinent to the engagements being reviewed. Also, alternative training methods
should be considered such as via the Internet, CD-ROM, or tele-conferencing.

ii.

The process for identifying and selecting course instructors and for monitoring
the instructor’s performance should be formalized.

iii.

Consideration should be given to developing more continuous training programs
for team captains.

b.

Develop a system for evaluating the performance of team captains. Such a system might
include a written evaluation of the team captain’s performance by the SECPS technical
reviewer and, when applicable, POB staff for each peer review. The results of such
evaluations could then be summarized on a periodic basis to identify team captains who
are not performing at an acceptable level so that appropriate actions can be considered
by the PRC.

c.

Discontinue setting rates for peer reviews conducted by CARTs. Fees for participating
in a CART review should be established by the firm being reviewed and the members of
the review team.
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